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Substance and subtlety in the analysis of 1789:
the example of David D. Bien
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The central mission of the St Andrews Studies in French History and
Culture series is to make available research that is longer than a standard
article but shorter than a “normal” historical monograph, but an additional
part of our self-imposed remit is to make such research accessible. The
long essay presented in these pages was originally published in French in
two parts by Professor David Bien back in 1974 in the prestigious pages of
Annales E.S.C.. It has long been regretted by myself and Rafe Blaufarb
that this outstanding contribution to the history of the collapse of the
French absolute monarchy was only available to those with a good grasp
of French, so I hope that this new publication of an English-language
version, complete with additional thought-provoking contributions from
two of Professor Bien’s distinguished former students, will bring his
messages about the nature of intra-noble strife and competing ideas of
reform in the Enlightenment and the run-up to the Revolution to a much
wider readership, including undergraduates and masters students, for years
to come.
In only a very few places has the original article been added to – and only
for the sake of clarity for an Anglophone audience – or brought up to date.
This is principally the case for archival references, for, among other
considerations, some institutions have altered their names and cataloguing
systems since the early 1970s. This is notably the case with what is
currently called as the “Service Historique de la Défense”, known the
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1Preface
Rafe Blaufarb
Most histories of the French Revolution have emphasized non-noble
resentment of noble privilege as one of the principal elements stoking the
revolutionary conflagration. Numerous honorific distinctions, such as
coats-of-arms and sword-bearing, drew a visible line of demarcation
between nobles and their roturier (commoner) compatriots. Seigneurial
prerogatives, from exclusive hunting rights to the myriad of feudal
exactions in money, kind, and service, burdened the peasantry. The
nobility’s exemption from certain kinds of taxes, while progressively
diminished by Louis XIV and his successors, still angered those who paid,
especially following the tax increases precipitated by the costly wars of
the mid-eighteenth century. Finally, the nobility’s exclusive professional
privileges, which barred even non-noble elites from holding certain kinds
of offices, outraged the very men of talent, education, and wealth the
monarchy could ill afford to alienate. It was largely from their ranks that
the revolutionary leadership would be drawn and the post-revolutionary
notabilité composed.
Of the many exclusionary measures implemented during the
eighteenth century, none was more inflamatory than the infamous Ségur
règlement of 1781. Requiring those seeking officer commissions in the
military to provide documentary evidence of four generations of unbroken,
paternal noble descent, it was widely denounced in 1789 in the cahiers de
doléances of the Third Estate and played a critical role in generating mass
support for the ideal of individual meritocracy – incarnated by the phrase
“careers open to talent.” Given the centrality of the Ségur règlement to the
revolutionary attack on the nobility’s professional prerogatives, it is
understandable that historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
interpreted it in much the same way as contemporaries had – that is, as a
measure aimed at excluding roturiers from the officer corps. Until the
early 1970s, this view remained unquestioned.
In 1974, however, the French journal Annales: Economies,
Sociétés, Civilisations published an article by the American historian
David D. Bien – appearing here in English for the first time – challenging
2this universally-accepted interpretation.1 Starting with the insight that, had
the Ségur règlement been designed to exclude roturiers, simple proof of
noble status (rather than four-generations of noble ancestry) would have
provided a sufficient barrier, Bien offered a fundamental reinterpretation
of the measure. Rather than targeting roturiers, he demonstrated, the
regulation was directed against new nobles who had acquired their status
in the relatively recent past through the purchase of ennobling office. The
regulation thus offered evidence for substantial internal conflict within the
nobility between different kinds of nobles, he concluded, not for hostility
between the nobility and Third Estate. This finding weakened one of the
main pillars of traditional interpretations – Marxist and non-Marxist alike
– of 1789: the centrality of conflict between nobles and non-nobles to the
outbreak of the Revolution.
Bien’s work was greeted with enthusiasm, especially by the
influential French historian François Furet. Eager to attack Marxist
interpretations of the Revolution, which tended to emphasize conflict
between the revolutionary bourgeoisie and feudal aristocracy, Furet cited
an early, unpublished draft of Bien’s article in his own seminal 1971
essay, “Le catechisme de la Révolution française.”2 And it was Furet who
encouraged Bien to publish it in the Annales in 1974, where it appeared in
two parts because of its length. Indeed, it remains the longest article ever
published by that prestigious journal.
With its publication Bien’s article has been associated with what
became known in the 1970s as “revisionism”, with the publication of
important articles by Furet attacking the Marxist interpretation then
dominant in France. It is important to note, however, that Bien’s article
was not shaped by Furet’s argument for it already existed in a (shorter)
draft form in 1966, several years before Furet’s first blasts against Marxist
orthodoxy. Moreover, Bien’s target was not the same as Furet’s. While the
Marxist interpretation associated with the work of Lefebvre, Soboul, and
other members of the historical community around the French Revolution
chair at the Sorbonne had long been dominant in France, this had hardly
been the case in the Cold War United States. Rather, post-war American
scholarship on the French Revolution was framed by ideas about social
1 “La réaction aristocratique avant 1789: l’exemple de l'armée,” Annales: E.S.C.,
29 (1974), 23-48 & 505-34.
2 Furet came across the draft in 1967, while visiting Princeton. Bien had taught
there in the 1960s, before he took a position at the University of Michigan in Ann
Arbor.
3stratification that leading historians such as R.R. Palmer, Franklin Ford,
and Elinor Barber drew upon. It was this liberal orthodoxy, an orthodoxy
that treated the American Dream as a universal social truth, as well as
several features of Marxism, that Bien had sought to question in his
article.
In the wave of historiographical essays on “revisionism” that
began to appear in the 1970s, the intellectual filiation of Bien’s article was
generally overlooked. Listed as one of the seminal writings of that
movement, it was assumed that Bien’s main concern had been to take
issue with the Marxist orthodoxy and its emphasis on bourgeois-noble
class conflict. In raising serious doubts about one of the key pieces of
evidence for the existence of such conflict on the eve of the Revolution,
the Ségur règlement, Bien’s article did indeed provide potent support to
the revisionist offensive. But to consider only its destructive impact on the
Marxist orthodoxy risks overlooking the article’s broader contribution to
the understanding of early modern France – a contribution which
transcends the Marxist-revisionist debate and makes the article just as
valuable today as it was when first published 35 years ago. This consisted
in a penetrating analysis of the relationship between venality of ennobling
office, state finance, and noble identity. Bien would go on to develop his
thoughts in a series of influential articles published in the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s.3 But the key insights behind these pieces may be found in
embryo in his 1974 article, “La réaction aristocratique avant 1789:
l'exemple de l'armée”. By laying bare the inner workings of Old Regime
social mobility and carefully tracing their effects, it constitutes essential
3 Notably, “The secrétaires du roi: absolutism, corps, and privilege under the
ancien régime,” in A. Cremer (ed.), Vom ancien régime zur französischen
Revolution. Forschungen und Perspektiven (Göttingen, 1978), pp. 153-68; “The
Army in the French Enlightenment: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution,” Past and
Present 85 (1979), 68-98; “Offices, Corps, and a System of State Credit: the Uses
of Privilege under the Ancien Régime,” in Keith Michael Baker (ed.), The French
Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, vol.1, The Political
Culture of the Old Regime (Oxford, 1987), pp. 89-114; “Manufacturing Nobles:
the Chancelleries in France to 1789,” Journal of Modern History, 61 (1989), 445-
86; “Old Regime Origins of Democratic Liberty,” in Dale Van Kley (ed.), The
French Idea of Freedom: the Old Regime and the Declaration of Rights of 1789
(Stanford, 1994), pp. 23-71; and “Property in office under the ancien régime. The
case of the stockbrokers,” in John Brewer and Susan Staves (eds.), Early Modern
Conceptions of Property (London and New York, 1996), pp.481-94.
4reading for anyone seeking to understand the dynamics of this
superficially familiar, yet so alien, society.
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Substance and subtlety in the analysis of 1789:
the example of David D. Bien
Jay M. Smith
If there were an index that measured influence-exerted per word, David D.
Bien’s “La réaction aristocratique avant 1789: L’exemple de l’armée”
(hereafter, “La réaction aristocratique”) would rank high on a list of the
most influential historical scholarship of the last half-century. In the wide
field of ancien régime and Revolutionary French history, perhaps only
George V. Taylor’s methodical dissection of the myth of a rising and
capitalistic bourgeoisie, published in the American Historical Review in
1967, packed the same analytical punch, and with the same powerful
effect, as the Bien article of 1974.1 Within a decade after its appearance in
the French journal Annales, “La réaction aristocratique” had come to be
recognized as one of the foundation stones for the new interpretive edifice
that was then incorporating the most dynamic scholarly work on the
eighteenth century. In the introduction to her own influential 1984 book,
Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution, Lynn Hunt cited
Bien’s crucial analysis of recruitment and promotion in the army as one of
three essential studies – along with the article by Taylor and Guy
Chaussinand-Nogaret’s iconoclastic synthesis, The French Nobility in the
Eighteenth Century – that provided the empirical ammunition for the final
assault on the traditional “social interpretation” of the coming of the
French Revolution.2 After absorbing the lessons contained in these instant
1 George V. Taylor, “Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French
Revolution,” American Historical Review 72 (1967), 469-496; David D. Bien, “La
réaction aristocratique avant 1789: L’exemple de l’armée,” Annales E.S.C. 29
(1974), 23-48 & 505-534.
2 Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley,
1984), p. 5, n. 8; Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, La noblesse au XVIIIe siècle: de la
6classics, Hunt explained, no self-respecting specialist of the period could
blithely assert that the Revolution had been precipitated by the kind of
class frictions predicted by Marxist models and casually invoked as
explanatory devices by generations of historians.
Produced just as the great “revisionist” wave of the 1960s and
1970s was cresting, Bien’s contribution to the debate was immediately
hailed as one of the crowning achievements of scholarship carried out in
the revisionist vein. Assisted by a small team of graduate student
researchers, Bien had marshaled a wealth of evidence to buttress his
argument, and the Annales article delivered an empirical body blow to the
standing orthodoxy. The author’s friend and colleague François Furet,
who had solicited the piece for Annales, quickly recognized the value of
the evidence and argument contained in the Bien article, and he
incorporated its findings, as well as those of a related but unpublished
piece by Bien, into his pivotal work of 1978, Penser la Révolution
française. Bien’s incisive and counter-intuitive findings about the thought
and behavior of the nobility of the ancien régime informed Furet’s own
continuing attack on the so-called Marxist “catechism” of the Revolution’s
origins and meaning.3 Within just a few short years after its publication,
the wide ripple effects of the Bien article began to appear in scholarly
journals all across Europe and North America.4 Because of the great force
féodalité aux Lumières (Paris, 1976), tr. by William Doyle as The French Nobility
in the Eighteenth Century: from Feudalism to the Enlightenment (Cambridge,
1985). The first salvoes against the orthodox “social interpretation” had been fired
in the early 1960s, most notably in Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the
French Revolution (London, 1964).
3 Published in English as François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, tr. by
Elborg Forster (Cambridge, 1981), see especially p. 105.
4 See, for example, Richard L. Kagan, “Law Students and Legal Careers in
Eighteenth-Century France,” Past & Present 68 (1975), 38-72, especially 67; Rolf
Reichardt, “Bevölkerung und Gesellschaft Frankreichs im 18. Jahrhundert: Neue
Wege und Ergebnisse der Sozialhistorischen Forschung, 1950-1976,” Zeitschrift
für Historische Forschung 4 (1977), 154-221, especially 200; Carlo Capra, “La
nobiltà europea prima della Rivoluzione,” Studi Storici 18 (1977), 117-138,
especially 136; Joseph I. Shulim, “The Continuing Controversy over the Etiology
and Nature of the French Revolution,” Canadian Journal of History/Annales
canadiennes d’histoire 16 (1981), 357-378, especially 361; Melvin Edelstein, “La
noblesse et le monopole des fonctions publiques en 1789,” Annales Historiques de
la Révolution Française 54 (1982), 440-443, especially 442. Discussion of Bien’s
treatment of continuity and change even crept into an article devoted neither to
7of the revisionist tidal wave that had washed across the landscape by the
late 1970s, the Bien article quickly achieved canonical status – and an
enduring identity as one of the “relatively small range of classic texts” that
made up what Colin Jones would irreverently but accurately come to call
the “New Revisionist Orthodoxy.”5
Unfortunately, canonical works are more often cited than
discussed.6 That condition especially pertains to works published in
foreign languages. For that reason alone, the appearance of David D.
Bien’s “La réaction aristocratique” in the language of its original
composition provides cause for celebration. By making the article
France nor to the eighteenth century but rather to the philosophy of history: see
John D. Heyl, “Kuhn, Rostow, and Palmer: The Problem of Purposeful Change in
the Sixties,” The Historian 44 (1982), 299-313, especially 311.
5 Colin Jones, “Bourgeois Revolution Revivified: 1789 and Social Change,” in
Colin Lucas (ed.), Rewriting the French Revolution (Oxford, 1991), pp. 69-118,
especially n. 6.
6 The authors cited here certainly read “La réaction aristocratique” with care, but
over time the Annales article, along with its influential companion piece, “The
Army in the French Enlightenment: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution,” Past &
Present 85 (1979), 68-98, came to be invoked more than discussed. Their well-
known theses functioned as stand-ins for revisionism tout court. Among the many
works that have used Bien’s argument to capture and convey the new revisionist
paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s – sometimes as a shorthand reference, sometimes
with accompanying discussion – see the following: Antoine de Baecque, “Le
Discours Anti-Noble (1787-1792) aux origines d’un slogan: ‘Le peuple contre les
gross’,” Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine 36 (1989), 3-28, especially
10; John Bosher, The French Revolution (New York, 1988), p. 108; Jack
Goldstone, “Reinterpreting the French Revolution,” Theory and Society 13 (1984),
697-713, especially 699; William Doyle, Origins of the French Revolution
(Oxford, 1999), pp. 18-19; Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French
Revolution, ed. by Timothy Tackett, tr. by R. R. Palmer (Princeton, 2005), p. xxiv,
n. 20; Hudson Meadwell, “Exchange Relations between Lords and Peasants,”
Archives Européennes de Sociologie 28 (1987), 3-49, especially 16; John Markoff,
The Abolition of Feudalism: Peasants, Lords, and Legislators in the French
Revolution (University Park, Penn., 1996), pp. 166-167; Michael P. Fitzsimmons,
“New Light on the Aristocratic Reaction in France,” French History 10 (1996),
418-431, especially 418. In his Aristocracy and its Enemies in the Age of
Revolution (Oxford, 2009), William Doyle took one further step. Bien’s findings
have become such a part of the conventional wisdom about the society of the
ancien régime that Doyle could recite Bien’s argument without actually citing the
article. See his chapter on “Aristocracy Ascendant,” p. 13.
8available in English for the first time, this edition in the St Andrews
Studies in French History and Culture series offers the prospect of
introducing the text to large numbers of undergraduates and other
Anglophone readers who have long been prevented from savoring its
riches. Just as important, the occasion of the article’s re-publication offers
specialists of French history a perfect excuse to re-read a classic work
whose historiographical importance is widely acknowledged but now
generally taken for granted. To provide a framework for genuine
retrospective appreciation, and to help non-specialists get their bearings,
the last section of this introduction will give some rough indication of the
article’s powerful impact on scholarship devoted to the nobility, the army,
and social stratification over the past thirty-plus years. But to enhance
what already promises to be a pleasurable reading experience, and to
highlight one of the more under-appreciated ingredients that went into the
making of this scholarly monument, I shall begin by drawing attention to
the rhetorical mastery that characterizes this article from the first page to
the last.
The form of the article’s presentation added greatly to its
persuasive power. From the vantage point of the “post-revisionist” era of
the twenty-first century, decisively shaped by the “linguistic turn” in
Revolutionary scholarship, appreciative reconsideration of Bien’s writing
style – economical, modest, understated – enables a reassessment of the
legacy of revisionism itself. A proper introduction to the masterpiece thus
requires that attention be given to the language and structure of “La
réaction aristocratique.”
To make the reader receptive to his evidence and argument, in the
first section of his article Bien employed a simple rhetorical formula. He
sketched the broad outlines of the existing interpretive framework – the
standard social interpretation of the Revolution that emphasized class
conflict between a newly self-conscious bourgeoisie and a decadent but
powerful and grasping aristocracy – and he then posed a series of short but
fundamental questions about the accuracy of that framework. In the first
pages of the article Bien especially stressed the broad coherence and
plausibility of the traditional explanation for the coming of the Revolution.
As Bien recapped the narrative provided through the orthodox social
interpretation, its appeal to an intuitive logic concerning the rise and fall of
historical forces, and its ability to assimilate a wide variety of fragmented
and impressionistic evidence from the period, seemed to account both for
its durability and for the failure of previous historians to test its
assumptions against documented realities.
9The prevailing narrative of the time had a consistency and power
that made it easy to grasp and, better yet, morally appealing to inhabitants
of the modern world. An aristocracy put on the defensive by the
domineering Louis XIV in the later seventeenth century was said to have
rebounded in the eighteenth century by protecting its class interests
systematically and aggressively. While squeezing peasants harder on their
landed estates, nobles imposed formal or tacit genealogical requirements
that made offices in the magistracy, the church and the army the preserve
of the nobility. They also cleverly solidified their control over a royal
administration that Louis XIV had once staffed with financiers and
wealthy commoners. By the second half of the eighteenth century the new
social reality had become clear: “Everywhere the ubiquitous aristocrat
squeezed out roturiers [commoners].” When army reformers, in 1781,
restricted access to the officer corps to all who did not boast four
generations of nobility, they provided, according to the orthodox tradition
of interpretation, “the classic, archetypical case of the aristocratic
reaction.”
History’s pendulum inevitably swung back, however, and the
aristocratic reaction inspired a reaction of its own. All who had suffered
from the aristocrats’ single-minded efforts to achieve exclusive control
over positions of power, standing, and prestige “discovered a solidarity
among themselves in 1789.” The nobles’ coordinated move against the
interests of commoners provoked a backlash that mutated into a full-scale
revolution against privilege, one that finally led to the abolition of nobility
itself. “Thus had a unified, aggressive, and exclusivist aristocracy,
monopolizing all the places that mattered, prepared its own destruction.”
In his opening pages Bien highlighted the apparent intellectual
coherence of the traditional social interpretation of the Revolution and also
pointed the way toward the critique that was to come. He showed that the
traditional interpretation took for granted the existence of two bounded
social classes, both characterized by homogeneity of outlook. The
commoners who discovered “solidarity” on the eve of the Revolution
evidently found themselves in opposition to an aristocracy that defensively
protected the interests of its class. No matter their differences in wealth,
position, and status, nobles “were merged into a single, determined, and
assertive body,” and their behavior was said to reflect that underlying
social reality. As the 1780s drew to a close, two mutually hostile classes –
rendered in “the sociologists’ categories” as the aristocracy and the
bourgeoisie – marched ineluctably toward the conflict that would transfer
the reins of social and economic leadership to a triumphant middle class.
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Bien boldly set forth to challenge this orthodox view, but he
tucked his devastating statement of dissent within a set of deceptively
limited questions. Focusing on the army’s so-called Ségur règlement of
1781, that quintessential expression of the alleged aristocratic reaction of
the eighteenth century, Bien proposed to examine the evidence for the
motivations behind the ruling. “How should we understand the army’s
behavior?” Did the reformers who designed and implemented this
restrictive recruitment policy really act on the basis of their interests as
aristocrats? “In this crucial instance, does the supposed model of broad
class behavior fit the facts? Does it fit at all?” Readers would ultimately
discover answers to these questions in the article’s potent empirical
findings. To maximize their impact, however, Bien took care to present
himself as a capable and disinterested prospector who was leading the
reader into rich and unmined deposits of evidence. The modest
formulation of his basic query was seductive. Bien inspired confidence
because he described with admirable clarity the task at hand, he eschewed
polemics, and he signaled to the reader that he himself remained open to
discovery. The author merely wanted to know whether the behavior of
army reformers had been dictated by their class position as aristocrats.
“This is the problem that we shall want to consider as closely as possible.”
Throughout “La réaction aristocratique” Bien maintained this
appealingly straightforward critical approach – one defined by a
combination of painstaking analysis and inspiring intellectual modesty,
crystallized in lapidary prose. The evidence he compiled and assessed
would prove overwhelming, but he consistently projected a posture of wry
and relentless inquisitiveness, and he addressed the limitations of his
sources, and of the conclusions that were to be derived from them, at
regular intervals. Slowly but surely, however, the interlocking pieces of
his jigsaw puzzle yielded a composition with clear, unmistakable forms.
The traditional social interpretation had held that the army’s
tendency toward aristocratic exclusiveness grew steadily over the course
of the century. “Access for roturiers had once been much easier, it is
said.” Did the evidence really bear out that assumption? Records were
incomplete and discontinuous, and the scarcity of statistical evidence had
induced previous historians to generalize from individual cases whose
typicality was simply assumed rather than established. Methodical, patient
analysis of all available evidence would surely lead to more accurate
results. “The picture that can be pieced together from other sources is
quite suggestive.” Bien simulated the feel of a treasure hunt, and readers
found themselves happily following the expert in charge of the sensor.
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Typical was his introduction of a valuable and previously unconsulted
army personnel register: “For the mid-eighteenth century, another piece of
evidence, limited and uncertain though it is, helps a little.”
Deep into his detailed reconstruction of the social origins and
career paths of military officers across the eighteenth century, Bien issues
an interim report. “At this point, then, several things seem certain.”
Specifically, he had found that the officer corps, contrary to conventional
wisdom, had been overwhelmingly noble throughout the entire period
under consideration. Commoners made up no more than about five percent
of the total number of officers throughout the eighteenth century. The
army’s Ségur règlement, then, could not have been aimed at commoners,
who had never been present in large numbers. An understanding of the
motivations that fueled the restrictive reforms of 1781 clearly required a
wider consideration of the cultural currents and social tensions specific to
the last decades of the ancien régime.
The details of Bien’s perceptive and imaginative reading of the
qualitative sources surrounding the deliberations that led to the Ségur
reform need not be shared here. The careful construction of his elegant
argument should be experienced rather than recapped. Suffice it to say that
Bien argued persuasively that the reforming noblemen of the officer corps
had especially taken aim at other nobles – nobles of recent vintage who,
because of their family backgrounds and the professional and social
milieus from which they emerged, seemed unsuited to military life. The
presence of these undesirables had been increasing, and their soft and
dilettantish character seemed inconsistent with the professional needs of
the corps. Whatever its impact on public opinion, or later interpretations of
the ancien régime, the Ségur règlement mainly expressed a deepening rift
within the nobility itself. The reform favored nobles with longer
genealogies over those of recent lineage, and its purpose was to build and
perpetuate a culture of military professionalism that reformers linked,
rightly or wrongly, to family traditions. “The army, wanting to close itself
off, thought that it could reform only by becoming more self-perpetuating,
internally regulated, corporatist.”
The social origins of the Ségur règlement thus pointed strongly
toward the heterogeneity, rather than the homogeneity, of the eighteenth-
century nobility. Far from being united in an uncomplicated aristocratic
outlook rooted in common experiences, the various sectors of the nobility
eyed one another with suspicion and scorn. “Below the top-most levels
association in a common point of view did not come automatically or
easily to nobles before 1789.” The implications of Bien’s analysis for the
12
reigning social interpretation of the Revolution were clear. If the Ségur
règlement had indeed represented the “classic” form of aristocratic
thought and intention on the eve of the Revolution, historians’ narrative of
Revolutionary origins should not place emphasis on simmering animosity
between a declining nobility and an emergent bourgeoisie. Specialists of
the period would need to widen their analytical frame if they wished to
understand and explain the conflicts that precipitated revolutionary
changes in French social structure.
Bien’s evidence was powerful, and his judicious assessment of
that evidence lent great authority to his findings, which Furet and others
quickly added to an arsenal designed to obliterate the twin bogeys of class
and class conflict. But “La réaction aristocratique,” despite its status as a
canonical “revisionist” text, should be remembered for something all too
easily forgotten in the wake of the historiographical polemics of the 1970s
and 1980s, namely, its author’s resistance to doctrinaire pronouncements
of any kind. Humility, openness to differing points of view, and an
ingratiating intellectual generosity defined Bien’s article right through to
its final conclusions. Note the tone with which he opened his report of the
meaning of his findings: “It would be a mistake to over-state conclusions,
and my thoughts are tentative…. Nonetheless, several suggestions for
ways of thinking about problems of development before and in the French
Revolution come to mind.” In this article, as in so much of his published
work, Bien proposed “ways of thinking about problems,” new routes of
inquiry that, however fresh and fruitful, always remained susceptible to
further refinement as “more and other kinds of evidence” came to light.
Bien and his “La réaction aristocratique” in fact represented a
variant of French Revolutionary “revisionism” that was fated to be
subsumed under and effaced by the “New Revisionist Orthodoxy” later
cited by Jones. Bien saw no urgent need to expunge class from historians’
critical vocabulary, nor did he wish to consign to the trash heap the
venerable interpretive tradition with which he found fault. His concluding
remarks showed an admirable spirit of conciliation. “It is surely not true to
say that there was no bourgeoisie, or that the categories of roturier and
noble did not matter. Of course they did, and in many of the ways that
have long been assumed.” Bien simply recognized that the evidence
reflecting social identity under the ancien régime was complex and multi-
layered, and that proper interpretation of that evidence demanded a
subtlety of perception, a sensitivity to context, and a mistrust of certitude
that the pre-packaged categories of aristocracy and bourgeoisie ruled out
by definition. Bien’s own reading of the Ségur règlement and the context
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surrounding it indicated that divisions between occupations – the lines that
separated the emerging “professions” – mattered as much or more to the
military nobles of pre-Revolutionary France than the legal divisions of
estate or class. “Both things, of course, were real: broad divisions of
wealth, legal status, and privilege, the background of class conflict, also
mattered. But if, in the effort to understand development from at least the
mid-eighteenth century, we combine too frequently, too soon, and too
continuously the occupational categories into the larger ones of class, we
are likely to distort the historical process.”
Bien’s call for greater subtlety of analysis, and for interpretations
more faithful to the historical process, did not entail the preemptive
exclusion of terms and concepts that might enable the historian to make
sense of the past as it had been experienced. For Bien such closing down
of analytical possibilities would have been unimaginable. Class,
bourgeoisie, economic base: he could certainly imagine scenarios in which
these and related notions would illuminate historical realities, so long as
the evidence yielded the category and not the other way around. Bien
would certainly never have thought to repudiate “social” interpretation in
favor of “political” interpretation, or vice versa. His credo was really quite
simple, and applicable to all genres of analysis: reject the many
temptations of teleology. (“[It] is always too easy to apply categories for
analysis taken from one period to others where they do not fit.”) Indeed,
his aversion to teleological readings of historical evidence would
eventually lead him to criticize Furet’s famed rendition of the origins of
the Reign of Terror.7 The Furetian interpretation of the Revolution’s
course had grown from a focus on politics and discourse that had proven
to be as inflexible, and as insensitive to the complexities of context, as
Marxists’ former focus on class and class conflict. Rigidity was always
unhelpful, whatever the circumstances of its application.
To understand the lasting influence of “La réaction
aristocratique,” then, one needs to recall the form, and not only the
empirical content, of the great article. The Bien piece shook to its
foundations an orthodox interpretation of the social origins of the French
Revolution, and it thereby shaped a generation of scholarship on the
nobility, the military, and the social structure of the ancien régime. But for
historians of the eighteenth century, the article remains vital and powerful
7 David D. Bien, “François Furet, the Terror, and 1789,” French Historical Studies
16 (1990), 777-783.
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– even in spite of the fading relevance of once-heated debates over the
social origins of the Revolution. The lasting power of “La réaction
aristocratique” owes less to its association with a form of revisionist
dogma, with which Bien himself was never entirely comfortable, than to
the infinitely expandable method of inquiry it modeled.8 That method,
based on an instinctive suspicion of overarching narratives and an
exquisite appreciation for what historical subjects actually meant to say
through their words and deeds, proved to be eminently transposable to
other problems. Bien’s method, instead of leading to door-closing
answers, endlessly turned up new questions.9 Historians of France have
been inspired by the fruitful simplicity of Bien’s relentless questioning for
thirty years and more.10
8 I once heard him say, with only a slight hint of irritation: “People talk about
‘revisionism.’ I’ve never known what that is.”
9 At a 1997 symposium in Bien’s honor, held in Ann Arbor, this basic point was
made with more panache by Dale K. Van Kley: “A Word of Appreciation on the
Occasion of his Retirement for David D. Bien. By an informal Student, a Neighbor
in Michigan, a professional Colleague, and above all a Friend.” My thanks to
Professor Van Kley for allowing me to paraphrase his paper.
10 Bien’s work on the army – and his perception of older nobles’ resentment of
newer nobles within that institution – soon led him to examine more closely the
phenomenon of venality of office (a practice that facilitated the creation of new
nobles). Recognizing its broad implications for the social order, and for the system
of state finance of which it became such a vital part, Bien opened new avenues of
inquiry into the connections between credit operations, the culture of corporate
institutions, and the process of political change in the eighteenth century. This
distinct and important tradition of analysis, which added much fuel for the
revisionist focus on “politics” in the 1980s and 1990s, was also informed by the
conclusions Bien reached in “La réaction aristocratique.” See, for example, David
D. Bien, “Offices, Corps, and a System of State Credit: the Uses of Privilege under
the Ancien Régime,” in Keith Michael Baker (ed.), The French Revolution and the
Creation of Modern Political Culture, vol. 1, The Political Culture of the Old
Regime (Oxford, 1987), pp. 89-114; and “Manufacturing Nobles: the Chancelleries
in France to 1789,” Journal of Modern History 61 (1989), 445-486; Gail
Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and Revolution in Lille
(Cambridge, 1991); Michael Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in
Eighteenth-Century France: Liberté, Egalité, Fiscalité (Cambridge, 2000). Bien’s
recognition of the key importance of “profession” as an organizing concept and
marker of identity has not had quite the impact that it should have had, but recent
examinations of the problematic category of the “bourgeoisie” have stressed the
rising importance of professional consciousness in the eighteenth century. See both
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Within the subfield of French military history, Bien’s findings
about the social origins of officers and the recruitment patterns that
governed entry and promotion in the ranks of infantry, cavalry, and
dragoon regiments have gone essentially unchallenged, even if some
would still prefer to describe the army’s restrictive impulses as
inescapably “aristocratic” in nature.11 Bien’s questions continue to find
new permutations, however, in the now considerable body of literature
devoted to military institutions and the underlying assumptions and
mechanisms central to their operation. By taking seriously the eighteenth
century’s military reformers, and by revealing some of the unexpected and
intriguingly complex ideas that guided their actions, Bien helped to
establish “a ‘new,’ socially oriented military history for eighteenth-century
France,” a scholarly agenda that has also made an impact on research in
adjoining fields.12
The work of the French army’s reforming commissions has
continued to attract interest, and the resonance of the subject provides
perhaps the most obvious sign of the lingering influence of “La réaction
aristocratique.” In articles that connect the work of Ségur’s committee in
Sarah Maza, The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the Social
Imaginary (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); and Christine Adams, A Taste for Comfort
and Status: A Bourgeois Family in Eighteenth-Century France (University Park,
Pa., 2000).
11 In the magisterial anthology Histoire Militaire de la France, Jean Chagniot cited
Bien’s article in his essay on the relationship between the army and society at the
end of the ancien régime, and he even echoed several of Bien’s themes –
Enlightenment’s steady infiltration of the officer corps, the building concern for
professionalization. But he still thought it appropriate to claim that “under Louis
XVI, the aristocratic reaction was unleashed in the army.” See Chagniot, “Les
rapports entre l’armée et la société à la fin de l’Ancien Régime,” in Jean Delmas
(ed.), Histoire Militaire de la France: De 1715 à 1871 (Paris, 1992), pp. 103-128,
especially p. 118. For a more recent account of pre-Revolutionary political culture
that situates the movement for military reform within the broad and messy
parameters of a noble prise de conscience, see Jay M. Smith, Nobility Reimagined:
the Patriotic Nation in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005), especially
pp. 193-221.
12 Michael Hochedlinger, “Mars Ennobled: the Ascent of the Military and the
Creation of a Military Nobility in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Austria,” German
History 17 (1999), 141-176, especially 141. Hochedlinger specifically cites Bien
as the exemplary figure behind the “new” history in France. Also see, for example,
Anna Maria Rao, “Esercito e società a Napoli nelle riforme del secondo
Settecento” Studi Storici 28 (1987), 623-677.
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1781 to that of both predecessors and successors in the 1780s, Rafe
Blaufarb and Christophe Dehaudt have demonstrated a consistency of
personnel, ideas, and objectives across the reformist era of the 1780s,
effectively reaffirming Bien’s argument about the fundamental
professionalism of the men behind the Ségur règlement.13 The impact of
Bien’s analysis of the army’s exclusiveness is also evident, in more
indirect ways, in the broad field of what might be called the cultural
history of military institutions. To understand motivations and intentions,
historians of the period have worked to penetrate the attitudes and
mentalities of soldiers and officers, as well as the social and institutional
worlds they inhabited. This work has generally proceeded from the
assumption, made axiomatic by Bien, that in order to understand the
thinking of historical actors, one must begin by taking seriously what they
actually had to say, even if the logic of their arguments is less than
transparent to the historian’s critical eye.
This appreciative and open-minded engagement with the sources
has proven to be especially fruitful in analyses of the forms of self-
representation typical of army officers. The concept of merit – that is, the
bundle of terms through which individuals and their superiors define,
understand, and represent “deservedness” for position – had always been
central to processes of appointment and promotion, but the subject had
rarely been explored critically before Bien set the example with his
pathbreaking articles of the late 1960s and 1970s.14 The mysteries behind
the meanings and mechanisms of merit inspired not one but three
dissertations in French history in the 1990s, and the subject continues to
generate new questions.15 Recent work on the military has explored from a
13 Christophe Dehaudt, “Le Comité de la Guerre (1781-1784): une institution
méconnue de la fin d’Ancien Régime,” Revue Historique 302 (2000), 869-894;
Rafe Blaufarb, “Le Conseil de la Guerre (1787-1789): aspects sociaux de la
réforme militaire après l’édit de Ségur,” Revue d’Histoire Moderne et
Contemporaine 43 (1996), 446-463.
14 The Annales article was the centerpiece of a sort of trilogy on military culture
that included “The Army in the French Enlightenment;” and “Military Education
in Eighteenth-Century France: Technical and Non-Technical Determinants,” in
Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek (ed.s), Science, Technology, and
Warfare (Washington, D.C., 1969), pp. 51-59.
15 Jay Michael Smith, “The Culture of Merit in Old Regime France: Royal Service
and the ‘Old’ Nobility, 1600-1789” (unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of
Michigan, 1990); Rafe Blaufarb, “Aristocratic Professionalism in the Age of
Democratic Revolution: The French Officer Corps, 1750-1815” (unpublished
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variety of angles the qualities that seem to have been cultivated,
demanded, desired, or rewarded by military institutions from the end of
the reign of Louis XIV through the Napoleonic wars. Three stimulating
articles on this subject – all inspired directly or indirectly by the work of
Bien, and all produced by young scholars who have creatively searched
for gold in the rich veins he first prospected – recently appeared within
months of each other.16 Each of the authors took for granted the army’s
immersion in wider currents of thought and social criticism in the
eighteenth century, and they all showed reformers engaging and
appropriating ideas and concepts that gained new or revived importance in
the culture of the Enlightenment. By breaking down analytical
dichotomies that once consigned the aristocracy and its institutions to the
“traditional” or “declining” side of the historical register, these historians
of military values have helped to place the military back at the center of
historical inquiry for the ancien régime and Revolutionary eras. More
important, they have burnished one of the most important legacies of the
Bien article: the instinctive rejection of teleology.
The value of Bien’s lessons has extended well beyond the
concerns of military historians per se, however. Beginning in the 1970s,
Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1996); Nira I. Kaplan, “A Changing Culture
of Merit: French Competitive Examinations and the Politics of Selection, 1750-
1820” (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1999). Two of these
dissertations were later revised for publication: Smith, The Culture of Merit:
Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France (Ann
Arbor, 1996); Blaufarb, The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit
(Manchester, 2002). For some of the widening reverberations see Ken Alder,
Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815
(Princeton, 1997); and John Carson, The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence,
and Inequality in the French and American Republics, 1750-1940 (Princeton,
2007).
16 Valeria Pansini, “Pour une histoire concrète du talent: les sélections
méritocratiques et le coup d’oeil du topographe,” Annales Historiques de la
Révolution Française 354 (2008), 5-27; Julia Osman, “Ancient Warriors on
Modern Soil: French Military Reform and American Military Images in
Eighteenth-Century France,” French History 22 (2008), 175-196; Christy
Pichichero, “Le soldat sensible: Military Psychology and Social Egalitarianism in
the French Army,” French Historical Studies 31 (2008), 553-580. See also David
C. O’Brien, “Traditional Virtues, Feudal Ties, and Royal Guards: the Culture of
Service in the Eighteenth-Century Maison Militaire du Roi,” French History 17
(2003), 19-47.
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and continuing for a generation, historians of early modern France from
the period of the Wars of Religion through the High Enlightenment
undertook a thorough reevaluation of received wisdom about the nobility
as an institution. On this broad subject, too, a traditional thesis about a
declining and crisis-ridden aristocracy had produced careless
generalizations and an overly teleological portrait of an ascendant power,
the absolutist state, in contrast to which the once-powerful feudal nobility
necessarily looked weak, reactive, and parasitical. The methodical
empirical research and counter-intuitive hypothesizing that had marked
French Revolutionary “revisionism” from the late 1960s carried over into
the work of the revisionist historians of French absolutism, and Bien’s “La
réaction aristocratique” (as well as Robert Forster’s The Nobility of
Toulouse in the Eighteenth Century) proved to be an inspiring example to
students of nobility in all periods.17
The wealth of scholarship on nobility that owes an intellectual
debt to Bien’s research is impressive. Ralph Giesey and Samuel Gibiat on
inheritance and patterns of mobility; Robert Descimon, Ellery Schalk and
Valérie Piétri on genealogy, legal proofs, and the evolution of noble
identity; Mark Motley on the education of courtiers; Harold Ellis on the
ideology of the “reactionary” political theorist Boulainvilliers; Michel
Figeac on the plural nobilities of Aquitaine; John Shovlin on nobility and
its role in political economy; Mathieu Maraud on the social and cultural
“permeability” of the Parisian nobility; Jonathan Dewald and Robert
Schwartz on the evolving practice of lordship: all have drawn upon Bien’s
work and have carried forward his against-the-grain critical instincts while
producing a greatly revised picture of the early modern French
aristocracy.18 The nobility that has emerged from this decades-long
17 Robert Forster, The Nobility of Toulouse in the Eighteenth Century (Baltimore,
1960).
18 Ralph Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in
Prerevolutionary France,” American Historical Review 82 (1977), 271-289;
Samuel Gibiat, Hiérarchies sociales et ennoblissement: les commissaires des
guerres de la Maison du Roi au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 2006); Robert Descimon,
“Elites parisiennes entre XVe et XVIIe siècle: Du bon usage du Cabinet des
Titres,” Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des Chartes 155 (1997), 607-644; and “The Birth
of the Nobility of the Robe: Dignity versus Privilege in the Parlement of Paris,
1500-1700,” in Michael Wolfe (ed.), Changing Identities in Early Modern France
(Durham, N.C., 1997), pp. 95-123; Ellery Schalk, From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas
of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Princeton, 1985);
Valérie Piétri, “Bonne renommée ou actes authentiques: la noblesse doit faire ses
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process of reconsideration has the look of a resilient and adaptable but
diverse and contentious social group, fully attuned to the world around it
and navigating through sea changes with the skill and confidence one
would expect of a thriving elite. Far from resisting change reflexively out
of fear, nobles embraced ideas, practices, and reforms that enabled them to
retain or reclaim social and political preeminence even as history’s ground
shifted beneath their feet. Jonathan Dewald even provocatively anointed
the noblesse as the originators of modernity itself.19
David D. Bien helped to topple an entrenched orthodoxy, and the
impact he made within the raging historiographical debates of the 1970s
largely explains the wide and lasting renown of “La réaction
aristocratique.” But among historians of aristocracies, elites, and nobilities
– and not only those of France – the critical perspectives deployed in his
pivotal Annales article continue to resonate.20 Bien’s article established a
bridge between social and cultural history by putting into practice an
unpretentious but powerful mode of analysis, one that has aged
exceptionally well. Bien never presented himself as a methodological
trend-setter, and he would have refused to be boxed in had anyone tried to
preuves (Provence, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles),” Genèses 74 (2009), 5-24; Mark
Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat: the Education of the Court Nobility, 1580-
1715 (Princeton, 1990); Harold A. Ellis, Boulainvilliers and the French
Monarchy: Aristocratic Politics in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, N. Y.,
1988); Michel Figeac, L’Automne des gentilshommes: noblesse d’Aquitaine,
noblesse française au siècle des Lumières (Paris, 2002); John Shovlin, “Toward a
Reinterpretation of Revolutionary Anti-Nobilism: the Political Economy of Honor
in the Old Regime,” Journal of Modern History 72 (2000), 35-66; Mathieu
Maraud, La noblesse de Paris au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 2000); Jonathan Dewald,
Pont-St-Pierre, 1398-1789: Lordship, Community, and Capitalism in Early
Modern France (Berkeley, 1987); Robert M. Schwartz, “The Noble Profession of
Seigneur in Eighteenth-Century Burgundy,” in Jay M. Smith (ed.), The French
Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: Reassessments and New Approaches
(University Park, Penn., 2006), pp. 77-109. To this list could be added my own
work on the development of a distinctly aristocratic patriotism between the 1680s
and 1740s (see Smith, Nobility Reimagined) as well as most of the essays in the
recent edited volume, The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century.
19 Jonathan Dewald, Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of Modern Culture:
France, 1570-1715 (Berkeley, 1993).
20 Although he does not cite “La réaction aristocratique” or any specific
publications by Bien, Dror Wahrman – to give one example – sought Bien’s input
for his Imagining the Middle Class: the Political Representation of Class in
Britain, c. 1780-1840 (Cambridge, 1995).
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apply a label to his method. To his way of thinking, his approach to
sources and problems had all the theoretical sophistication of common
sense. Nevertheless, in his attention to “the native’s point of view,” his
sensitivity to the relationship between individual actors and the reigning
structures that condition their thoughts and actions, and his inclination to
see worldviews as complicated codes in need of dissecting, he clearly
anticipated both the “new cultural history” and the application of
Geertzian thick description to historical analysis.21 Working within a
framework (or problématique) recognizable to all social historians of the
1960s and 1970s, he experimented with techniques that would become
dominant in the 1980s and still remain at the forefront of the historical
discipline to this day.
He might be offended by the idea, but glimmerings of a vaguely
post-structuralist sensibility are not hard to discern in Bien’s subversive
analysis from 1974. The word “deconstruction” carries critical
connotations that Bien himself would almost certainly resist. One can
imagine him asking: must hidden contradictions always trump coherence?
And can discourse never say what it seems to say? Any term that
potentially leads to the prejudging of evidence is unlikely to find favor
with the historian who began his career immersed in the eighteenth-
century experience of religious persecution.22 Still, the deconstructionist
impulses that lie behind historians’ new attention to the problem of
“identity” – impulses ubiquitous in recent work on nobles and other elites
– clearly include “La réaction aristocratique” in their intellectual ancestry.
The desire to access subjectivity, the focus on the multiple sources of
selfhood, the awareness of the relational nature of identity formation, the
close attention to the meanings of key words in a social vocabulary, the
distrust of ascribed categories: these were all present and well developed
in Bien’s trailblazing essay. In his close and sensitive analysis of military
thought and practice in the eighteenth century, Bien pioneered “ways of
thinking about problems” that would long outlive the specific debates that
“La réaction aristocratique” happened to engage. Packed inside the
21 Clifford Geertz, “‘From the Native’s Point of View’: On the Nature of
Anthropological Understanding,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences 28 (1974), 26-45.
22 In addition to The Calas Affair (Princeton, 1960), see “Religious Persecution in
the French Enlightenment,” Church History 30 (1961), 325-333; “Catholic
Magistrates and Protestant Marriage in the French Enlightenment,” French
Historical Studies 2 (1962), 409-429.
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disarming plain-spokenness of the article’s presentation lay an innovative
methodology used with penetrating intelligence and sensible restraint.
Fertile insights, when combined with a portable model of
analysis, produce timeless scholarship. The everlasting value of the
argument and style of “La réaction aristocratique” befits the rare openness
of mind and intellectual generosity consistently displayed by its author,
who is no doubt pleased to see conversation continue. Bien’s article
helped to open new perspectives on the origins of the French Revolution,
the history of the nobility, the relationship between ideas and social
structure, the surprising vitality of corporate institutions under the ancien
régime, and the meaning and importance of “profession” in the eighteenth
century. Its introduction to a new generation of Anglophone readers
insures that the critical explorations it launched will continue to find new
and unexpected avenues in the years to come.
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This study is the expansion of a paper prepared first in 1966 for the
criticism of a working group of historians from various eastern American
universities, specializing in the study of aristocracies. The time to
assemble the additional scattered data and to write the initial version of
this article during the academic year 1972-73 was provided by the Institute
for Advanced Study, Princeton, with the support of the National
Endowment for the Humanities (Grant H5426), and by the Hudson
Research Professorship of the University of Michigan. The research in
France has been supported by grants from the Rackham School of
Graduate Studies of the University of Michigan, the National Endowment
for the Humanities, S.S.R.C., and A.C.L.S.. I received helpful criticism
and observations from the Institute’s social science seminar, directed by
Carl Kaysen, and from my colleagues at Michigan, John Bowditch and
John Shy. I have found stimulation in the researches on close, related
topics for their undergraduate or M.A. theses by former students: Lutz
Berkner, Lenard Berlanstein, Stephan Fishelman, Marcia Dildine Young.
At various times research assistants helped enormously; they are Jacques
Chevalier, Mme. Bernard Favre, Sharon Hilt Lasker, Charles Mathews,
Elizabeth Muenger, Robert M. Schwartz, Judith Silver, and Ann
Tenenbaum Toohey. In France the late François Furet solicited and
introduced this with other papers that appeared in the Annales E.S.C.,
under the heading “Ancien Régime et Révolution: Réinterpretations,” in
1974. Two long-standing friends, André Burguière (then Secrétaire de la
Rédaction of the Annales) and Olivier Zunz (at the time a member of the
Society of Fellows at the University of Michigan), were indispensable in
ways each knows in turning a very long paper into print. I thank them all.
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I The closing of the French nobility
and the Ségur law
If the “causes” of the French Revolution continue to evoke lively
discussion and dispute, one cause that many historians can accept is that a
new aggressiveness by the nobility in the decades before 1789 contributed
heavily to that great event. Some who wish to see the Revolution as
“bourgeois” call the aristocratic reaction that preceded it “feudal”; others
who define the Revolution as essentially “democratic” stress matters of
law, politics, and citizenship, but they too find a prior “aristocratic
resurgence.” Approaches vary, and there are real and interesting
differences on many questions concerning the nobility. But at one point
they come together: an increasingly activist nobility took the offensive
before 1789 to protect their ideas and interests, and in so doing that class
helped to generate the forces that overturned it. Whether squeezing
peasants locally, or operating nationally behind a façade of constitutional
argument, sometimes turning the high-sounding vocabulary of the
Enlightenment against the state, nobles were concerned to defend both
themselves and the whole hierarchical legal and social order that
guaranteed their own preeminence and material position. However much
they might differ in wealth and functions, grands seigneurs and
hobereaux, robe and sword, nearly all shared a common point of view in
opposition to other groups and were merged into a single, determined, and
assertive body. Some historians would say that the defense of seigneurial
rights was essential in holding together the nobility; others might find that
tax exemptions or the privileges of aristocratic corporations mattered
more. But for most, it is the privileges and interests that united nobles,
more than the lesser ones that divided them, that seem controlling and
operative in the background of revolution.1
1 In French the writings are too numerous to specify, but the names of Georges
Lefebvre and Albert Soboul are of course very important. In English the best and
fullest statements of the legal, institutional, and constitutional developments in
social context are Franklin L. Ford, Robe and Sword: the Regrouping of the
French Aristocracy after Louis XIV (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); R. R. Palmer, The
Age of the Democratic Revolution: a Political History of Europe and America,
1760-1800, vol. 1 The Challenge (Princeton, 1959).
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In this view of things, a second, closely related development is
often thought really a particular expression of the first: the resurgent and
aggressive nobles began systematically to exclude from positions of power
and prestige in state and church the non-nobles, or roturiers. A numerous
and threatened nobility, undermined earlier in its political and economic
interests by Louis XIV’s centralizing state, would take no more chances.
Increasingly, to defend themselves, they infiltrated all the important places
in the controlling institutions. The power vacuum after the Grand
Monarch’s death made easy their invasion. On the one hand, they
entrenched themselves in institutions that could speak for them
individually and collectively, especially the parlements and the provincial
estates. And, on the other hand, they also moved into the central royal
administration, and thereby sapped the strength of the one body that had
once been dedicated to a policy of cutting down or even destroying their
privileges. A Machault, Maupeou, Turgot, or Calonne might try to attack
or to transform aristocratic and corporatist institutions, but their efforts
were episodic, brief, and ineffective. Revived and modernized aristocratic
ideas in support of the traditional hierarchical order were closely linked to
a narrowly aristocratic recruitment of personnel for important institutions.
Historians have increasingly drawn on the sociologists’
categories for understanding social stratification and the significance of
rapid or slow movement by individuals within the system, and in this
instance they could refer to impressive literary evidence for important
change during the eighteenth century. Toward 1700 it had seemingly been
easy for new men of little birth but much wealth to move into positions of
importance and high social rank. For the duc de Saint-Simon the age of
Louis XIV was “the long reign of the vile bourgeoisie!” La Bruyère and
others agreed. But by 1789 the situation was apparently reversed, for then
and later many observers remembered and remarked on the narrow
exclusivism of aristocrats who were blocking the access of those same
bourgeois to the positions of power and prestige. The traditional elite
evidently shut itself off from receiving new blood. In the army officer
corps, sovereign courts, high royal administration, episcopacy, nobles
closed ranks to keep out the parvenu. Everywhere the ubiquitous aristocrat
squeezed out roturiers.
Bracketed in this way, the eighteenth century may be seen to have
prepared the whole overturn in the political, social, and legal order. The
awesome and bitter struggles of the French Revolution at the upper levels
in society were between the insiders and outsiders, the established and the
excluded. Insiders were sons of nobles who filled their places because
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their fathers had done so, and because the law and custom recognized birth
alone as the source of rights and privileges. Outsiders were non-nobles,
men of experience and talent who had everything that was needed to rise
and to perform well in social and political functions. All that those who
were left out lacked was the proper noble ancestry. Excluded by the
accident of birth alone, frustrated in their personal hopes and angry, they
discovered a solidarity among themselves in 1789. The massive
revolutionary struggle generated a heat in which was forged a new order
where all men were legally equal as citizens. Now birth was irrelevant,
and no one could be kept from the place to which his talents gave him a
right. Thus had a unified, aggressive, and exclusivist aristocracy,
monopolizing all the places that mattered, prepared its own destruction.2
The landmarks along the road to democratic revolution were
many, but among them the so-called Ségur “law” was perhaps the most
notorious. This was the regulation that from 1781 governed the entry of
officers into the army. The maréchal de Ségur, then Minister of War, set
his name to the famous, or infamous, restriction that appeared to close off
forever access to officerships by talented and ambitious roturiers. By its
2 The argument about growing noble exclusivism is as old as the Revolution itself,
but it became prominent again in recent decades. In the United States Elinor G.
Barber, trained in sociology as well as history, applied sociologists’ categories of
social stratification in a very interesting book, The Bourgeoisie in 18th century
France (Princeton, 1955). The argument that social mobility slowed importantly
late in the century has a place in the books by Ford and Palmer. In the United
States where a tradition expressed in the saying, “three generations from
shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves,” approves mobility by individuals, there has been a
lively interest in the problem. In France, François Bluche, Roland Mousnier and
others mentioned below worked on aspects of the question. For the state of the
question today [1974], see the articles by François Furet, “Le catéchisme de la
Révolution française,” Annales E.S.C. 26 (1971), especially 272-76 ; and by Guy
Lemarchand, “Sur la société française en 1789,” Revue d’histoire moderne et
contemporaine 19 (1972), especially 79-83. If I understand M. Lemarchand
correctly, for some Marxist historians the idea that ennoblement continued at a
high rate throughout the century would imply the creation of what he calls “élites
mixtes” that do not easily fit the concept of a “bourgeois” Revolution. In recent
years there have been studies, cited in M. Furet’s article, that suggest continuing
openness of recruitment to the nobility. To the references in that article should be
added now Gilbert Shapiro and Philip Dawson’s “Social Mobility and Political
Radicalism: the Case of the French Revolution of 1789” in W.O. Aydelotte, A.G.
Bogue and R.W. Fogel (ed.s), The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History
(Princeton, 1972).
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terms the new règlement demanded that an aspiring sous-lieutenant
present to the royal genealogist documentary evidence to establish his
pedigree as noble for four degrees, or generations, on his paternal side. To
wear the uniform and to share in the dignity and high prestige that army
officers enjoyed, one now needed at least a father, grandfather, and great-
grandfather who had themselves been nobles. Other institutions often
recruited rather narrowly from the nobility – among all the bishops only
one was a roturier at the end of the ancien régime. A few – the parlements
of Aix, Grenoble, Nancy, Rennes, and Toulouse – even demanded proofs
of noblesse for entry. But the several hundred officers in parlements that
were technically closed to roturiers pale in significance beside the 8,000
or so military officerships. It was in the army where nobles acted most
conspicuously to dramatize their broad determination to seal off their
estate and to prevent penetration into it by new men. Its recurrence as one
of the grievances cited in the cahiers of the Third Estate in 1789 is not
surprising.3 Here was evidently the classic, archetypical case of the
aristocratic reaction.
How should we understand the army’s behavior? Did Ségur and
his colleagues act reflexively as aristocrats? Were they, in short, but one
wing of a wide and articulated noble offensive aimed at sweeping aside
roturiers and future democrats? In this crucial instance, does the supposed
model of broad class behavior fit the facts? Does it fit at all? This is the
problem that we shall want to consider as closely as possible.4
Unfortunately, the examination of it is difficult because, for reasons
3 From 73% to 100% of the cahiers examined by George V. Taylor for four
categories of bailliage and city assemblies specified as a grievance exclusion from
offices and appointments on the basis of birth. Lower in the social hierarchy of the
Third Estate that issue mattered much less: only 9% of 428 parishes and 14% of
146 lower corps in five towns mentioned it. See Taylor, “Revolutionary and Non-
revolutionary Content in the Cahiers of 1789: an Interim Report,” French
Historical Studies 7 (1972), 485, 498.
4 The standard works on the army are of high quality and, of course, have been
useful and important to this study: Louis Hartmann, Les officiers de l’armée royale
et la Révolution (Paris, 1910); Albert Latreille, L’armée et la nation à la fin de
l’ancien régime (Paris, 1914); Louis Tuetey, Les officiers sous l’ancien régime.
Nobles et roturiers (Paris, 1908). For the Ségur law and social hierarchy, see also
André Corvisier, “Hiérarchie militaire et hiérarchie sociale à la veille de la
Révolution,” Revue internationale d’histoire militaire 30 (1970), 77-92 ; and
Georges Six, “Fallait-il quatre quartiers de noblesse pour être officier à la fin de
l’ancien régime?”, Revue d’histoire moderne, 4 (1929), 47-56.
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indicated below, there is not much direct evidence on the subject. Critics
did not come to grips with the issue in specific and practical detail. The
references that one finds in scattered writings are made in passing; they
are usually brief, tucked into works on other matters, and tell little about
the ideas and intent of those who drew up and implemented the
genealogical requirement. When they did talk about it, contemporaries
often placed the Ségur regulation in a broad context of thought and
discussion about relations between the classes.
Before 1789 some grumbled and expressed tentative doubts about
the wisdom of the Ségur règlement. An infantry captain, de Cessac,
himself a roturier, son of a bailliage official at Agen, was commissioned
to write the article “Capitaine” for a volume on military affairs that
appeared as part of the Encyclopédie méthodique in 1784. In it he
wondered whether a long war might not necessitate dropping the
genealogical barrier, and he went on to evoke the names of several great
army leaders who had not been gentilshommes: “Let’s hope… that the
Faberts, the Cheverts, and all the French who resemble them, or who will
resemble them, may come from illustrious parents.” The next year Jacques
Necker, in a work analyzing French state finance and society, briefly
questioned the wisdom of the Ségur règlement. In his view, it unduly
favored the whole nobility without truly being effective in protecting the
“real French chevaliers whose founding titles are lost in the darkness of
time.” The exclusion of roturiers was consistent with the French
“constitution,” according to Chérin, the court genealogist whose trade it
was to concern himself with such matters. But he too had doubts about an
action that, if useful for poor, rural nobles, was nonetheless humiliating for
the Third Estate. The writer Saint-Lambert, envisioning a new society
where unequal but functionally complementary social groups joined
together in common enterprise for the good of all, thought that the Ségur
règlement would only produce needless and unhealthy envy and hostility
between groups that must coexist.5
5 De Cessac, “Capitaine,” Encyclopédie méthodique. Art militaire (1784), vol. 1, p.
475; Jacques Necker, De l’administration des finances de la France (1785), vol. 3,
p.151; L.-N.-H. Chérin, La noblesse considérée sous ses divers rapports, dans les
assemblées générales et particulières de la nation… (Paris, 1788), pp. 61-62;
Jean-François, marquis de Saint-Lambert, Oeuvres philosophiques (Paris, 6 vol.s,
n.d.), vol. 4, pp. 371-372. De Cessac’s legal status is indicated in the article on him
in the typescript group biography of officers serving in 1789 prepared by F.V.S.
Churchill and kept today in the Bibliothèque du Ministère de la Guerre [on the
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For all that, references in printed works were few, and until
almost 1789 there was no explicit or dramatic confrontation or quarrel in
print over the army’s admission procedures. Only in 1789 did discussion
become freer, and then the tone hardened. An anonymous pamphlet
echoed and developed the complaints that were appearing in the cahiers of
the Third Estate: the new system robbed roturiers of an ancient right to
serve, and it deprived the nobility of the means to renew itself after losses
suffered in war; it destroyed ambition and “émulation” in the Third Estate.
The writer went on to say that although high birth and education disposed
the heart naturally toward virtue, one must not therefore scorn everything
that is not noble, “as if nature, by a new compact, had reserved absolutely
all talents, all qualifications for this first class of society, and as if the
other had for itself only what is common and vile.”6
II Non-noble army officers:
how many were there ?
The evidence in print that reflects what contemporaries were saying,
however, is not extensive or detailed enough to take us very far into the
question. The records of the army should tell more. Here too, if one looks
for proof that the Ségur règlement was an aspect of a global aristocratic
reaction directed against roturiers, the examination of who the army in
fact recruited to be officers in the 1780s seems at first glance to be helpful.
We should, of course exclude from the analysis the 10% who were
officiers de fortune, nearly all of them roturiers. Beginning as simple
soldiers and rising slowly by assiduous service through the ranks of the
non-commissioned officers, officers of fortune were fitted into special,
designated slots in the grenadier companies. Usually more than twice as
old as the other newly-created lieutenants, often forty rather than sixteen
Boulevard Saint-Germain when I used it, but now part of the Service Historique de
la Défense at Vincennes].
6 Observations sur le règlement du 22 mai 1781, concernant les preuves de
noblesse exigées pour entrer au service (Londres, 1789), p. 8.
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or seventeen, they performed the dull and routine tasks of regimental
administration and were not allowed to rise higher than capitaine de
grenadiers. It is not these, but the other, regular officers who formed 90%
of the total in the regiments who are of interest here. For them a narrowly
aristocratic social origin at the end of the ancien régime is undeniable.
Of almost 3,000 young men who entered the line regiments of the
French infantry, cavalry, and dragoons in the 1780s, about one-third were
either students paid for by the king in the royal military schools, or had
been pages in one of several such corps at Versailles.7 They had presented
their proofs of nobility earlier – four generations for the military schools
and nobility to the year 1550 for pages – when they entered the
educational institutions. Others might have attended a military school at
their parents’ rather than the king’s expense, or joined directly from home,
but in either case after 1781 they had to obtain a certificate of noblesse.
The royal genealogists – the two Chérins and Berthier served in
succession during these years – investigated and verified the credentials of
applicants with scrupulous care, and have left us records that are full for
the years 1784-87 and partial for the others. These records show 1,102
names of persons who, in addition to those from the pages or écoles
militaires, were actually placed in regiments after having received the
7 Overall, in 1788-89, about 7,100 officers were serving at any one time in those
regiments, including artillery but not the 12 regiments of light cavalry, 12
battalions of light infantry, 6 regiments of hussards, and the engineers. The
officers excluded from our calculation numbered about 1,050, and in light infantry
and hussards were often foreigners not subject to the same proofs of noblesse. The
estimate of 3,000 entrants to places in the regular units that required genealogical
proofs is based on examination of a sample of registers for 20 regiments, and it
conforms closely to the figure of 2,943 that Tuetey gave in his Les officiers sous
l’ancien régime, p. 219. The students entering the line regiments included 487
élèves du roi whose education in the provincial schools the king had paid for, and
119 pensionnaires whose families paid their expenses at the École militaire in
Paris. The pages numbered 325, of whom 101 from the Grande Écurie, 79 from the
Petite Écurie, 34 pages of Monsieur (the comte de Provence, Louis XVI’s younger
brother), 24 of the Queen, 24 of the comte d’Artois (the king’s youngest brother),
and a scattering who had served other members of the royal family. These figures
are taken from the registers that record for each regiment the service of their
officers, which service included time spent as page or élève. Service Historique de
la Défense (SHD) Yb 166-468, 529-643.
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certificate.8 Finally, a third group of uncertain size was comprised of sons
whose fathers had earned the Cross of the Order of Saint-Louis through
long military service and who were thereby exempted from having to
present proofs of noblesse. In the artillery after 1781 these numbered 49 of
the 148 entrants; for all the branches it is likely that as many as 500 took
advantage of the exemption for sons of military men. In principle they
could have been roturiers, and unquestionably a few were. But most of the
sons of chevaliers of the Saint-Louis were in fact nobles. Among the 49
coming into the artillery, generally considered more open to non-nobles
than the rest of the infantry or the other branches, a maximum of 8, but
probably only 3 or 4, were roturiers.9 It seems clear, then, that overall the
vast and overwhelming majority of the new sous-lieutenants after 1781
were nobles, and most of them could prove four or more generations of
noblesse. Except for the handful whose fathers had served, ambitious
bourgeois did not find an army career open to them in the 1780s. The
exclusion of roturiers was almost complete.
To see what this exclusion meant, it should be understood against
a background of earlier recruiting practice. Access for roturiers had once
been much easier, it is said. The case for the army’s new and stringent
determination to exclude non-nobles at the end of the ancien régime is
often made by invoking the intelligent and interesting work of Louis
Tuetey. It was he who first stated that roturiers must have occupied at
least one-third of all the places as officers in the infantry regiments during
the Seven Years War. Earlier there had evidently been a time of relatively
open recruitment. Tuetey found a military man who complained in 1742
“that scarcely six ‘officiers gentilshommes’ would be found in any
infantry battalion,” and in 1758 the comte de Saint-Germain stated flatly
that the troops were “filled with roturiers.” On the basis of this and other
evidence that reflected contemporary opinion, Tuetey established his
8 The names are in the fichier prepared by J. de la Trollière, who took the
information concerning the placements and families principally from the
certificates in the cartons of the Travail du Roi in the Service Historique de la
Défense. The fichier is in the Archives Nationales (AN), listed as Inv. 464 (974).
9 SHD Yb 669, Corps Royal de l’Artillerie, contrôle, lieutenants, 1768-1791. The
clerk recorded the fact of noble status and often the father’s profession for nearly
all entrants to the artillery during these years.
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proportion of non-noble to noble officers. His was only an estimate, but it
has seemed a reasonable one to historians who used it subsequently.10
But how can one be sure? Do we really know that large numbers
of non-nobles, other than the officers of fortune, had ever served in the
army as officers, at least in its main branches that comprised the line
regiments of infantry, cavalry and dragoons? Unfortunately, systematic
evidence on this important point is scarce. The evidence that Tuetey used
for individual cases, interesting though it is, is susceptible to varying
interpretations – it could even be argued that the very availability of the
kind of information he used, information from the military archives
concerning the difficulties that individual roturiers sometimes had as
officers because of their personal status, may be testimony to the
infrequency, rather than the frequency, of their appearance in that role.
What is needed then, is to review what data there are, and in doing so, to
try to avoid making general the special or unusual cases, and avoid also
misusing the comments of contemporaries who were expressing only what
they believed to be true and in terms that are sometimes misleading. The
picture that can be pieced together from other sources is quite suggestive.
André Corvisier studied Louis XIV’s generals, and concluded
that roturiers among them were scarce, in fact nearly as scarce, as we shall
see, as they were on the eve of the Revolution. From a total of 211 French-
born lieutenant-generals for whom he had information, 16 (7.6%) were
roturiers or doubtful nobles. If new families appeared increasingly among
the names of generals late in Louis XIV’s reign, they came mainly from
the robe and administrative nobility. Except among the engineers, the
number of roturier generals was very small.11 For the mid-eighteenth
century, another piece of evidence, limited and uncertain though it is,
helps a little. This is a register that was used to record the entries of all
sous-lieutenants and lieutenants en second into the infantry regiments
10 Tuetey, Les officiers sous l’ancien régime, pp. 94-99. Louis Hartmann, who
published two years after Tuetey, concluded on this basis that in 1781 there must
have been, in addition to the 1,100 officiers de fortune, another 1,845 officers who
were roturiers: see, Les officiers de l’armée royale et la Révolution, p. 97. The
matter is discussed by R.R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, vol. 1,
p. 460, n. 15. John Shy kindly allowed me to read a paper he prepared on the
subject.
11 André Corvisier, “Les généraux de Louis XIV et leur origine sociale,” XVIIe
Siècle 42-43 (1959), p. 53.
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between 1738 and 1763.12 For most of the years nothing but the names
appear, but during the years 1740 to 1743, for 74 regiments and for
periods varying from one to three years according to the regiment, the
clerks also added brief information concerning relatives already in the
regiment or the social status of the new officer. This information, taken by
itself, is perhaps not conclusive and might not convince a genealogist,
since it was surely in the interest of the lieutenant to hide his low social
origin if he had one. But it does measure what was officially accepted and
believed about the social composition of the officer corps at this moment
of rapid expansion of the armed forces. After eliminating the 47 officers of
fortune, 813 names remain. Among those, 84 had relatives who were then
or had once been officers in the regiment, and that fact once indicated, no
further information was needed or recorded. Thus, for them it is
impossible to be certain what was their social and legal status. Among the
rest, 649 were designated as noble, gentilhomme or “homme de condition”
as opposed to 81 said only to be of “bonne famille” or for whom nothing
at all was written beside the name. The appearance in that last category of
a La Tour du Pin when he entered the Bourbon infantry regiment suggests
that not all of the 81 were in fact non-noble. Nonetheless, it is clear from
other cases where sometimes the clerk added information on a father’s
occupation that some in this group were roturiers. On this evidence, a
maximum of 10%, but more likely 5%, of the entrants did not belong to
the nobility.
There is another, somewhat circuitous means that might allow
one to get at the same question. In 1766, the publishers of the annual État
militaire (that began to appear in 1758) issued a special volume that listed
the names of all the “officiers major”, mainly aides-major and sous-aides-
major, in the regiments (in contemporary American terminology, staff or
regimental headquarters officers) who had seen service between 1758 and
1765. The intent was thereby to complement and to complete the skimpy
early volumes of the État militaire that often omitted the names of these
officers. The special volume contains biographical and career information
for each officer, and from that work it was possible to extract the names of
297 French-born regimental staff officers who were either killed or
wounded during the mid-century wars. Then, by comparing those names
to others that appear in a work compiled by Champeaux, an unofficial list
of casualties among officers through the ancien régime – taken mainly
12 SHD Yb 126.
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from nobiliaires and other sources that would include the noble, but
exclude the non-noble, officers –, one finds which among the 297 names
officially listed did not appear also in Champeaux’s collection and, thus,
may have been roturiers. What emerges is that only 20 of the 297 names
on the official list were not also in the other list that contains the nobles,
and of those 20, there were six who were, to judge from their titles of
prince, comte, or marquis, definitely noble. Thus, no more than 14 of the
297, or a little less than 5%, might have been roturiers in these
functions.13
With the edict that created the “Noblesse Militaire” in 1750, other
and complementary sources accumulated that fortunately permit locating
more exactly and positively many of the roturiers who served. Army
reformers in 1750, after the War of the Austrian Succession, secured the
issuance of an edict that conferred legal nobility on those valorous roturier
officers who, as the preamble put it, were “already ennobled by their
actions.”14 It is important to review the provisions of this edict of
“Noblesse Militaire” and the king’s Déclaration of January 1752 that
amended and interpreted it. The legislation provided two paths to nobility.
One was by rising to very high rank: any non-noble maréchal de camp or
lieutenant general serving in 1750 or one who would attain that grade in
the future was automatically ennobled with all his posterity. The other
path to noblesse was longer and much less direct, but it was open to the
officer who did not rise so high: it required three generations of military
service to reach permanent or hereditary nobility. A kind of personal, or
life, nobility was given to the officer who retired as chevalier de Saint-
Louis after at least thirty years’ service, of which twenty with the
commission of captain. The requirement of twenty years’ service as
captain was reduced to eighteen for lieutenant-colonels, sixteen for
colonels, and fourteen for brigadiers. The most tangible of the immediate
rewards for the eligible roturier officer was life exemption from payment
of the taille for the cultivation of two ploughlands. When the officer
whose father and grandfather had completed these requirements, in 1750
13 Table historique de l’état militaire de France depuis 1758 jusqu’à présent
(Paris, 1766); J. de Champeaux, Honneur et Patrie, ou la noblesse aux armées
(Nevers, 3 vol.s, 1893-96).
14 The Édit and the Déclaration that qualified it in 1752 are printed in Tuetey, Les
officiers sous l’ancien régime, pp. 367-75; and also in D. Labarre de Raillicourt,
La Noblesse militaire. Etude, liste biographique des titulaires. Armorial (Paris,
1962), pp. 27-31.
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or after, fulfilled the same service requirement, he obtained for himself
and his posterity permanent, hereditary nobility. The edict specified that
the service time prior to 1750 could be counted for this purpose by the
officer who was still serving in the army in 1750, but careers of direct
ancestors who had left the army before 1750 did not count toward the
required three generations. The Declaration of 1752 directed the minister
of war to issue lettres d’approbation de service to the eligible officer.
These lettres were then registered without fees by the courts, and served
the retired officer in each generation as proof that he need not pay the
taille. In only two situations could the lettres be issued without the
completion of thirty years as officer; that is, when a captain was forced to
retire early because of wounds, or when a captain died in service and his
family applied for the lettres as evidence for the completion of one of the
three generations of service.
Two distinct groups of roturier officers, then – those who
reached general officer’s rank, and those who served twenty years as
captain or above and thirty years altogether – were moving into or toward
nobility through military service. Fortunately lists of these officers exist,
and with the lists it is possible to trace the careers. If the records for these
groups are not an exact index to the size of the whole body of non-noble
officers, they do provide a rough measure of their numbers, the patterns of
mobility, and changes in the patterns from 1750 to 1789.
Starting with the general officers, the maréchaux de camp and
lieutenant-generals, ninety were created nobles through holding or rising
into those ranks in 1750 or later. For the whole period the 90 represented
5.2% of the total of 1,748 who were in or entered these ranks and were
eligible for being created nobles. The others (94.8%), then, were already
nobles.15 The break-down by decades was as follows:
15 The list of those ennobled by rising into these offices is printed in Labarre de
Raillicourt, La Noblesse militaire, pp. 11-26, constituted from SHD Ya 125-126,
where the documents pertaining to the decisions on individuals contain some
additional information on careers. I have determined the figures for the total
number in the various promotions, nobles and non-nobles together, from the lists
in the Almanach Royal and, after 1758, from the annual volumes of the État
militaire.
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Maréchaux de camp or
lieutenant-généraux
Roturiers among them




1761-70 383 18 (4.7%)
1771-80 265 15 (5.7%)
1781-89 530 42 (7.9%)
Total 1,748 90 (5.1%)
A rising number and proportion of the maréchaux de camp were roturiers.
But lest one exaggerate the extent to which the army was being opened
rather than closed to upwardly mobile roturiers, it is important to qualify a
bit what precedes. Of the 86 anoblis whose careers were traced, two were
in the Swiss guards associated with the Maison du Roi and seven were
foreigners serving in other foreign regiments within the French army.17
The technical branches – artillery and engineers – accounted for 41, or
almost one-half of those identified, and of these, 24 were ennobled in 1784
or later. The big bulge, then, came mainly in the smaller technical
branches, and it came late. Cavalry and dragoons together provided only
fourteen roturiers ennobled by becoming general officers, and the infantry
21 (of whom, 11 in 1780 or later). If the incidence of non-nobles among
the engineers and artillerymen was quite high – for example, four of the
16 The much lower percentage of roturiers who appear among those promoted
prior to 1750 and still serving in that year is deceiving. The figure does not show
the roturiers in the ranks of general who were ennobled before 1750 by individual
lettres de noblesse. Their conferral on generals ceased after 1750 when the office
itself gave noblesse.
17 Summary information for careers has been found by using SHD Ya 125-126 and
the volumes of the État militaire. More detailed information could be found in the
dossiers for the individual generals in Y2d and Y3d of the SHD.
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eleven engineers promoted in 1780-81, and 13 of 36 in artillery – the
percentage of non-nobles in the main branches of infantry, cavalry and
dragoons was not large even at its height. The highest point for roturiers
in those line regiments was in 1780 when seven became maréchaux de
camp, but even then the seven in that year comprised but 4.4% of
promotions in those branches. The later promotions reflected the
temporarily larger number of non-nobles who may have entered the army
toward the end of the wars in the middle of the century. But in general, not
many French-born general officers were being ennobled, because the vast
majority, except in the artillery and engineers, were already noble.
It is perhaps more interesting to see how many lower officers
received lettres d’approbation de service and were, therefore, non-noble.
The lower officers or their families had good reasons – tax exemption,
recognition of having fulfilled one of the three steps toward hereditary
nobility – to apply for the lettres if they were eligible. That does not mean
that all would actually have done so. The officer who lived where payment
of the taille rested on the status of the land rather than the personal
condition of its owner, that is, in the pays de taille réelle, and who also
had no son to carry on his name had less incentive to apply. The family of
an officer killed in battle or who died later from his wounds might ask for
the lettres, but again would probably have made the effort only if a son
were preparing to follow a military career. Moreover, if the retired officer
was not troubled at home over the taille or franc fief, he surely preferred
not to advertise his roturier status by asking for the lettres. For all that,
there were real gains to be derived from the lettres, and probably most of
the eligible retired officers who were known to be roturiers would have
found it useful to apply.
The available records reveal the names of 138 roturier officers –
122 who themselves applied for and received the lettres immediately after
retirement and an additional sixteen whose sons or grandsons cited their
ancestors’ prior service when making their own applications at a later date.
It seems that that list is not complete, but it represents probably a little
more than two-thirds of the total issued.18 The 138 can be divided by
period and type of service in this way:
18 Basing his listing on the dossiers in SHD Ya 125-126, Labarre de Raillicourt
cites 122 lettres d’approbation actually issued. Knowing the completeness of that
listing is of course important here. Tuetey estimated that the total was 200, but
only 1 of the 9 recipients whom he mentioned was not also in Labarre’s list. For













1751-60 6 8 2 1 3 20
1761-70 4 16 6 0 4 30
1771-80 17 15 1 1 8 42
1781-90 14 19 4 3 6 46
Total 41 58 13 5 21 138
Whether the increase in the numbers applying in the late 1770s
and 1780s is real, reflecting a rise in roturier entrants late in the War of
the Austrian Succession, or only apparent, owing to some lettres for the
earlier period that are missing from the list, is uncertain. It is clear that, for
the roturiers who received the lettres d’approbation, infantry was the
favored branch, but the Maison militaire du Roi was also strongly
represented. The very small number from the artillery and the engineers is
surprising: only five officers served in the lower ranks there long enough
to gain the lettres. This reversal of the trend among the ennobled generals,
nearly half of whom were from these technical services, suggests that in
them the roturier either rose quickly and far, or he got out early. Perhaps
men who commanded technical and mathematical skills that were easily
pay a fee, the droit de marc d’or, that varied in amount from 36 to 49 livres;
records of payments made for these letters, 1785-89, are in the registers of the
Trésorier des revenus casuels (AN P 4881-4888) and reveal 16 names of persons
who paid in those years; of the 16, there were 15 who were also in Labarre’s list
and only one name (Semilly) was missing from it. Earlier, however, many more
names are missing: Mme Gallet at the Archives Nationales has completed an
inventory that details all the arrêts made by the Royal Council during Turgot’s
two-year ministry, 1774-76; among them are those that were needed to authorize
the payment of the marc d’or by individuals receiving the lettres d’approbation.
Of seven such arrêts issued during those two years, four do not appear in
Labarre’s list. Thus, the figure of 122 is too low, and the list, fairly accurate for the
1780s, is incomplete for the earlier period. Tuetey’s guess of 200 is probably about
right.
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convertible to civilian occupations found other alternatives for careers too
attractive to resist unless it was clear that they might became generals. In
any event, at no time had the lower ranks in the artillery and engineers
been filled by many long-serving roturiers.
In a sense, however, the essential point is not to become too
immersed in the details of these figures, but to keep in mind that the total
who received lettres d’approbation for the entire period was something
above 138, probably about 200. To these must be added other roturiers in
military service who, without becoming generals, received direct
ennoblement by royal action. These were men who did not wish to wait
for the slow turnover of the three generations’ service, and who found a
friend in or near power to recommend them for lettres de noblesse. Once
more, from a variety of sources, it is possible to assemble a picture that
includes most, if not all of them. The 102 military men in this group, taken
from regional lists that include about two-thirds of all the lettres de
noblesse issued between 1750 and 1789,19 were distributed as follows:
19 AN P 2592-2601, lettres de noblesse registered in Chambre des Comptes, Paris,
to 1787; E 2768-2782 (registers listing letters sent by Minister of War, 1750-51,
1753-59, 1767, 1770-71, 1775, 1777, 1779); O1 94-123 (registers of letters of the
Ministère de la Maison du Roi, 1750-76); Jules Maulbon d’Arbaumont, Les
Anoblis de Bourgogne, liste par ordre chronologique des lettres d’anoblissement,
de confirmation et de relief de noblesse enregistreés au Parlement et à la Chambre
des Comptes de Dijon (1363-1782) (Paris, 1867); Inventaire sommaire des
archives départementales antérieures à 1790. Gironde. Série B. Archives
Judiciaires. Registres d’Enregistrement du Parlement, I B 1 à 58. Redigé par
Jean-Auguste Brutails (Bordeaux, 1925) (includes references to registration of
lettres de noblesse in the Parlement of Bordeaux, except during the years 1766-74
for which the registers are missing); Inventaire sommaire des archives
départementales antérieures à 1790. Haute Garonne. Archives civiles. Série B.
Parlement de Toulouse, Nos. 1923-74, vol. 5 Enregistrement des actes du pouvoir
royal (2ème partie), 1569-1790 (Toulouse, 1965). These regional lists overlap and
are sometimes incomplete. Comparison between the composite list formed from
them with known general enumerations that are complete for all of France, 1750-
1767 and 1784-1789 (see note 42 below), but lacking indication of profession,













8 2 4 0 2 16
1761-
70
17 4 3 1 0 25
1771-
80
22 11 4 3 4 44
1781-
90
10 4 1 1 1 17
Total 57 21 12 5 7 102
This time the preponderance of the Maison militaire du Roi (Royal
Household) is striking, though surely not surprising.
What is even more striking, however, is how low these figures
are overall. Consider just the main branches of infantry, cavalry and
dragoons, where the regiments contained some 6,000 officers: during the
forty years after 1750 those places produced 35 generals who were
ennobled by their offices, and if we adjust the totals upward (in each
instance by 50% to compensate for the incompleteness of our lists),
probably 50 junior officers who received lettres de noblesse and perhaps
100 who had lettres d’approbation. The likely total of confirmed
roturiers, then, was 185. Fairly complete regimental service registers for
the period from 1758 to 1789 show that there were 619 majors and
lieutenant-colonels in line regiments who finished their careers there,
occasionally by death but usually by retirement.20 Of those, 21 were
ennobled by being made maréchaux de camp at retirement and ten others
received either lettres de noblesse or lettres d’approbation. Thus, 31 of
619, or 5%, were confirmed roturiers in these highly professional grades
where long service was likely to have brought recognition through
20 SHD Yb 166-468, 529-643.
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ennoblement if one needed it, and always eligibility to apply for lettres
d’approbation. In the infantry regiments captains were ten times more
numerous than the majors and lieutenant-colonels, in cavalry and dragoons
six times more numerous. It is probable that 4,000 or more of these
officers retired after long service in our period, and yet only 70 secured
either kind of the lettres. There were 295 captains killed and about 1,000
wounded, some badly enough to retire, during the Seven Years War, but
only very few of their families appeared then or later to claim lettres
d’approbation.21
What is impressive, then, in all the evidence is the relative
scarcity of roturiers in military service as officers, both late, which is not
surprising, and early, which is. The wars of the mid-century were bloody,
the yearly average of casualties heavier than in Louis XIV’s wars, and
captains were the most exposed and vulnerable of the officers in battle.
Some were killed, many wounded, and thousands retired through the
period. Any of them or their families might have applied at least for the
lettres d’approbation if they had needed them. The evidence for entering
lieutenants and for the killed and wounded aides-major reinforces what
the records for the lettres tell us. It simply does not seem possible that
anything like one-third – Tuetey cited estimates of one-half and thought
his own a conservative one – of the officers in line regiments were
roturiers. Some did enter, and they appear among the retirements,
especially in the 1780s. But there cannot have been many – 5% may be
too high but it is the proportion toward which all the evidence converges
and is probably a safe guess. Their presence in larger numbers would have
been recorded in a flood, rather than the trickle that we have, of lettres
d’approbation, and would show up in the other sources as well. Thus,
whether one looks to the middle of the century, to find roturiers whose
careers might have begun under Louis XIV or in the early years of Louis
XV, or to the end of the century, what emerges is the extent to which the
army officer corps had never really provided a wide access to roturiers in
the eighteenth century. They were present, but not in large numbers.
21 The numbers of captains killed or wounded are derived from Champeaux,
Honneur et Patrie.
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III The purpose of the Ségur law
Who, then, was the Ségur règlement directed against? Were the limited
number of roturiers among the army officers really thought to be a
problem sufficient to evoke so strong a response? Or, was that response
purely gratuitous, an attack by the aristocrats who ran things against an
imaginary evil and enemy? But all the hypotheses that impute the action to
an essentially noble reaction against non-nobles will run into one serious
difficulty: the army’s committee that discussed and adopted the règlement
knew quite well that the officer corps had been recruited almost entirely
from the nobility alone for many years. As early as 1718 the Conseil de la
Guerre was directing the army’s inspecteurs to be sure that the colonels
chose only nobles to be lieutenants en second. It insisted even then on
proofs of the candidate’s noblesse through attestations of the fact by three
or four gentilshommes who knew the family. Perhaps the requirement was
not always enforced strictly, and in 1734 the minister of war, under
pressure to fill vacancies in the regiments fighting then in Germany and
Italy during the War of the Polish Succession, did advise the intendants to
do what he in a similar place had done earlier. That advice was to seek out
for officers the young men who were wealthy enough to support
themselves in the service among the “gentilshommes or sons of
magistrates living nobly,”22 that is, not in trade or the manual occupations.
Nonetheless, most of the recruits were nobles, and the maréchal de Belle-
Isle, who was running the Ministry of War in 1758, did not hesitate to
remind the colonels of the old rules right in the middle of the Seven Years
War. The scattered instances that Tuetey cites where roturiers had
difficulty in entering, even in the light infantry and militia, testify to the
broad awareness among colonels and others that it was unusual for a non-
noble to enter. When the colonel of the Bigorre infantry regiment wrote a
letter to the minister in 1760 to ask permission to receive a roturier, he
found it necessary to reassure his superior: “I can assure you,
monseigneur, that until now I have paid great attention to giving
preference to the nobility; nearly all those whom I have named to
officerships since I have been colonel have been gens de condition.”23 The
22 Tuetey, Les Officiers sous l’ancien régime, p. 91.
23 Ibid, p. 172; see also pp. 164-181.
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system of testimonial proofs of noblesse was well established by the
1770s.
Then in 1776, the minister Saint-Germain and the reformers in
his entourage hit on a new plan for training junior officers. They would
use the savings from a reorganization of the École militaire to create
special places in the regiments through which all the new officers had to
pass. These places of “cadets gentilshommes” held the young men to a
program of studies and apprenticeship in the ranks during which they were
supposed to learn the regiment’s work from the bottom up. But in order to
enter, every one of these cadets had either to present a certificate of
nobility, verified now by the military commander in the province where he
lived and the intendant in his généralité, or else show that his father had
been or was then in military service, in the grade of captain or higher. It
was the ending in 1781 of this experiment in practical training for the
entering officers – the cadets to be replaced by an equal number of
ordinary, though unpaid, sous-lieutenants in the regiments – that was the
occasion for the simultaneous issuance of the Ségur règlement, an act that
in fact only renewed the prior demand for proofs of noblesse.24 Thus, the
army’s committee in 1781 could not have thought that it was doing
something new when it insisted that candidates for officerships be nobles.
By then that was an old story, and everyone was well aware of it.
But much did change in 1781, and we must try to see what it was.
To grasp what was happening, however, one needs to look elsewhere, to
look past the social categories of noble and roturier, so useful for
understanding the Revolution itself but misleading for what happened
earlier. The army’s behavior needs to be seen against the wider
background of thinking about society and social questions. Many
observers found the functioning of society bad, bad both because it was
inefficient and because good morality seemed to have broken down. The
idea that social ills come from essentially moral causes was, of course, not
24 Ordonnance portant création de Cadets Gentilshommes, 25 mars 1776,
summarized in État militaire de France pour l’année 1777, pp. 411-12; Règlement
concernant les Cadets Gentilshommes, créés dans les troupes du roi, par
l’Ordonnance du 25 Mars 1776. Du 20 août 1776, and Ordre du roi, envoyé à
chaque Mestre-de-camp-commandant des régimens d’Infanterie françoise, de
Cavalerie, Chevaux-légers, Dragons et Chasseurs à cheval, concernant la création
d’une troisième place de Sous lieutenant en pied, sans appointemens et l’extinction
des places de Cadets-gentilshommes, 22 mai 1781, in AN AD VI 10B Recueil, vol.
1, pp. 104-109, 169-172.
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new in the eighteenth century, nor has it disappeared since. But its form
then was a special one – a misplaced ambition, many thought, was driving
men to move restlessly from more to less useful occupations in quest of
higher social standing and a more luxurious life. The result was a kind of
chaos that derived from the excessive mixing of ranks. Perhaps this
mixing of ranks is what is meant when historians speak of the shift from a
society of orders to a society of classes. Whatever the cause, there arose a
chorus of complaints that sons of peasants were leaving for the city; that
artisans’ sons abandoned productive trades in favor of schools where the
Latin curriculum taught them only how to be useless monks, scholars, or
scribblers; that merchants were pushing into occupations that did not
concern them, to the neglect of their own. Money seemed too much the
measure of men. Whether caused by the increased mobility of individuals
or the rising sense of dignity and importance in the activities that mobile
individuals abandoned, or both, is not certain, but these concerns grew,
and everywhere there were men unhappy over self indulgence, the lost
sense of duty, the lack of seriousness. Excessive luxury and pomp, the
emulation of bad models – these were driving young men to scorn what
their fathers had done and to move outward and upward into uselessness in
cloisters or in swollen cities that were not really productive. If the theme
was not new, what Molière had once satirized no longer seemed an object
for humor, and one can still sample the outpouring of works in print and
the draft projects that crossed the desks of ministers proposing remedies
through changes in the education of the young and not so young. Some
wanted to transform the collèges; others would create new orders and
honorific distinctions to change the social objects of emulation. However
conflicting and various the proposals, many shared the concern. Somehow
order had to replace disorder.
The theme was general and widespread. Here it can only be
illustrated briefly. Proposals proliferated that would place and classify
men, would mark them off more clearly from one another. Babeuf, one of
the many correspondents with whom the secretary of the Academy of
Arras maintained frequent communication, discussed many things in his
letters to him. In 1787 he wrote that people in preceding years had been
talking about “the excessive progress of luxury,” and he described the
discussion that went on:
People complained that all the ranks were mixed up;
that it was no longer possible to distinguish a grand
seigneur from a peasant clod by what he wore, and it
was proposed, in order to check this alleged abuse, to
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establish a distinctive sign for each rank. A sign,
moreover, to express and even to explain the état of
each individual, such as the mark of a sword for the
noble; for the grocer, the image of a sugar-loaf; the
oil dealer, a cask of anchovies; the cook-shopkeeper,
a goose; the locksmith, an anvil; the tailor, scissors,
etc.25
Babeuf objected strongly to such a plan, but others did not. Someone sent
to Chérin’s office a plan to divide the nobility into four separate groups –
great officers of the crown, families noble for over 200 years, families
with four or more generations of nobility, and a last category for all the
rest – each group distinguished from the others by the different color of
the ribbon that every noble would wear around his neck. A special medal
worn on the ribbon had the additional advantage that nobles were to
purchase it and thus contribute two and one-half million livres to aid the
king’s finances. The abbé Expilly conceived a similar plan to demark by
visible honorific distinctions a corps of persons intermediate between the
nobility and the Third Estate. From the Vivarais came a mémoire
protesting that in France “the language of signs” was too much neglected:
“Nothing is more imposing for ordinary people than external marks, they
always begin by respecting the dress, and that’s good.” Its author believed
that, for the purpose of showing the differences between them, it would be
best to put all men into uniforms. Conceding that this might be
impractical, he settled for ornamental shoulder-knots to filter into
recognizably separate groups at least the titled nobility, nobles whose
origin in that status was before 1500, “militaires” and other nobles. It is
hard to know what the Minister of War made of the proposal he received
to decorate with special distinguishing insignia not only the husbands, but
the wives as well, of “the nobility of every kind”, sword, robe, church,
finance, and others.26
25 Correspondance de Babeuf avec l’Académie d’Arras (1785-1788), publiée sous
la direction de Marcel Reinhard, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences
Humaines de Paris, Série “Textes”, vol. 1 (Paris, 1961), p. 112.
26 The four mémoires cited are in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF),
Collection Clairambault, ms. 930, fos 64-65; Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, ms. 6085,
fos 356-363; SHD A4 XLI, no. 37, “Project des Notables, par l’abbé Expilly;” and
Mémoires et Reconnaissances [1M], 1709, no. 47.
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If no one took such proposals seriously enough to try to
implement them, many did wonder what was the source of the confusion
of ranks and how in other ways the ill could be corrected. Less informed
persons believed that in the upper levels of society there was widespread
usurpation of noble status by persons who had no legal claim to it. From
the provinces came repeated complaints. According to the avocat du roi in
the sénéchaussée of Béziers, writing in 1767, the problem there lay in the
assuming of noble titles on their own initiative “by the smallest bourgeois,
so that it is no longer possible to know the true nobility.” The next year an
infantry captain at Aubenas, bothered over local abuses that caused
“grumbling,” told the Minister of War about the need to stop “usurpation
of nobility by an infinity of men of wealth.” He added that “these daily
examples tend directly toward the destruction of subordination.” License
and fraud reigned in the Vivarais, another reported: “there is no petit
bourgeois who does not think himself gentilhomme and who does not take
that title with impunity, no peasant with a little opulence who on
becoming bourgeois does not soon expect to be equal to his seigneur…,”
and from this there “necessarily follows the upsetting of every kind of
subordination and the discrediting of that part of the Nation that is alone
capable of containing a naturally insolent and Republican populace.”27
By the 1780s some even at the center were pondering the
possibility of the government’s renewing the old formal search for false
nobles that had ended in 1717. Not surprisingly, the genealogists, who
stood to profit from it, favored the new recherche de la noblesse and they
disagreed among themselves only over whether a single man or a special
joint tribunal should run it. The younger Chérin, disparaging the common
“frenzy to change one’s place and to usurp privileges” that injured mainly
the ones who were left behind to pay the taxes, expected to direct the
investigation himself.28
But few people who were in a position to know, even the
genealogists, really thought that the principal issue was usurpations. They
knew that the center of the problem lay elsewhere. Throughout the
27 For the mémoires from Béziers, Archives départementales de l’Hérault, C 1995;
from Aubenas, BNF Clairambault ms. 930, fo 60; from the Vivarais, Arsenal ms.
6085, fos 356-363.
28 BNF Clairambault ms. 930, fo 124; see also on the subject, fos 42, 46, 66, 125,
128; and Chérin, La noblesse considérée sous ses divers rapports, pp. 37-49;
Antoine Maugard, Remarques sur la noblesse, dédiées aux assemblées
provinciales (Paris, 1787), passim.
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eighteenth century one did not need to dissemble or to cheat in order to
rise in status and to enter the nobility; in practice anyone with money
could do it quite easily and legally. Jacques Necker, as minister of finance,
knew the situation as well as anyone. He described in 1785 the more than
4,000 venal offices in France that conferred noble status on their holders.
If “a large number” of these offices in law courts and administration did
not effectively ennoble because persons entering them were already
nobles, others did. Generally it was the least useful of the offices,
especially those of secrétaires du roi in the chancelleries attached to
sovereign courts that made the most new nobles. Necker rehearsed the
usual arguments against them – these offices removed wealthy roturiers
from the tax rolls; they deflected and diverted merchants from useful
commerce. His position was clear and succinct: “I think, therefore, that all
public arrangements that augment or favor vanities foreign to the état in
which the various citizens find themselves placed, are contrary to a
healthy policy.” Like others, he objected to the growth in “that prodigious
number of families who have acquired nobility for money alone,” and
wished that the state could make a massive effort to repurchase and retire
at least the offices of secrétaires du roi.29 When he returned to the subject
eleven years later it was 1796, and Necker then found tragic the weakness
of the nobility that had hastened its own fall. Induced by Richelieu to
depart the provinces and to surround the throne, the nobility lost its old
morals in idleness and the life of luxury. But more immediately serious
had been the loss of luster by the perpetual alteration of the nobility’s
composition: “…it was no longer the same after an endless incorporation
of new Anoblis was the result of prerogatives granted to municipal offices
and venal charges.”30 In Necker’s view, then, the rapidity of movement by
bourgeois into the noblesse, a movement fully legal if unwise, fatally
divided and weakened that body before 1789.
Chérin too thought that ennoblement through purchase of office
was frequent, too frequent, but feared that suppressing those offices would
have been dangerous.31 When Chérin’s rival and critic also wrote a book,
he introduced it as “a work in which the author proposes to put each
citizen in his place … [and] to convey undivided to the children of la
29 Necker, De l’administration des finances, vol. 3, pp. 149-51.
30 Necker, De la Révolution française (s. 1., 4 vol.s, 1796), vol. 1, p. 163; and see
generally pp. 157-70.
31 Chérin, La noblesse considérée sous ses divers rapports, pp. 93-96.
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gloire the honors usurped by the children of la fortune.”32 Maugard
calculated that in each twenty-year period offices in France might ennoble
3,000 heads of families, or 18,000 persons, and said that it was impossible
to absorb such persons into the functions of nobles. His plan was to strip
the power to ennoble from all but a few civil offices, and to have those
ennoble only after three generations of real service.33 Thus, Maugard
shared with Chérin, Necker, and many others the supposition that roturiers
were moving rapidly and easily into the noblesse, a movement that the
critics did not like but whose existence they did not doubt.34
If one assumes that, perhaps, these observers were right, and that
whatever aristocratic reaction there was did not in fact close off the old
means by which roturiers gained noble status, we may begin to make
better sense of what the army really did in 1781. Who did the army’s
leaders have in mind when they imposed the Ségur règlement to govern
and limit entry as officer? In the army many were grumbling and grew
angry over the presence in it of non-serious officers, men of wealth,
frivolous, sunk in the habits of luxury. We should recognize that if there
had been such roturiers there to exclude, the army would have gladly done
so. What was entirely new in the règlement of 1781, however, was not the
32 Maugard, Remarques sur la noblesse, Introduction.
33 Ibid., pp. 6-7, 35.
34 For a good discussion of social hierarchy and other examples of the views
concerning it, see Yves Durand, Les fermiers généraux au XVIIIe siècle,
Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Paris - Sorbonne,
Série: Recherches, vol. 70 (Paris, 1971), pp. 177-203, 289-292. Among
contemporaries, it was the common view that access to nobility was too easy. For
additional illustrations, see André Decouflé, “L’aristocratie française devant
l’opinion publique à la veille de la Révolution (1787-1789),” in Decouflé, F.
Boulanger, & B.-A. Pierelle, Études d’histoire économique et sociale du XVIIIe
siècle, Travaux et Recherches de la Faculté de Droit et des Sciences Économiques
de Paris, Série Sciences Historiques, no. 9 (Paris, 1966), p.46. Some did not
oppose fluidity of social movement. The abbé Expilly (mentioned above, see note
26) merely assumed its existence, and proposed to take advantage of it to aid the
king’s finances. His draft édit in 1772 would have created from the third estate a
new fourth estate of 60,000 roturier notables, paying 1,500 to 2,500 livres each.
Only shopkeepers and persons who worked with their hands were ineligible to buy
the lettres de notable that conferred on its purchaser a new hereditary condition
that automatically changed into noble status in the fifth or seventh generation after
its acquisition, the length of time depending on the amount paid originally for the
lettres. See SHD A4 XLI, no. 37.
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elimination of roturiers, but the demand for rigid proofs of four
generations of nobility on the paternal side. If the army had meant only to
keep out roturiers, the method chosen was a kind of genealogical overkill
– a requirement of one generation of nobility would have been enough for
the purpose. What this suggests, in turn, is that the offending group was
persons already noble, but whose pedigrees fell short of four generations.
Nobles of at least one but less than four generations, always admissible
until 1781, would now be left out. If this was in fact the issue, the quarrel
should be understood as intra-aristocratic, setting one group of nobles
against another, gentilshommes against anoblis.
One can find observers at the time who saw the Ségur règlement
in just those terms. Already anticipating in 1790 his later and fuller
statements of counter-revolutionary doctrine, Sénac de Meilhan
nonetheless criticized the Ségur règlement that he thought unwise and an
important cause of the Revolution. Ennobled himself by an office in the
Grand Conseil and understandably sensitive on the subject, he described it
as “a regulation that singularly offended a large part of the nation,” and
said that it had eliminated for many the older and healthy hope for rising
in a French society where ranks had not been distinct and clearly marked
off from one another. What was the injured part of the nation? Sénac de
Meilhan explained: “Such a regulation humiliated the Magistracy, the
opulent, and a crowd of honorable families in the Provinces that were
forced to admit that they could not make these proofs and from that time
were scorned by men from the same Order but who had two or three more
lustres of nobility than they.”35 Sénac recounted for emphasis the story of
the son of a Minister of the Navy who, being only a third-generation
noble, was not permitted to enter the service. He went on to say that the
règlement outraged the Third Estate also by throwing up insurmountable
barriers against them, but he mentioned the Third Estate as a body apart
from the one that was directly injured. In this view Sénac was joined by
Soulavie who said that the army’s action irritated “the provincial robe
which cannot prove four degrees of nobility.”36
The genealogists, if anyone, should have understood the issue,
and they did. Chérin noted especially that the Gardes du Corps demanded
for entry only that one have been noble; hence they accepted “the sons of
35 [Gabriel Sénac de Meilhan], Des principes et des causes de la révolution en
France (Londres, 1790), pp. 103-104.
36 Jean-Louis Soulavie, Mémoires historiques et politiques du règne de Louis XVI
depuis son mariage jusqu’à sa mort (Paris, 6 vol.s, 1801), vol. 4, p. 394.
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anoblis.” The contrast to the regular army that did not accept such persons
as officers was clear.37 Maugard confronted the question directly. His
hostility to what he believed to be the continuing and frequent
ennoblement of roturiers led him to protest that the “titles of honor” that
once went to “gentilshommes d’ancienne extraction” as a reward for
striking services were being usurped by others. The usurpers, however,
were not roturiers but “persons whose nobility is, if not doubtful, at least
very new.” The mass of new nobles would either be idle and useless, or
they would use their wealth to procure employs at the expense of the
“nobles de race.” For Maugard the problem was a crucial one, and he
worked out a plan to deal with it: reduce ennoblements, on the one hand,
and establish a clear and fixed progression of service allowable to new
nobles according to the degree or age of nobility that they held, on the
other. Let new nobles, not yet able to “claim [the honor] of defending the
country,” be administrators and judges. “How many nobles, excluded from
military service by the regulation of 22 May 1781, would make excellent
magistrates!” Thus, assign to second-generation nobles the places in
bailliages, sénéchaussées, chambres des comptes, cours des aides, and
bureaux des finances. Their sons, in the third generation of nobility, could
fill the offices in the parlements. If jobs there were not numerous enough
to go around, they might serve in the Gendarmerie awaiting the moment
when the family would have ripened sufficiently in its noblesse to enter
the army officer corps in the fourth generation. For good or ill and,
however inadequate his solution, Maugard had diagnosed the problem that
others believed they were treating.38
Most persons, however, were not genealogists and used words
loosely. They did not classify families so precisely, and the concepts that
moved them were moral and social, not legal. It is not surprising that on
hearing the complaints that there were scarcely six “officiers
gentilshommes” in any infantry battalion in 1742, historians have thought
that the regiments were filled by roturiers. But that is almost certainly not
what the writer at the time meant. He was more likely to have been
referring instead to men like Randon de Pommery whose grandfather
gained nobility by being a capitoul at Toulouse and who was denied entry
to a cavalry regiment after 1781, this despite the combined solicitations of
the colonel, the comte de Vaudreuil, and members of the royal family. Or
37 Chérin, La noblesse considérée sous ses divers rapports, p. 64.
38 Maugard, Remarques sur la noblesse, pp. 3-7
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the son of the Parlement of Besançon’s greffier en chef, an office that
ennobled in one generation, who could not enter the corps of military
engineers in the 1780s. To judge from their fathers’ offices, at least seven
of the persons whom Tuetey listed as evidence for the frequent appearance
of roturiers in the officer corps at mid-century were nobles.39 If not
gentilshommes, they were not roturiers either.
What this hypothesis supposes, then, is that the creation of new
nobles continued unabated until the Revolution; it assumes the continuing
presence of a substantial pool of nobles of less than four generations, a
pool constantly fed from bourgeois springs below, against which the army
reacted at the end of the ancien régime. But seen this way, the “reaction”
becomes more specifically military than aristocratic, for its essential
condition is the failure or non-existence of a broader reaction by nobles in
general. The continuing flow of roturiers into the nobility, especially
through the purchase of office, could have persisted only if the aristocracy
had not been effective in closing off to roturiers the traditional path to
personal advancement. But did the avenues upward in fact remain open?
IV Proliferating ennoblements and venality
The next step, then, is to examine the various means of ennoblement and
to ask whether and on what scale roturiers continued to enter the nobility.
In addition, since the sources allow it, it is interesting to look at the age of
nobility of many of the high office holders in order to learn how large was
the whole pool of nobles whose credentials did not stretch to four
generations, and to see which offices in particular sheltered anoblis. Who
and how many in various high offices, the offices that ennobled, could and
did fulfill the four-generation requirement? If a general reaction against
roturiers by a unified, homogeneous nobility had taken place, one might
expect that a rising number of office holders would have had claims to
older noblesse at the end of the ancien régime, and that there would be
signs that the pool of anoblis was drying up. But was it?
39 Tuetey, Les officiers sous l’ancien régime, pp. 94-98, 202-203, 212.
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It would no doubt be interesting to know the genealogical status
of the holders of high offices thought the whole century, but that would be
very difficult to determine. But owing to the availability of special sources
that cover the last fifteen years of the ancien régime, it is possible to
examine closely the more than 3,000 persons who were ennobled or
entered ennobling offices during those years. There is good reason to think
that, except for the issuance of the lettres de noblesse, the patterns that
emerge for the later period were much the same as those that had obtained
since about 1730. To study the 3,000 persons I have drawn on a fairly
wide range of printed and unprinted sources, some used by others and
some evidently not. It cannot be said that no errors have been made for
individuals here and there, but after checking each as carefully as possible,
I am confident that the general impressions that come out of the data are
correct. Where there is the risk of any systematic and more serious error, it
will be indicated in the notes that detail the sources and basis for the
analysis. That said, we should proceed in order from those methods of
ennoblement that were quickest and most direct to some that were slower
and others that were only nominal and in fact failed to ennoble. In each
case it will be important to find out both how many persons were ennobled
and how many fell on either side of the critical fourth-generation dividing
line.
1. Lettres de noblesse. These lettres, once registered in the sovereign
courts, of course conferred immediate inheritable nobility on the receiver
and all his descendants. The king issued them, as we saw, to military men,
but also to wealthy merchants who developed commerce or otherwise
aided the state, to officials in government functions at the center or in the
provinces, and to a scattered lot of doctors, scholars, engineers, architects,
and artists. The distribution of these dignities was intended to reward the
talent and energy of socially useful individuals. That was not always the
case – the names of servants of the royal family and men who served only
in the increasingly ornamental military units of the Maison du Roi appear
too frequently to leave doubt that personal connections and friendship
often mattered at least as much as utility. Still, an effort was being made
through these ennoblements to dignify useful pursuits, an effort that grew
in scale later in the century.40
40 Marcel Reinhard, “Elite et noblesse dans la seconde moitié du 18e siècle,” Revue
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 3 (1956), 5-37.
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How many persons received these lettres? Earlier estimates seem
too low, at least for the final period. Two sources are especially
convenient since they tell about lettres issued throughout the whole
country for at least some of the years. Others record them fully over time
but for a single region only, usually through their registration in a
sovereign court. One comprehensive list includes all the lettres de
noblesse that were granted, 1731-67, and it has been possible to construct
another, for the years 1784-89, from the registers of payments for a fee,
the marc d’or, that each recipient had to make.41 Three stages are
discernible: from an average of 3.5 a year for 1731-42, the figure rose to
10.5 in 1743-66, and finally to 18.0 a year in 1784 and after. During the
five and one half years that preceded July 1789, there were 99 persons
who paid the fee for the lettres. The comparison of that list to regional
ones that cover a longer period shows that the later 1780s were not
exceptional for the whole later period, and that 17 a year was the likely
rate of ennoblement by this means from 1774 on. The lettres de noblesse
issued, 1774-89, totalled about 270.42
2. The Chancelleries. Secrétaires du roi. Turning now to consider the
entrants to various offices, those who were most conspicuous by their
rapid ennoblement were the secrétaires du roi in both the better-known
Grande Chancellerie in Paris and the other chancelleries attached to the
provincial sovereign courts. These were the offices that opened the way to
those whose descendants would eventually reach very high places in the
41 For the earlier period, BNF ms. fr. 32889; for 1784-89, AN P 4881-87.
42 For references to regional and other lists that do not cover the whole country, see
notes 18 & 19 above. To names appearing in them for 1774-83 were added others
in H. Gourdon de Genouillac, Dictionnaire des anoblis (Paris, 1875), which is
based on several courts in addition to the Chambre des Comptes de Paris. The lists
are often overlapping, but when the duplications are eliminated, there remain 113
names for 1774-83. Comparison of the composite list from partial sources to the
complete one from the registers of the Trésorier des revenus casuels who received
payments for the marc d’or, 1784-86, shows that the list from partial sources
contains about two-thirds of all the lettres de noblesse issued each year. Thus, the
113 names that we have for 1774-83 should be increased by 50% to about 170, or
17 a year, to make a reasonable estimate of the total for the decade to 1784. M.
Reinhard’s estimate (“Elite et noblesse”, 29) that 400 lettres de noblesse were
issued during the whole period from 1750 to 1789 rests on the assumption that the
rate of about ten a year after mid-century continued to the Revolution. In fact, the
rate of issuance rose, and the estimate is too low.
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state. More than 20% of the ministers and about 40% of the judges in the
Parlement of Paris and the provincial intendants came from families that
were originally ennobled through holding them.43 Many of the purchasers
occupied places in state finance before they entered the office. In the
offices they were charged with the job of supervising the writing,
transmitting, and signing of the official letters that went out from the royal
chancelleries. By the seventeenth century, however, clerks did the work,
and the secrétaires du roi themselves had no real functions left, only
privileges, which were very considerable ones. A secrétaire du roi had his
suits at law evoked directly to the Parlement of Paris or to the Royal
Council, received exemptions from taxes and from fees demanded of other
officeholders, and had the right to be received at court. But by far the most
important privilege, and the one that really mattered for an eighteenth-
century purchaser, was the conferral of hereditary or transmissible nobility
on the holder of this office. Upon his installation the new secrétaire du roi
and all his posterity were nobles.44
If the privilege was enormous, so was the price. To purchase the
office in 1789 cost 120,000 livres, at a time when Church and State
figured subsistence for a curé at 700 livres, and a professor at the École
Militaire in Paris earned 2,400 livres for a year’s work. In return for the
investment the secrétaire du roi received 3,033 livres a year in gages, less
deductions for the capitation and other impositions, and 1,000 to 1,400
livres a year in 1789 from his bourse, which was the equal share that each
secretary received from the fees and emoluments of the Chancellerie. At
best the return was only a little over 3% a year on the price of a Paris
office, and normally 2% in the provinces.45 But through this sinecure the
richest non-nobles could rise into the nobility.
One may wonder why the king permitted useless offices such as
these to exist. Necker wanted to be rid of them. But the wonder diminishes
43 François Bluche, “L’origine sociale du personnel ministériel français au XVIIIe
siècle,” Bulletin de la Société d’Histoire Moderne, 12e série, no. 1 (1957), 9-13;
Vivian R. Gruder, The Royal Provincial Intendants: a Governing Elite in
Eighteenth-Century France (New York, 1968), pp. 120-21.
44 P. Robin, La compagnie des secrétaires du roi, 1351-1791 (Paris, 1933), pp. 10-
13; François Bluche & Pierre Durye, L’anoblissement par charges avant 1789 (La
Roche-sur-Yon, 1962), vol. 2, pp. 3-12.
45 For the Grande Chancellerie, see the Mémoire pertaining to finances, septembre
1789, in AN V2 55; for the provincial offices, see Jean Meyer, La Noblesse
bretonne au XVIIIe siècle (S.E.V.P.E.N., Paris, 1966), vol. 1, p. 241.
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on discovering that the wealthy merchants and financiers who composed
the Grande Chancellerie in Paris numbered 300, and that to reimburse
them the price of their offices would have cost 36 million livres. In
addition, their credit rating being higher than the king’s, they had
collectively borrowed from the public another 24 million livres for the
royal treasury, a sum the state would have had also to repay.46 Adding to
these the price of the offices of the nearly 500 gardes des sceaux,
audienciers, contrôleurs and secrétaires in twenty provincial
chancelleries, places that cost nearly 40 million livres, it is clear that the
king would have needed about 100 million livres if he were to reimburse
and retire all the chancellerie offices. The condition of royal finances, for
which each new year brought the need for additional borrowing, made it
evident even to Necker that it was impossible to touch this structure. If
French kings had once been able to dispossess and destroy merchants and
financiers, that time was long past.
In principle, of course, the actual effect of the offices in
ennobling roturiers could have been limited if their turnover was very
slow or if, as happened elsewhere, it was common for sons to follow
fathers in the same offices. In this, as in most other ennobling offices, the
occupant and his descendants were confirmed in the acquisition of nobility
only if he either held the office for twenty years or died earlier while
serving in it. For the 300 offices in the Grande Chancellerie in Paris the
information is good: here 266 persons entered places of secrétaire du roi,
1774-89. Of those, five succeeded their fathers in the office and thus need
not have entered in order to gain noblesse.47 But it appears that all the
other 261 were roturiers. Seven had been in other ennobling offices, but
only of the kind that ennobled over two degrees, that is, when father and
46 AN, V2 55: mémoire on finances, septembre 1789.
47 The figures are derived from analysis of the dossiers of the “enquête sur la vie et
les moeurs” of the secrétaires du roi, who entered the Grande Chancellerie. The
dossiers are in AN V2 35-46, and are complete for the years 1675-1705, 1713-
1789. The number of entering secrétaires du roi who succeeded their fathers in the
office and thus did not need it for the purpose of being ennobled had declined
throughout the century: in the years 1731-1750, there were 31 sons and 3
grandsons of former secrétaires du roi who entered the office; in 1751-1770, there
were 25 sons; in 1771-1789, only 6. The average of more than 17 entries a year,
1774-1789, is slightly higher than normal. It reflects some that were delayed
during the years 1771-1773, when the abbé Terray was demanding an additional
40,000 livres from each officer, until 1774 and after. Normal recruitment was that
of the 1780s when about 16 entered each year.
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son each held the office; these 7 now became secrétaires du roi to speed
the process of ennoblement. A sampling of dossiers of the “enquête sur la
vie et les moeurs” for 87 secrétaires reveals the roturier occupations of
their fathers: 30 merchants, 13 in bailliage, sénéchaussée, or municipal
administration; 6 with places in the tax farms or various offices in finance;
others were doctors, lawyers, notaries, some designated only “bourgeois,”
a few “laboureurs” or non-noble landowners.48 Except for the three in this
sample whose fathers were secrétaires du roi, all evidently needed the
office to gain noble status.
That impression is strongly reinforced by examining the more
numerous secrétaires du roi in the provinces. The evidence, if less
detailed, is at least as clear. Here the secrétaires du roi, unlike their
colleagues in Paris who were exempted from it, had to pay at entry not
only the ordinary marc d’or, but as well the marc d’or de la noblesse, a
special fee imposed by the edict of December 1770 on roturiers who
entered ennobling offices – 3,000 livres for entry to offices that ennobled
in one degree, 1,500 livres for those that required the two generations’
service. The aim of the edict was to generate revenue for the king by
making persons ennobled by office pay the same amount as would have
been required had they received lettres de noblesse. When, as frequently
happened, the entrant to one of these offices was already noble and thus
could not profit additionally from its power to confer noblesse, he applied
to the Royal Council for a special arrêt dispensing him from having to pay
the fee. To secure this arrêt the applicant had to present his proofs that he
was already noble, and the proofs were detailed in the arrêt itself. These
dispensations from the payment have been printed.49 In addition, evidence
48 The sample selected for closer examination was constituted from the dossiers of
entrants in 1773, 1776, 1779, 1782, 1785, and 1788.
49 Robert de Roton, Les Arrêts du Grand Conseil portant dispense du marc d’or de
noblesse, commentés et complétés par J. de la Trollière & R. de Montmort (Paris,
1951). The arrêts de dispense were taken from AN E 2466-2655. The volume’s
uses for analyzing the social composition of institutions were shown by Jean Égret:
“L’aristocratie parlementaire française à la fin de l’ancien régime,” Revue
historique 208 (1952), 1-14. The Roton collection of arrêts omits one interesting
category of very new nobles who received dispensation from making the payment,
that is, the sons or grandsons of secrétaires du roi in the Grande Chancellerie who
had not completed twenty years in office when the Revolution began. By special
arrangement such sons or grandsons had been considered to be nobles already, this
on the traditional privilege granted earlier to the Grande Chancellerie and
providing that its member, although he might lose the status if he failed to serve
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as to who actually paid as well as the noble entrants who did not is
available from 1784 to 1789 in the records of receipts issued by the
trésorier des revenus casuels.50 From one or the other of these sources,
and some others discussed later, the genealogical profile of the entrants to
nearly all ennobling offices can be sketched.
In the case of the twenty provincial chancelleries, the records of
payments of the ordinary marc d’or show that from 1784 alone, 206
persons entered their ennobling offices. Among the 206, there were three
who paid only 1,500 livres because, having bought since 1770 another
office that conferred noblesse over two generations, they had already paid
1,500 livres and had now only to make up the difference to the 3,000
livres that were required to attain noblesse in the first degree. All the rest,
the other 203, paid 3,000 livres. In short, none but roturiers entered these
offices.
Considering the motives of the persons who bought offices in the
chancelleries, it is not surprising that movement through them was rapid.
With some exceptions in Paris, this was not an office that many wished to
occupy longer than was necessary to become nobles; it was commonly
sold promptly by its owner after twenty years incumbency. In addition, the
secrétaires du roi were much older than other entrants to offices – nearly
half were aged 50 or more when they entered the Grande Chancellerie.
Consequently, they often died before completing twenty years there: this
was the case in almost one-third (82 of 266) of the vacancies created after
1774.51 Thus, the turnover was very high. In the provincial chancelleries
the twenty years, became a noble at the moment when he entered the office.
Genealogists are no doubt purists, and in this instance the editors evidently did not
wish to assign noble rank to families that did not really have it. Since the
secrétaires du roi who in 1789 had not served twenty years did not and could not
fulfill the formal requirement for confirming and preserving their nobility, our
genealogists revoked their, and their descendants’ noble status and did not print
their arrêts de dispense. To find out how many dispenses of this type may have
been omitted from the printed volume, I used Mme Gallet’s inventaire of arrêts for
the Turgot ministry (May 1774 –May 1776), which yield five, and also examined
AN E 2590-2627 (late 1783-1786) where five others were found. For the whole
period 1771-89, perhaps forty dispenses will have been excluded.
50 AN P 4881-4888.
51 These figures are based on the dossiers for the secrétaires du roi in the Grande
Chancellerie: AN V2 35-46. Dates of baptism are available for 261 of the 266 who
entered after 1774, and their ages at entry were: under 40, 70 (27%); 40-49, 77
(29.5%); 50-59, 71 (27%); 60 and over, 43 (16.5%).
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an estimated 605 persons passed through their nearly 500 offices during
the fifteen and one-half years beginning in 1774.52 That number is slightly
misleading, swelled as it is by the additional purchasers who had been
afraid to acquire the office during the years between 1771 and 1773, when
Maupeou and Terray were making threats to accompany the demands for
additional capital from these offices. Many waited until 1774 and later to
buy. Trade in these as in all offices was especially brisk in 1775 and 1776.
Even so, the yearly average of 39 entries for the period from 1774 to 1789
falls only to 36 when the years 1771-73 are included. After adding 12
known entrants to the small Chancellerie du Palais in Paris, it is a
reasonable estimate that 883 persons, all but five of them roturiers,
entered the chancelleries’ ennobling offices in Paris and the provinces
during this period.
3. Municipal Offices. Ennoblement through municipal office, very
common in the early seventeenth century, was sharply reduced in 1667. In
five cities by the later eighteenth century seven offices of maire and
lieutenant de maire continued to ennoble their occupants for serving over
periods varying from four to twenty years, but these were not very
significant in the addition that they brought to the nobility.53 In three other
cities, however, places in municipal administration remained important for
52 Chronological lists of all entries into three (Arras, Dijon and Montauban) of the
twenty chancelleries are available, and in them the 23 officers who were received
from 1784 to 1789 were 32.4% of the total (71) who entered those chancelleries in
the whole period, 1774-89. We know that in all 206 persons entered the twenty
chancelleries after 1784, but about ten were the first holders at Roussillon of
offices created under Louis XIV but never before sold. By reducing the figure for
Roussillon by ten to make it conform to the average for the other chancelleries, we
can take 196 as the proper figure to represent normal turnover in these offices in
1784-89. Calculating that they were 32.4% of all entrants 1774-89, we can
estimate the total entering during that period at 605. The chronological lists for
specific chancelleries are in André Bourée, La Chancellerie près le Parlement de
Bourgogne de 1476 à 1790, avec les noms, généalogies et armoiries de ses
officiers (Dijon, 1927); M. Taupiac, Notice sur la Cour des Aides de Montauban,
suivie de la liste chronologique de ses membres (1642-1790) (Montauban, 1865);
Chev. Amédée Le Boucq de Ternas, La Chancellerie d’Artois, ses officiers et leur
généalogie, continuée jusqu’à nos jours (Arras, 1882).
53 For information on which offices ennobled and when, see Bluche & Durye,
L’anoblissement par charges, vol. 1, pp. 23-38.
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that purpose down to 1789. In Paris, in addition to three administrative
offices that ennobled over twenty years, places of échevins conferred
noblesse for only two years of service. Two new men each year, many of
them lawyers but some financiers and doctors also, came into these
offices. It was exactly the same at Lyon, except that merchants and
financiers were more strongly represented in the recruitment to the
échevinage. At Toulouse a bitter struggle was taking place over the
composition of the capitoulat that had at times produced as many as seven
new nobles a year, many of them not from the region, and a few who
never even saw the city. The fight led to a sharp reduction in the number
of roturiers admitted to those ennobling offices, but even there 31 entered
and gained noblesse in the years 1774-89. The 31 at Toulouse, added to 30
from Lyon, 35 at Paris, 4 maires of Nantes, and a few more in other cities
bring to about 100 the total of non-noble persons who entered ennobling
municipal offices in this period.54
4. Bureaux des Finances. The offices in these courts shared the privileges
of the chambres des comptes and, except at Paris and Grenoble where
their holders received nobility in a single generation, they gave gradual
noblesse in two degrees. The number of présidents, trésoriers de France,
procureurs et avocats du roi, greffiers and chevaliers d’honneur – all
ennobling offices – had risen throughout the seventeenth century, even as
their functions diminished. Their role, once a large one in assessing and
distributing taxes, watching over all the operations in the royal domain,
supervising the building and repair of roads, verifying annual lists of
payments to all local officials, became trivial under the relentless
administrative imperialism of the intendants and, to a lesser degree, the
chambres des comptes. Nonetheless, except at Nantes where this court was
absorbed into the Chambre des Comptes, every généralité retained an
independent court. The 28 bodies contained 769 ennobling offices filled
by persons whose real life, work, and even residence usually lay
elsewhere. Revenue from the periodic fees that they paid and the need to
54 For Paris, the names of the échevins, with summary indication of profession, are
in the volumes of the Almanach Royal, 1774-90; for Lyon, see Maurice Garden,
Lyon et les Lyonnais au 18e siècle, Bibliothèque de la Faculté des Lettres de Lyon,
18 (Paris, 1970), pp. 497-505; for Toulouse, Archives départementales de la Haute
Garonne, C290.
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reimburse them the more than 33 million livres in capital invested in the
offices were enough to assure their survival.55
Turnover in these offices was slower than that in the
chancelleries. The explanation for this lies at least partly in the need for
both father and son to hold the office to obtain hereditary nobility. The
father frequently would keep it longer than twenty years, awaiting the
arrival at legal maturity of an heir; or, in this relay race, his own twenty-
year stint completed, he would promptly turn the office over to a son
barely out of his teens whose actuarial chances of completing the full
twenty years in office were substantially stronger than those of the older
secrétaires du roi. Even so, movement through the bureaux des finances
was brisk and regular. Between 1784 and 1789, payments for the regular
marc d’or were made by 167 persons to enter the offices that ennobled,
and of those 167, all but ten paid the additional marc d’or de la noblesse
signifying that they were roturiers.56 From available lists that show the
names and number of men coming into eight of the bureaux des finances,
it emerges that the members who entered in 1784 or later were 29% of all
the entrants to those courts in 1774-89.57 Applying the proportion derived
55 The distribution of offices in 1789, except greffiers, is listed in Jean-Paul
Charmeil, Les trésoriers de France à l’époque de la Fronde (Paris, 1964), p. 18;
the offices of greffier, also ennobling, are specified for the individual courts in
Louis de la Roque & Éd. de Barthélemy, Catalogue des gentilshommes qui ont
pris part ou envoyé leur procuration aux Assemblées de la Noblesse pour
l’élection des Députés aux États-Généraux de 1789 (Paris, 1862-92), in 26 parts,
divided by region and published separately. For the total investment in these
offices, see the table in Édouard Éverat, Le bureau des finances de Riom, 1551-
1790 (Riom, 1900), p. 617.
56 The term “roturier” in this instance, as for all the courts where the officers
ennobled only over two degrees, is somewhat misleading. A second-generation
officer whose father had been a roturier would, if he fulfilled the required terms,
count as a second generation noble, even though on entering the office he had been
technically still a roturier and paid the 1,500 livres for the marc d’or de la
noblesse. His son, in turn, would be a third-generation noble. The records for the
marc d’or do not distinguish between the first and second generations in the
offices that gave only gradual noblesse, and the effect of calling all of them
roturiers, as I shall do, is to expand that category at the expense of the second-
generation nobles. For the purpose here, however, that will not matter much
because for this analysis the critical dividing line is at four generations.
57 Lists available were for the bureaux des finances of Aix: Balthasar de Clapiers-
Collongues, Chronologie des officiers des Cours Souveraines de Provence (Aix-
en-Provence, 1904); Amiens: comte Adrien de Louvencourt, Les trésoriers de
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from the eight courts to the whole group, it can be calculated without risk
of much error that, in all, 568 would have entered from 1774. Then, using
the dispensations from the marc d’or de la noblesse that give information
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5. Cours des Comptes, Aides, Monnaies. With these financial courts we
begin to arrive at the range of offices whose holders, or at least some of
them, actually worked. Whether they worked well or badly is, of course,
not the question here. The fifteen courts that concerned themselves with
affairs of taxation and finance varied enormously in size. Their
approximately 980 ennobling offices were spread through the Chambre
des Comptes in Paris with its 200 members, those of Montpellier and
France de la généralité de Picardie ou d’Amiens (Amiens, 1896); Dijon: le père
Gautier, Armorial de la Chambre des Comptes de Dijon (Dijon, 1881); Lille: baron
Eléonore Paul Constant du Chambge de Liessart, Notes historiques relatives aux
offices et aux officiers du Bureau des Finances de la généralité de Lille (Lille,
1885); Lyon: Léonard Michon and B.H. de Saint-Didier, Armorial général de
nosseigneurs les présidents, chevaliers d’honneur, trésoriers généraux de France,
avocats et procureurs du roy au bureau des finances de la généralité de Lyon…
1577-1790 (Lyon, 1903); Moulins: C. Grégoire, “Le bureau des finances de
Moulins, 1587-1790,” Bull. Soc. Émul. Bourbonnais 18 (1910), 155-158, 188-195;
Poitiers: Adrien Bonvallet, “Le bureau des finances de la généralité de Poitiers,”
Mémoires de la Soc. des Antiquaires de l’Ouest, 2e série, no. 6 (1883), 340-74;
Riom: Éverat, Le bureau des finances de Riom, pp. 289-306. The proportion of
entrants, 1784-1789 only, relative to those for 1774-1789 is based on figures for
offices of trésoriers de France, procureurs et avocats du roi, and greffiers en chef
that appear uniformly in all the lists. Of the 136 who took those offices from 1774,
40 did so in 1784 or later. The 29% that they represent is lower than the figure for
the secrétaires du roi, and reflects the sharp reduction in entries after May 1788
when the bureaux des finances, together with some of the other sovereign courts,
were suppressed. Although they were restored in September, the uncertainty of the
situation lingered. As a result, in 1788 only 16 of these offices changed hands,
whereas the average for the preceding years was 35.
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Rouen, that had 125 each, down to the ones at Bar-le-Duc and Metz that
together could muster only 20.58 Among those officers, 359 (37%) gave-
first degree noblesse: 315 in the three Paris courts, 38 in the Chambre des
Comptes at Grenoble and 6 at Metz. All the rest required the two
generations of service. It is here, in institutions that played some
administrative role, where one might expect to find that nobles were
themselves filling the offices and excluding newcomers. To a limited
extent that did happen, for the records of the marc d’or payments, from
1784 to 1788, when the uncertainties concerning all venal offices caused a
substantial drop in entries, show that 32% (48 of 151) of the new office
holders in these courts did not pay the additional marc d’or de la noblesse
and had thus been nobles earlier.59 Still, after reconstructing lists for all the
entries of présidents, conseillers, maîtres, correcteurs, auditeurs, and the
gens du roi, and finding and classifying all the nobles according to their
degree of noblesse,60 it is the preponderance of roturiers and quite new
nobles that impresses:
58 These figures exclude the non-functional offices of chevalier d’honneur and
conseillers d’honneur, usually filled by nobles.
59 AN P 4881-4887.
60 The list includes all officers who entered an ennobling office in these financial
courts after 1774. In some cases the officer, usually a maître des comptes or a
président, might have occupied a different ennobling office in the same or another
court; if he entered the other office before 1774, he is counted in the office and
court to which he shifted after 1774. It was fairly common for the officer to enter
two ennobling offices in the same court, since présidents were usually recruited
from within the court, and in chambres des comptes there was also frequent
shifting from offices of correcteur to those of auditeur and maître. In all those
cases the officer is counted only once. It was much less common, except in Paris,
for the officer to enter two ennobling offices in two different courts after 1774. If
he did, he is counted twice. At least twenty-two of the 90 officers who entered the
Châtelet after 1774 had gone on to other ennobling offices before 1789. Among
the 66 maîtres des reqûetes who took office in this period, 17 had also entered as
conseillers in the Parlement de Paris in 1774 or after; four others had been in the
Cour des Aides de Paris, and six were from various provincial courts. Thus, 27 of
the maîtres des reqûetes will appear on two lists. Elsewhere, the problem is not a
serious one. In the parlements most présidents and the gens du roi came from
within the same court (see J. Égret, “L’aristocratie parlementaire…,” 3-6). In the
chambres des comptes and cours des aides promotion of outsiders to be président
or procureur général, in particular, was a little more frequent, but duplication of
entries to ennobling offices since 1774 through service in two of these courts
involved only about 10 cases: 3 présidents each in the Cour des Aides and
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Chambre des Comptes of Paris (5 of these 6 had been in the Parlement de Paris), 4
similar cases in the provinces. In other offices such shifting almost never occurred.
But it should be kept in mind, when considering the full enumeration of
ennoblements and entry to ennobling offices that between 60 and 70 persons,
spread about equally through the columns that distinguish the degree of noblesse,
will have been counted twice.
Lists for each court have been assembled from a range of printed and unprinted
sources. For the courts in Paris, the volumes of the Almanach Royal have been
used in addition to H. Coustant d’Yanville, Chambre des Comptes de Paris. Essais
historiques et chronologiques, privilèges et attributions nobiliaires et armorial
(Paris, 1866-75); and François Bluche, Les magistrats de la Cour des Monnaies de
Paris au XVIIIe siècle, 1715-1790, Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon,
vol. 81 (Paris, 1966). For the courts in Aix, Dijon, and Montauban, the works by
Clapiers-Collongues, Gautier and Taupiac, cited in notes 52 and 57 above, provide
lists. Others, for Grenoble, Montpellier, and Nantes are in M. Pilot-Dethorey & M.
A. Prudhomme, Inventaire-Sommaire des Archives Départementales antérieures à
1790: Isère. Archives civiles – série B (Grenoble, 1884), vol. 2, pp. 78-108; Pierre
Vialles, Etudes historiques sur la Cour des Comptes, Aides et Finances de
Montpellier, d’après ses archives privées (Montpellier, 1921); M. H. de Fourmont,
Histoire de la Chambre des Comptes de Bretagne (Paris, 1854). Finally, among
the printed sources, two works list for all the courts officers still serving in 1788 or
1789, sometimes with date of entry; these works would, of course, omit anyone
who entered after 1774 and died or resigned before 1789, but they are helpful for
verifying and completing lists assembled in other ways. They are La Roque &
Barthélemy, Catalogue des Gentilshommes (see note 55 above) and [Duhamel],
État de la magistrature en France. Pour l’année 1789. Publié pour la première
fois en 1788 (Paris, 1789).
To check these lists, and to make new ones for the other six courts for which
none in print was available, various manuscript sources were used. Complete lists
of all who entered these offices in 1784 and after were taken from the records of
payments of the marc d’or (AN P 4881-4888). For the period 1774-1783 copies of
the provisions of office, arranged in dossiers alphabetically by office, fill four to
six cartons for each year in AN V1 470 ff. From 1771 many entering roturiers who
had paid the marc d'or de la noblesse had that fact marked on their provisions,
although comparison to the registers of the trésorier des revenus casuels shows
that this was not done systematically and the omissions are too numerous to allow
for their safe statistical use for purpose of social analysis. For this study I used
only the dossiers marked “conseillers.” In addition, there are other registers of the
trésorier des revenus casuels (AN P 3730-3747) that record payments made for
“survivances” of offices. These registers are an accurate measure of how many
offices changed hands, but between 5% and 20%, according to the individual
court, of the persons recorded as making the payment were heirs or creditors of the
















Aix 17 4 5 1 4 31
Bar-le-Duc 4 0 0 0 4 8
Dijon 28 3 6 0 2 39
Grenoble 18 1 1 0 0 20
Metz 4 0 0 0 0 4
Montpellier 64 3 10 3 5 85
Nancy 7 0 1 0 4 12
Nantes 49 3 2 0 1 55
Paris 51 39 16 1 11 118
Rouen 49 3 3 0 4 59
TOTAL 291 56 44 5 35 431
Cours des
Aides
Bordeaux 28 2 0 1 0 31
Clermont-
Ferrand
16 0 0 0 1 17
Montauban 16 1 1 1 0 19
Paris 21 22 13 4 7 67




19 3 0 0 2 24
SUMMARY 391 84 58 11 45 589
from the combined manuscript sources in the Archives Nationales proved to
coincide almost exactly with the others, often made from local records that were in
print. There is no reason to think that the lists for the courts where no printed list
was available would be any less accurate.
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One fact that emerges is that their occupants did not leave these
offices nearly so quickly as did those who were in offices solely to be
ennobled. Movement through the offices in the provincial chancelleries
was nearly twice as fast.61 In the financial courts men coming in were
much younger: in the Cour des Aides de Paris, from 1727, 84% were not
yet 30, and 56% under 25, this compared to the Grande Chancellerie
where only several were less than 30 and 73% were over 40.62 There was,
perhaps, a professional, and also a financial, interest in remaining in these
working courts for a long time. A close study of the papers of Dionis de
Séjour, conseiller du roi in the Cour des Aides from 1724, shows that the
2% return on his 68,000 livres invested in the office began to rise toward
the 10% it eventually reached only after he had served for twenty-eight
years and started then to receive bigger fees through seniority.63 Only
early entry and living a long time brought a good return. Others were held
to their corps by professional interest and by the heightened social
standing that their places conferred. For all that, if they remained longer
where they were, the majority of these magistrates were men who would
gain noble status from their jobs.
6. Parlements and Conseils Souverains or Supérieurs. Here at last is the
group of magistrates whose credentials as nobles were often in good order.
Their story is familiar.64 Secure and confident in their aristocratic status,
steeped in truths derived from Montesquieu and an English model they
perceived only dimly, they did not hesitate to instruct the crown about
what they called the “fundamental laws” of the putative French
constitution. They used their venal offices to provide the independent base
from which they preached about the proper limits to draw to the crown’s
authority. Activist parlementaires claimed a kind of right of judicial
review, and sometimes refused to validate by registration in their courts
61 In the provincial chancelleries, about 600 persons entered the nearly 500 offices;
in these financial courts, counting the miscellaneous sovereign court officers
discussed below, about 650 persons entered 980 offices.
62 For the Grande Chancellerie, see note 51, above; for the Cour des Aides, G.
d’Arvisinet, “L’office de conseiller de la Cour des Aides de Paris, au XVIIIe
siècle, d’après les mémoires inédits de Louis-Achille Dionis du Séjour,” Revue
hist. de Droit français et étranger, 4e série, 33 (1955), 540, n. 5.
63 Ibid., 539-59.
64 See the well known works by R. Bickart, Fr. Bluche, E. Carcassonne, J. Égret, F.
Ford.
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the acts of royal authority, especially on financial matters, that they
regarded as unconstitutional. Through their periodic confrontations with
the king’s administration they were powerful enough to block action and,
in the end, to force the crown to call first the Assembly of Notables and
then the Estates General in its desperate effort to by-pass them. The proud
magistrates in the more aggressive of the sovereign courts have
increasingly seemed to historians the main moving force that defined and
led the broad movement within which were united many nobles in defense
of their privileges. Their ideas, institutional base, training in law, and skill
with words, it is said, made the parlementaires from at least mid-century
the aristocracy’s voice that articulated more clearly what the other
members of that class thought.
The sixteen courts contained slightly more than 1,000 offices of
présidents, conseillers, and gens du roi that ennobled their holders. The
data here are perhaps less certain for the officers who are listed as second-
or third-generation nobles – some, though probably not many, may have
had additional degrees of noblesse.65 The following genealogical profile of
65 There is a problem here that, for the moment, I can only state. For most
individuals who received a dispense from paying the marc d’or de la noblesse, the
arrét traces the family’s noble origin to a source that roturiers commonly used for
ennoblement, the lettres de noblesse, but more often to an office in a chancellerie
or in a financial court. For them there is little difficulty. But for others, especially
in the Parlement de Paris, it is clear that the arrêts de dispense do not always list
all the noble ancestors. For example, when the young Anjorrant entered as
conseiller there in 1778, the arrêt noted only that his father was also conseiller, an
office that conferred first-degree noblesse on its holder. For Anjorrant, the arrêt
thus tells us that he was a noble, but not that he was in fact a ninth-generation
noble, which we learn from the dictionary of officers in the Parlement de Paris: Fr.
Bluche, L’origine des magistrats du Parlement de Paris au XVIIIe siècle (1715-
1771): Dictionnaire généalogique, Mémoires de la Fédération des sociétés
historiques et archéologiques de Paris et de l’Ile-de France (Paris, 1956), vol.s 5-6,
1953-1954. For Paris, this and other of Bluche’s works make verification easy. But
outside Paris there were 70 such cases where the presence of ancestors in the same
court for one or two generations, depending on the number required for
ennoblement, is all that appears. This leaves doubt as to whether there may have
been additional noble ancestors. The type appears everywhere, but most frequently
at Pau (11 instances) and at Besançon, Bordeaux and Dijon (9 each). Where the
offices ennobled over two generations and where the proof of noblesse is that the
father and grandfather held offices in the same court, an additional noble ancestor
would have pushed some across the important line between the third and fourth
generations. Some of the 70, then, might have been older nobles. I am inclined to
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680 entering parlementaires, 1774-1789, is nonetheless accurate in the
main outline it portrays:66
think, however, that outside Paris, where corrections have been made for this
tabulation, such cases were rare, for in 61 other cases of exactly the same type,
entrants listed degrees of noblesse beyond what they actually needed to prove they
were noble. This suggests that if the 70 dubious cases could have shown additional
degrees of noblesse, they would have done so.
66 The heterogeneous social and professional recruitment to the parlements is
shown in Égret’s article (note 49 above). The figures here are derived from the
unprinted sources detailed in note 60, above, and from printed works by Clapiers-
Collongues (note 57), Pilot-Dethorey & Prudhomme, La Roque & Barthélemy,
Duhamel (all specified in note 60), Bluche (note 65), as well as from the Almanach
Royal and Roton. In addition, for Arras: P.-A.-S.-J. Plouvain, Notes historiques
relatives aux officiers et aux offices du Conseil provincial d’Artois (Douai, 1823);
for Bordeaux: J.N. Dast Le Vacher de Boisville, Liste générale et alphabétique des
membres du parlement de Bordeaux (Bordeaux, 1896); for Grenoble: Jean Égret,
Le parlement de Dauphiné et les affaires publiques dans la deuxième moitié du
XVIIIe siècle (Grenoble & Paris, 1942), vol. 2, pp. 374-78; for Metz: Emmanuel
Michel, Biographie du parlement de Metz (Metz, 1853); for Nancy: Hubert de
Mahuet, La Cour Souveraine de Lorraine et Barrois, 1641-1790 (Nancy, 1958),
pp. 234-43; for Rennes: Frédéric Saulnier, Le parlement de Bretagne, 1554-1790…
(Rennes, 2 vol.s, 1909); for Rouen: Stéphane & Louis de Merval, Catalogue et
armorial des présidents, conseillers, gens du roi et greffiers du parlement de
Rouen (Rouen, 1867); for Toulouse: Benjamin Faucher & Thérèse Gérard,
Inventaire des Archives départementales antérieures à 1790. Haute-Garonne,











Aix 5 0 12 5 12 34
Alsace
(Colmar)
8 0 0 1 1 10
Artois
(Arras)
10 4 0 0 0 14
Besançon 6 13 6 4 8 37
Bordeaux 15 1 18 3 13 50
Dijon 13 5 16 14 15 63
Douai 6 14 4 2 5 31
Grenoble 6 7 8 1 9 31
Metz 13 12 6 1 3 35
Nancy 0 0 0 0 17 17
Paris 9 20 26 23 38 116
Pau 15 2 12 2 12 43
Rennes 0 0 0 0 72 72
Rouen 11 1 11 8 34 65
Roussillon
(Perpignan)
3 0 3 2 6 14













Several points deserve comment. Overall, turnover in these
offices was fairly slow, and although they conferred noblesse on their
holders, over 80% of the entrants did not need it. The courts varied
enormously in size, importance and degree of aristocratic membership.
The parlements at Rennes and Nancy were special cases where the courts
themselves verified the noblesse of their recruits and accepted only old
nobles. At the other end the three conseils of Alsace, Artois, and
Roussillon, together with the parlements of Douai and Metz, were quite
open; they did not differ much from the chambres des comptes in their
recruitment. Among the other courts, those where 50% or more of entering
members had at least four generations of nobility – Paris, Aix, Rouen,
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Toulouse – were also the ones that, together with the Parlement of Rennes,
had strong traditions of intransigent resistance to the king.67
For us, however, what matters most is, which of these new
magistrates would have been excluded from entry into the army officer
corps by the requirement for four generations of nobility. It appears that
about one-half of all the entering magistrates in these courts, or three-fifths
of those outside Rennes and Nancy, could not themselves have satisfied
the requirement. There was, of course, a sizable group here of third-
generation nobles whose sons would have been eligible to become army
officers. But since almost invariably the entrants to the offices in the
sovereign courts were very young, they did not in fact have sons to
place.68 Except at Rennes and Nancy, the four-generation requirement cut
through and divided most courts somewhere near the middle.
7. Miscellaneous Offices in High Sovereign Courts. It would be easy to
overlook approximately 150 offices of various kinds that were steadily
producing a number of new nobles. They are here classified separately
because, whereas all the others are complete, this list will have at least a
few omissions, and because also to include these with the others would be
misleading, especially for the parlements, by suggesting a more open
67 The various writings of Jean Égret are essential for these matters: in the 1780s
the parlements of Besançon, Bordeaux, and Dijon, quiet earlier, became active: the
“badly composed” courts at Arras, Colmar, Douai and Metz were subservient to
the crown throughout; see La Pré-Révolution française, 1787-1788 (Paris, 1962),
ch. 5. Contemporaries during the Maupeou ministry were drawing connections
between the recruitment of non-nobles and anoblis to the magistracy, on the one
hand, and obsequious compliance with despotic royal demands enforced with
military display, on the other: see Louis XV et l’opposition parlementaire, 1715-74
(Paris, 1970), pp. 193, 198, 227-28. For the composition at Grenoble, see Le
parlement de Dauphiné et les affaires publiques, vol. 1, pp. 20-24, 290-94; vol. 2,
pp. 27-37. For recruitment at Colmar, see F. Burckhard, “La bourgeoisie
parlementaire au XVIIIe siècle,” in La bourgeoisie alsacienne, études d'histoire
sociale, Publications de la Société savante d’Alsace et des régions de l’est
(Strasbourg & Paris, 1954), pp. 153-176; for the Maupeou Parlement and Chambre
des Comptes at Aix, see Ch. Carrière, “Le recrutement de la Cour des Comptes,
Aides et Finances d’Aix-en-Provence à la fin de l’ancien régime,” Actes du 81e
Congrès national des Sociétés savantes (Rouen-Caen & Paris, 1956), pp. 141-59.
68 Of the 126 entrants who were third-generation nobles and whose ages have been
determined, 86 (68%) were not yet 25 years of age, an additional 19 (15%) were
25-29 years old, and only 8 (6%) were over 40.
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recruitment than there really was in the functionally more important
offices of the magistrates. In the case of the Parlement of Rennes, for
example, no roturiers could get into places of conseiller but roturiers were
being ennobled in six other, lesser offices of different kinds in that court.
The list here is complete for entrants after 1784, but not for the ten
preceding years.69 These offices include the court clerks (greffiers), at
least 56 offices in 32 courts, of which 20 offices ennobled in the first
degree. Places as secrétaire, or secrétaire et notaire, ennobled in 12
courts70; the function of substitut du procureur général did so in eight
others,71 those of premier huissier in ten,72 and payeur des gages in three.
The not quite complete listing of entrants to these offices shows, again for
1774-89:
69 For 1784-89 the listing of entrants is derived from AN P 4881-4888; for 1774-
83, printed sources for individual courts are cited in notes 52, 55, 57, 60, 66, as
well as the Almanach Royal. For other courts, La Roque & Barthélemy, and
Duhamel, list the officers serving in 1789, sometimes, but not always, indicating
date of entry; they do not include entrants who may have left office before 1788.
For these offices I have not used the provisions in série V1 in the AN. As before,
Bluche & Durye, L’anoblissement par charges… is very useful.
70 Nine courts – the parlements of Aix, Paris, Rouen; chambres des comptes of
Aix, Grenoble; cours des aides of Bordeaux, Montauban, Paris; Grand Conseil –
contained 31 of these offices that ennobled, of which 17 in the first degree. Similar
offices ennobled in the Parlement of Bordeaux and in the chambres des comptes of
Bar-le-Duc and Rouen, but I do not know their number. In other courts these
offices seem not to have conferred noblesse on their holders.
71 The 36 ennobling offices were in the parlements of Besançon, Metz, Paris, Pau,
Rennes; the Chambre des Comptes of Nantes; the Cour des Aides of Paris; the
Grand Conseil. Three additional offices at Metz were not filled.
72 In the parlements of Besançon, Bordeaux, Paris, Pau, Rennes; the chambre des
comptes of Nantes and Paris; the cours des aides of Bordeaux and Paris; the Grand
Conseil. There could be others – only the actual payments of the marc d’or de la
noblesse (AN P 4881-4883) reveal that these offices in two courts at Bordeaux
were ennobling. If registers for payments from 1771 to 1783 were available,




















19 5 0 0 2 26
Premier
huissier
6 0 1 0 0 7
Payeurs des
gages
3 1 0 0 0 4
Total 106 8 2 1 4 121
8. Royal Administration. The maîtres des requêtes serving in the Royal
Council were at the heart of the central administration. From their ranks
were selected the intendants whose activities in the provinces built the
centralized state by steadily expanding its powers and functions.73 With
them, for convenience, might be placed two courts whose offices also
ennobled, but that do not fit easily with the sovereign courts. The Grand
Conseil was the body to which was assigned investigations and legal cases
that the crown evoked and thereby took out of the hands of the ordinary
73 The fundamental institutional and social study is by Michel Antoine, Le Conseil
du Roi sous le règne de Louis XV, Mémoires et documents publiés par la Société
de l’Ecole des Chartes (Genève, 1970), p. 19. See pp. 247-264, on social
recruitment. Social origins of the intendants who were serving in 1710-12, 1749-
1751 and 1774-1776 are compared and analyzed by Vivian R. Gruder, The Royal
Provincial Intendants. See also Roland Mousnier et al, Le Conseil du Roi de Louis
XII à la Révolution, Travaux du Centre de recherches sur la civilisation de
l’Europe moderne, fasc. 6 (Paris, 1970), pp. 31-45. M. Antoine is preparing a
biographical and genealogical dictionary of the maîtres des requêtes who served
during Louis XV’s reign.
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magistrates.74 To some, the administrative justice it dispensed seemed the
essence of arbitrariness, even despotism. Finally, the Châtelet was the
bailliage court of Paris, and the only one in France below the level of the
sovereign courts whose offices ennobled. Its officials often entered young
and put in an apprenticeship there in the work of justice and administration
before they moved into the network of pure administration. In the period













10 13 13 7 23 66
Grand
Conseil
17 2 2 0 1 22
Châtelet 37 24 13 5 11 90
Total 64 39 28 12 35 178
To the preceding enumeration should no doubt be added a few
more offices and persons here and there. In the colonies especially: there
were in 1789 fifty ennobling offices in the three conseils supérieurs of
Guadeloupe, Martinique and Saint-Domingue. Lists of the officers in the
first two of those Conseils show that 25 entered after 1774.76 No doubt
most were roturiers, but they do not appear in the sources used for this
study. Lettres de noblesse issued in the colonies might also be added, but
74 Bluche, Les magistrats du Grand Conseil au XVIIIe siècle, Annales littéraires de
l’université de Besançon, vol. 83 (Paris, 1966), for analysis of the institution and
list of members with summary information on each.
75 Lists compiled from the volumes of the Almanach Royal, verified and completed
from the provisions in AN V1; P 4881-4888; and Roton, Les arrêts du Grand
Conseil…., including the conseillers d’état, who almost invariably were recruited
from persons who were already in other ennobling offices, would have multiplied
the problem of duplication in our enumeration and are omitted.
76 Bluche & Durye, L’anoblissement par charges.., vol. 2, pp. 32-33; lists in La
Roque & Barthélemy, Catalogue des gentilshommes, and [Duhamel], État de la
magistrature..., pp. 483-504.
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in the absence of fuller data are left out. That said, a summary detailing
ennoblements and the genealogical composition of the office holding






























106 8 2 1 4 121
Administration 64 39 28 12 35 178
Total 2477 231 230 100 351 3389
This table measures rather well the proportions of new and old
noble families at the upper levels of civilian office holding. What emerges
from these figures is the importance of roturiers and new nobles in these
places, 86% of whose entrants in these years could not have met the
army’s requirement for entry. Even though the share assigned to roturiers
in the table is a little misleading, including as it does some men who were
their families’ second generation in the offices that gave gradual noblesse,
the evidence for significant continuing recruitment from the Third Estate
into the nobility is clear. Of course not all the important civilian offices are
included here, only the ennobling ones; those in finance, bailliage and
sénéchaussée courts, or sub-delegations that did not confer noblesse are
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omitted. Some nobles held those offices, although most were filled by
roturiers. More important for us to remember is that the numbers shown
here, considerable as they are, do not tell the whole story of how many
were in the whole pool of nobles of less than four generations, since those
serving but who entered their offices before 1774, or those whose service
was finished and whose descendants had not yet reached the magical
fourth generation of nobility, are not included. It is reasonable to think that
the whole number of new nobles against whom the Ségur règlement
discriminated would have been several times larger than the one shown
here. In addition, it should be recognized that some in this group had
almost by definition special demographic characteristics – secrétaires du
roi, in particular, but the acquirers of lettres de noblesse and officers in the
bureaux des finances as well, had no real interest in acquiring their places
and new status at their more advanced ages if they lacked male heirs to
whom they could pass on the rank. Historical demographers do not often
give us this kind of information for specific professional or occupational
groups, but a close study of the families in the chancelleries, for example,
would almost certainly show a number of sons and grandsons
disproportionate to that of their peers in wealth and earlier experience.
There was, then, a sizable group of new nobles whose sons were and
would be looking for something to do.
V Filtering new nobles from old,
and civilians from military
This seems to be the world against which the army directed its heightened
exclusiveness in 1781, a sizable world that from the army looked
relatively homogeneous. Within the groups that made up that world there
were enormous differences – the occasional conseiller in the Parlement of
Paris who, like Anjorrant, could claim nine generations of nobility, had
little in common with the newest secrétaire du roi or trésorier de France.
But what the army saw was a group united by its wealth – all in it had
money enough to buy expensive offices, and all or many had sons who
could afford to pay the expense that the officer’s military service entailed
– and, no less important, united also by being civilians. Some families in it
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were fresh from trade; others came through law and service in a judicial
court. Almost none was military. If the army, then, had it in mind to
eliminate as officers not roturiers but nobles of wealth and non-military
formation, the Ségur règlement was an effective way to begin it. By that
stroke the army denied entry as officer to the families of the large majority
of the civilian office-holding nobility.
The specific effect of the exclusion is visible after looking again
at the army’s entering officers, from May 1781 to 1789. We saw above
that the nearly 3,000 young men who joined regiments in the infantry,
cavalry and dragoons were nobles. But what kind? First, consider those
from the écoles militaires that placed nearly 500 élèves du roi in the line
regiments after 1781. Their names appearing in twenty-four randomly
selected regiments from all the branches provided a sample of seventy-
seven whose genealogies were studied.77 All had the four or more
generations of noblesse and fathers with long military service as required
by the edict of 1751 creating the school. Two great-grandfathers had been
secrétaires du roi; one student was ennobled by his grandfather’s and
great-grandfather’s service in the Chambre des Comptes of Montpellier;
and another, in the fifth generation of noblesse, had had a grandfather
avocat général in the Cour souveraine of Lorraine and Barrois. In each
case long military service by the father intervened between the family’s
earlier ennoblement and the student’s acceptance by an école militaire.
Among the 77, these were the only cases where an ancestor had either
been ennobled or occupied an ennobling position within the previous five
generations. Fifty-four of the 77 fathers were in military service.
There are also indications for the fathers of 255 pages who came
from families that had proved nobility to 1550 and were placed in
regiments during these years.78 They show a similar absence of new
77 The regiments’ registers for the contrôles des officiers in the SHD série Yb, and
the genealogical data for students at the École Militaire in the BNF, mss. Fr.
32060-99, are the sources for this analysis. The regiments examined included 10
from the infantry (Austrasie, Auvergne, Bourbonnois, Bourgogne, Bretagne,
Dauphin, La Fère, Lorraine, Piémont, Touraine); 10 from cavalry and dragoons (of
which only seven contained students – Mestre-de-Camp Général, Orléans,
Penthièvre, Royal Champagne, Royal Étranger, Royal Pologne and du Roi); two
artillery (La Fère, Strasbourg); and two chasseurs (Auvergne, Gévaudan).
78 Two cartons, not yet assigned a number when I used them at the [Service
Historique de la Défense] in 1964, contained recently assembled dossiers for pages
in military service. The extraits de baptême, available for all but 14, supply at least
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nobles and civilians: only nine of the fathers were in civilian employments
at all, of whom none were secrétaires du roi, none in bureaux des finances
or chambres des comptes or cours des aides. A président in the Parlement
of Aix (Grimaldy de Raguse), a conseiller at Rennes (Piccot de Peccaduc),
and an avocat général in the Parlement of Paris (Séguier) was the total
yield from the ennobling offices. The rest of the 255 were military (101)
or without employs and specific functions – simple noble seigneurs (111),
nobles designated only as “écuyer” (13), or titled nobles (21).
Beyond these, there were also the young men who joined directly
from home after Chérin certified their four generations of nobility. Here
one might expect to find a more professionally heterogeneous group
among the fathers. We do, but only to a limited degree. The 979 fathers
included 432 who did nothing, or at least occupied no government or
military posts; another 435 were then or had been in military service.79 A
scattering were in courts at the bailliage level (11) and in various kinds of
administration (19); six were lawyers. A dozen were former pages, grands
baillis, and so on. But turning to the offices that ennobled, the number of
fathers there is small: no secrétaires du roi; two members of bureaux des
finances (both of them premiers présidents); none in ennobling municipal
offices. The higher sovereign courts did better, but not by so much as
might have been expected. The fathers in chambres des comptes or cours
des aides number 19; those in parlements 33; together they comprised
about 5% of the entrants in this category. A closer look shows, not
surprisingly, that eight of the high robe fathers were from the courts at
Rennes and Nancy; of the rest, 16 were présidents or gens de roi and the
mass of ordinary conseillers, maîtres, auditeurs, and others together
supplied 28 fathers who placed sons in regiments. From nine courts none
is found.80
A final category of entrants would, of course, include no sons of
civilians at all. These were the sons of long-serving military men who had
sketchy information on the 255 fathers’ official functions or employs if they had
any. For letting me see these, as for other kindnesses over a number of years when
working at Vincennes, I am indebted to Mr. Jean-Claude Devos.
79 For the source, see note 7 above. The 979 fathers placed a total of 1,102 sons for
whom information is available. These do not include the placements in artillery
(see note 83 below).
80 Those nine courts were the parlements of Aix and Besançon, the cours des aides
of Bordeaux and Montauban, the Chambre des Comptes of Rouen, the conseils
supérieurs of Alsace and Artois, the Châtelet, and the Grand Conseil.
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earned the cross of Saint-Louis; they, it will be remembered, were exempt
from having to make proofs of noblesse. By definition, then, all their
fathers were military. In the artillery, where this type seems to have been
more common, one-third (49 of 148) of the entrants after 1781 were sons
of chevaliers de Saint-Louis. As noted earlier, the vast majority of the 49
were noble, some even nobles of four or more generations who found it
easier or less expensive merely to use their fathers’ military service record
to gain entry.81 Again, in this last, large category of entrants, perhaps as
many as 500 of approximately 3,000 for all the line regiments, one will
not find representatives of civilian, office-holding families.
It appears, therefore, that none of the newer, and only a handful
of the office-holding nobles in general, entered the army as officers after
1781. The 55 who had fathers in sovereign court offices must have felt a
little different from the others in an officer corps where they constituted
less than 2% of the groups that entered with them. But, perhaps, that was
not new. Had the genealogical and professional composition of officers’
recruitment really been different earlier? It is conceivable that informally
prejudice had always operated to make new nobles feel unwelcome, or
they simply had other interests and preferences for careers. In short, if, as
we saw earlier, the Ségur règlement did not have practical effect in
eliminating roturiers, perhaps it was equally ineffective in excluding the
new nobles who had not been there either. This returns us to the possibility
that the Ségur règlement was a purely gratuitous act. There was in
Tuetey’s evidence, discussed above, the sign that some whom he called
roturiers were, in fact, nobles of less than four generations. Elsewhere we
hear about illustrative individual cases, for example, the four Petitjean de
Rotalier brothers who in 1778 sought authorization to abandon the less
elegant patronymic name of Petitjean and to be known legally as Rotalier;
all four were then in military service, sons of a member of the Chambre
des Comptes at Dôle who was ennobled by his office.82 Unfortunately, I
do not have full, systematic data for treating this question, but what there
81 SHD Yb 669; see note 7 above. Of the 148 who entered 1781-89, 47 did so after
presenting Chérin’s certificate and 33 had presented proofs for entry to an école
militaire. Toward 1789 notes giving information on individuals in this register
become less full and systematic, but it seems that at least 9 of 49 who entered as
sons of chevaliers de Saint-Louis had four or more generations of nobility and
would have been eligible to receive Chérin’s certificate.
82 Claude Brelot, La noblesse en Franche-Comté de 1789 à 1808, Annales
littéraires de l’université de Besançon, 134 (Paris, 1972), p. 27.
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is suggests that new nobles had been entering in larger numbers before
1781. And there is also reason to think that the number had been rising.
There are convenient records for the artillery that include all the
741 lieutenants who were serving in 1765 or who joined between then and
1781. In the register, beside their names, the clerk wrote briefly what he
knew about their families. No doubt it is not complete, but 23 were sons
and 12 others grandsons of secrétaires du roi, 11 had fathers in bureaux
des finances, 10 had them in cours des comptes, aides, or monnaies, and
24 in ennobling offices of parlements. A scattering of nine other fathers
who were échevins of Lyon, received lettres of nobility, or were otherwise
identifiable as having been both recently ennobled and not military by
profession brings the number to 89, or 12% of all who served in that
period as lieutenants of artillery. After 1781, among the 148 entrants to the
artillery, only three (1.5%) had fathers in sovereign courts.83 Or consider
the Maison militaire du Roi. Similar data are available for one of the two
companies of Mousquetaires, from 1750 to 1775 when Saint-Germain
disbanded it. This was a unit in which were collected old, and rich,
noblesse, and it offered a favored kind of brief apprenticeship to young
men whose family connections destined them to rise quickly to be
colonels of regiments. But into it during those twenty-six years came 17
sons of secrétaires du roi, 12 sons of trésoriers de France, 19 with fathers
in cours des comptes and aides, and 33 in parlements – a total of 81, or
10.5% of 765 entrants.84 For the Chevau-légers de la garde, the printed
summary genealogies for the 489 who entered, 1750-1780, show 53 (11%)
ennobled by offices or by letters in the generation of the father or
grandfather.85
These figures state what was the minimum number of entering
new nobles, but we have no way of knowing whether the clerks always
had or recorded full information. Overall, throughout the army it is
reasonable to surmise that before 1781 the share of civilian and new-noble
families that supplied army officer recruits was higher than the 10 to 12 %
positively identified. The Chevaux-légers de la Garde had been more
83 SHD Yb 669-70.
84 SHD Yb 69.
85 J. de la Trollière & R. de Montmort, Les Chevau-légers de la Garde du Roy,
1592-1787 (Paris, 1953). Among the sons of the 223 fermiers généraux of 1726-
91, mainly anoblis or in process of ennoblement (only 15, or 6.7% had four or
more generations of noblesse), 20% had entered military service. See Durand, Les
fermiers généraux, pp. 294-301, 375.
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exclusive and demanding than were the line regiments of infantry, cavalry,
and dragoons, while the artillery chose especially from those families
whose orientation had earlier been technical, and who imposed on their
young sons the special and necessary training in mathematics that was not
to be found in ordinary schools. In principle other types of units were less
demanding socially or technically, and were more open to newer, non-
professional military aspirants. The proportion of nobles of less than four
generations was probably higher in the line regiments. And it could also
have been rising. When Saint-Germain in 1776 and 1777 drastically
reduced the military units in the Maison du Roi, he thought he was
attacking the waste and extravagance lavished on those now ornamental
and militarily useless bodies; he was also attacking the base there in venal
offices for opulent court favorites who, after learning the wrong things,
used their connections to filter into the line regiments, bringing with them
the dangerous and contagious taste for luxury. But in reducing the Gardes
du Corps, Chevaux-légers de la Garde and Gendarmes de la Garde, and
eliminating the Mousquetaires altogether, he eliminated also places, 870
of them, in fact, that had come to absorb and isolate some of the richest,
least serious, most useless officers.86 Perhaps not all would do it, but this
safety valve now partially closed, they might move in even larger numbers
to fill places in the regular army units. The baron Pérusse des Cars, who
began his army career before the Revolution and had composed works on
the “état militaire,” remembered later that the rest of the army disliked the
Maison du Roi and that a minister had called it “an establishment
intermediate between robe and sword.”87 And the Gendarmes de la Garde
and Gardes du Corps were known to contain more new men than the
Mousquetaires and Chevaux-légers de la Garde. The Ségur regulation
would have been only a partial solution to what might seem a problem, but
from the army’s point of view it would help.
At this point, then, several things seem certain. The Ségur
regulation did have practical effect in narrowing the social base for
recruiting officers. It was not a purely gratuitous act. If not many roturiers
were there, there was in fact a fairly large group of wealthy and young
new nobles whose fathers were not military. If not all, at least some had
86 Latreille, L’Armée et la nation.., pp. 75-78; Léon Mention, Le comte de Saint-
Germain et ses réformes (Paris, 1884), ch. 2.
87 [Des Cars, Jean-Francois de Pérusse], Mémoires du duc des Cars, publiés par
son neveu (Paris, 1890), vol. 1, p. 143.
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been taking up officerships in the army, and after 1781 they could no
longer do so.
Immediately the army gave evidence that it meant what it said.
Early in 1782 the young Bergeret, son of a secrétaire du roi in the Grande
Chancellerie in Paris, secured the nomination to a place in a regiment and
went to Chérin expecting to get the genealogical certificate that would
allow him to enter.88 His father, Jean François Bergeret de Frouville, was
one of those who had served long in the Chancellerie and no doubt played
a role in directing and arranging the financial and banking functions that
the company performed for the king. When he resigned all his offices to
his then eighteen-year-old son, Adelaide Étienne, in 1783, those offices
included not just the one in the Chancellerie but also his place as
secrétaire ordinaire of the Conseil d’État Direction et Finances. The
young man, if consoled by wealth and the prospect of high places in the
king’s financial administration, must nonetheless have been disappointed
when his candidacy for a place as an army officer was rejected. He was a
noble and he had wanted to be in the army. The army, no doubt, wondered
in his, as in similar cases, how long he would have stuck at it and how
serious would have been his concern for the dull and routine work of
training the troops in winter. What made Bergeret’s case different than the
others, however, was that his legal claim to be an officer was in good
order. True, his father was born a roturier, but membership in the
company of secrétaires du roi in Paris gave a number of special and
unusual privileges. One of them assured that the secrétaire du roi when he
entered the office was transformed instantly and magically into a fourth-
generation noble. If this did not easily fit the laws of biology, it was at
least consistent with lettres patentes issued by Charles VIII in 1484 and
often confirmed subsequently, several times in the eighteenth century. In
the edict of March 1704 the king had stated it simply: “it is our will that
our 340 Conseillers secrétaires be reputed nobles of four races and
capable of being received into all orders of chivalry in our kingdom.”
Thus, the young Bergeret was not just a noble but a gentilhomme; his
father a fourth-generation noble, he was in fact in the fifth generation.89
88 Information on this episode comes from AN V2 55, letters and notes for the
mémoire on this subject addressed to the Garde des Sceaux by the Grande
Chancellerie.
89 It was surely this fact and the peculiarities of this office that led Molière to
characterize M. Jourdain, even if bourgeois, as “gentilhomme,” a status that had a
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The trouble was that he could not get the needed certificate. The
whole company of secrétaires du roi promptly concerned itself with the
matter. They gathered the numerous precedents that proved their case.
Bergeret père himself remembered the time when, in 1750, only two years
after he had entered office, the Tribunal des maréchaux de France, whose
function it was to handle cases of conflict between nobles on the basis of a
graded law that distinguished gentilshommes from others, had made
trouble for the secrétaires du roi. But he also remembered that Louis XV
had himself decided in their favor. Thus, when the company’s syndics
gave its mémoire on the subject to the Keeper of the Seals (Garde des
Sceaux), asking him to intervene for them with the Minister of War, they
had law, precedent, and the king’s deepening financial need working for
them. Ségur received the mémoire and reported on it to the king at a
meeting of the Conseil des Dépêches in September 1782. Unfortunately,
we do not know the exact nature of the discussion, but the answer was, if
very polite, also very clear. In his letter (14 September 1782) to the Garde
des Sceaux, who had also been present at the meeting, Ségur stated: “You
have seen that His Majesty, having at heart not impairing the plan that he
formed when he made his regulation, did not judge it suitable to consider
favorably Sr. Bergeret’s request…” He went on to say the usual nice
things, in particular that he was sorry not to have been able to be of
another opinion on the matter out of respect for the Garde des Sceaux and
the company.
VI The military outlook: caste as reform
This then was to be a law to which, for once under the ancien régime,
there would be no exceptions for the wealthy and powerful and influential.
To understand the army’s zeal there is needed more than Dollot’s easy
characterization of Ségur as “the plaything of a coterie of reactionary
gentilshommes,” a simplified view that will not bear much explanatory
more technical and precise meaning in his day than our own. M. Jourdain’s
pretensions went beyond those of the ordinary anobli.
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weight.90 Ségur’s own son, an officer with the French forces in America
when the règlement was issued, contributed to this simplification when,
writing his memoirs much later, in the nineteenth century, he stated that
although the règlement had been reactionary, his father was not. He said
that the genealogical requirement had been forced on his unwilling father
by the selfish and shortsighted aristocrats around him.91 But this does not
tell us much, and is, I think, misleading by missing the essential
seriousness of Ségur, his colleagues, and their règlement. The members of
the committee that proposed it were professional military men as well as
aristocrats.92 What we must do is to enter the narrower but pervasive
culture that infused the institution where they worked. If the règlement
was reactionary, as no doubt it was in many ways, we need to see in what
terms the army leaders could understand it as nonetheless appropriate to
the situation. For all to some degree, and for some to a large degree,
simple snobbery may have moved them, but that sentiment was not new in
1781. Other ideas were needed to make the writing into law of snobbery
seem necessary, proper, and legitimate. One must include in the
explanatory equation the tone and substance, the not-always explicit ideas
and underlying assumptions, that were contained in printed works and the
piles of manuscript mémoires, some solicited and many not, that arrived at
the Ministry of War. Here, in works addressed to a military audience, are
found the terms and limits to discourse and argument within the army.
90 L. Dollot, La question des privilèges dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe siècle
(Paris, 1941), p. 54.
91 Louis Philippe, comte de Ségur, Mémoires, souvenirs et anecdotes (Paris, 1890),
vol. 1, p. 159.
92 The committee organization that Ségur set up is described in [Pierre Marie
Maurice Henri], comte de Ségur, Le maréchal de Ségur (1724-1801), ministre de
la guerre sous Louis XVI (Paris, 1895), pp. 234-36; Latreille, L’armée et la nation,
pp. 179-81. Four committees specialized by areas of technical expertise were
headed by lieutenants généraux (de Besenval, de Caraman, du Châtelet, and de
Poyanne) who met as a superior committee under the maréchal de Contades to
make recommendations to the minister for changes in the army. The procès-
verbaux of that committee’s meetings, known in 1840, were, unfortunately, lost by
the time when P.-M.-M.-H. de Ségur wrote his book in 1895 (p. 236) and have
evidently not been recovered since. [N.B. I found these records later in the
manuscripts of the Bibliothèque du Ministère de la Guerre. For their use, see my
article: “The Army in the French Enlightenment: Reform, Reaction and
Revolution”, Past and Present 85 (1979), 68-98.]
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In the army most shared the more general concern that ranks and
orders were too much mixed and confused.93 From within came frequent
complaints that new men were arriving to take up the old military
occupation. Since 1789, and in our own day, most people are inclined to
think that a steady infusion of new blood is the sign that institutions
recognize and reward talent and competence. This was not how the
reasoning went in the army, or more broadly in French society, at the end
of the ancien régime. New men were not believed to be professionally
serious. They did not serve long, and they paid little attention to the needs
of dull but essential routine. They seemed frivolous, and frivolity was the
enemy. But persons who were frivolous were also likely to be rich; they
often came out of cities, and at least some of them were thought to have
had a fairly recent family origin in commerce. If some writers were
arguing that commerce was gentle and civilizing in its effects, the army
saw in its practitioners low motives tied to egoism and cupidity,
conditioned by a private rather than public definition of self-interest. The
new and wealthy men had usually had a good education of the traditional
kind: they studied in collèges, knew Latin, and could turn a phrase,
perhaps even make verses. Retaining as they did their ties to cities and
non-military families, they always had in civil activity and employment an
alternative to long service in the military camp. At home they did not find
on their walls the portraits of ancestors and great-uncles in uniform to
reproach by their gaze the failure to serve well or long. Long and serious
service was the critical point, and only men who were for one reason or
another both dependent on the institution and shamed if they failed to
perform well were likely to provide it. In this view, something called
“talent” was important, but it was thought to be inspired by character and
93 My sense of the character of argument and implicit understanding within the
army, as expressed briefly in this and the next paragraph, derives from reading in
practical and “technical” military writings and proposals. The series M and MM
that contain documents on the École militaire, and K where the Broglie papers are
found are the important sources at the AN; the series “Mémoires et
Reconnaissances” [1M] and A1 at the SHD are, of course, even more important.
More careful and detailed analysis is needed. In general, if Emile Léonard’s
understanding of military exclusivism in the 1780’s seems to me not quite right,
his presentation of the development of thought in the army during the eighteenth
century is excellent. See L’armée et ses problems au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1958).
Much can be gleaned also from Tuetey, Latreille and Hartmann (see note 4,
above).
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will rather than by sheer intelligence, and was acquired with experience by
anyone who was zealous. Only later, with the Romantics, would men
imagine talent to be innate, inborn, unique, something involving rare and
special individual skills. In the Enlightenment, talent seemed more a thing
to be acquired, a matter of adapting to efficient routine, developing good
habits, working hard and continuously, and paying steady attention to
detail. Almost anyone could attain it if he really wished to. These views
were set in the rising wave of secular puritanism that has marked the
military mind in modern times.
Such thoughts about officers and their deficiencies seemed at the
time fully consistent with the environmentalist ideas that were central to
the French Enlightenment. The problem of officers’ recruitment, although
only one of many practical matters with which the army concerned itself
in its effort to renovate the institution, was understood in a context of ideas
that were fully up-to-date. In the Enlightenment many contemporaries, and
not just the philosophes and professional writers, were placing heavy
emphasis on the environmental formation of men – Condillac and
Helvétius less produced than reflected the current ideas that, at one level,
were shared by both liberals and conservatives who would quarrel instead
about other things. Locke had observed that nine parts of ten among the
things that distinguished one man from another were put there by
education, and in the Enlightenment most Frenchmen agreed. But now, for
the army, everything seemed to work in the same direction.
Environmentalist ideas fitted nicely with aristocratic assumptions, and
together they combined to place ever-greater stress on the role of the
family in determining and fixing the character and the special orientation
of individuals. The first and most formative part of the environment, after
all, was family. In the army there was much discussion about the proper
form of initiation and practical training for officers, whether in military
schools or through apprenticeship in the regiments as cadets or special
sous-lieutenants. But formal, specialized training and education could be
useful only when it built on the inclinations and habits that had been
placed there already when the boys were very young.94
94 The rising importance of sentiments surrounding the family in the eighteenth
century is difficult to measure, but is observed everywhere. Seen often in Greuze
and Diderot, sometimes called “bourgeois” in inspiration, change in these
sentiments was surely more broadly cultural and general than the narrower class
analysis supposes. See Philippe Ariès, L’Enfant et la vie familiale sous l’ancien
régime (Paris, 1960), part 3.
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Family, therefore, was crucial to the army’s understanding, and
the kinds of families that they would choose to recruit, thinking their sons
more assimilable by the army, were military ones. The best officers, it was
thought, would come from families where the spartan virtues were taught
at home by precept and example. In these terms, sons of old militaires
would make the best new ones. Guibert, in his report to the Conseil de la
Guerre on 28 October 1787, a report that almost unchanged became the
new Ordonnance sur la hiérarchie in 1788, expressed this common point
of view.95 In connection with his plan to restore the place of cadet
gentilhomme in the infantry regiments, he discussed the recruitment of
young officers generally. In the infantry, nearly half the new sous-
lieutenants would come from the écoles militaires and pages – where
military families, it will be remembered, were heavily represented. The
other places, said Guibert, would be left to the colonels to fill as follows:
…to supply the requests of… this precious class of
sons or brothers of the old officers in the regiments, a
type to which it is so essential to assure places
because it furnishes a great many good officers, and
because it is the one that puts into units the spirit of
family which attaches to the king’s service fathers by
sons and sons by fathers.96
This view of the importance of recruiting from military families
was accepted by the Conseil de la Guerre and seems to have been
widespread. We met earlier de Cessac, one day to be the president of the
Assemblée Législative after playing a central role in its military
committee, and to die as a Pair de France, but then a captain in the
Dauphin infantry regiment to whom the editor assigned the writing of
important articles for the military volumes of the Encyclopédie
méthodique. His ideas are the more interesting because he was himself a
roturier. In the article “emploi” published in 1785, he elaborated more
fully and explicitly the notion that narrow recruitment among military
families was essential to the good functioning of the regiments.97 He spoke
of, and concurred in the frequent complaints that the army was beset by
ills tied to egoism, disunion, and a lack of patriotism among its officers.
95 The report is printed in full by Albert Latreille, L’armée et la nation, pp. 393-
453.
96 Ibid., p. 433.
97Encyclopédie méthodique. Art militaire, vol. 2 (1785), pp. 249-51.
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The problem was how to bind them together as a corps, to produce a
healthy “esprit de corps.” What was the source of the disorder and how
could it be cured? He explained: “the real source is found in the spirit of
our century: since it is nearly impossible to change that, let us try to
modify its effects by opposing to the spirit of egoism that divides, the
spirit of family and kinship that unites.” Instead of naming to emplois
persons chosen indiscriminately from all provinces who had no prior
connection with one another, “let us apply ourselves to subordinating to a
single leader as many sons, brothers, relatives, and friends as we can find.”
To this end, that of reestablishing a “spirit of patriotism,” de Cessac would
limit the freedom of the colonels of the regiments to nominate to vacant
places, this by requiring them to name new men only when all serving
officers’ sons, brothers, nephews, cousins, or other relatives – in that order
– had been exhausted as possibilities. The young gentilshommes whom the
regiment had to expel or who simply left early were nearly always,
according to our writer, those who had no relatives in the regiment and
who thus were free to turn quickly to vice and irresponsibility. How much
better to have in a regiment many members of the same families who
formed a chain binding together the various parts and grades in the corps!
How much more respectful the young officer toward all the older officers
when his father was also there! In battle, ties of blood guaranteed ardor
and cooperation. What a gain with a new spirit that would make “each
answerable for the honor of all, and all answerable for the honor of each.”
Family, then, was central to the army’s thinking about
recruitment, but it was difficult to guarantee that the right families would
come in. The École militaire helped. But exclusion and inclusion before
1781 on the basis of simple proofs of nobility clearly was not working. It
failed in two ways: not all nobles, even those of ancient lineage, came
from military families, and a number of new nobles and a few roturiers
did. The second problem was easier to treat than the first. Families, when
they were military, could be exempted from having to make the proofs of
nobility. As we saw, the regulation of 1781 provided that sons of
chevaliers de Saint-Louis could enter on simple presentation of evidence
for their fathers’ services. Even the attempt in 1787-88 to define and limit
that exemption illustrates its intent. After insisting, without meeting
resistance, on maintaining the system of proofs, Guibert spoke in his
report about what he called abuses in the exemptions. It was “a
misunderstood and badly contrived rule” that admitted sons of officiers de
fortune who had remained simple lieutenants, sons of essentially civilian
commissaires des guerres, retired gendarmes, officers of the maréchausée,
88
or “persons of an even more inferior état or type who became chevaliers
de Saint-Louis.” These were admitted, he continued, “while the son of an
intendant if he does not have four generations, of a first president, the
grandson of a lieutenant-général whose son had not served… were
excluded from service.” The solution to this problem, however, was not to
admit the second group, but to exclude the first, this by requiring that the
chevalier de Saint-Louis must have been at least a “capitaine en pied dans
les troupes du Roi” in order for his son to be freed from the four-
generation requirement. Guibert and the army thus moved to assure that
the exemption applied only to those sons whose fathers’ service had been
professional and serious in the line regiments. And in the process Guibert
expressed pleasure that by this means, and awaiting reform in the Order of
Saint-Louis to deny the cross to all non-military types, “we will exclude
definitively, and without saying it, all the classes of people mentioned
above, we will purify the composition of the officers…” New nobles could
and should remain, but only the right type.98
If they could have had their way, then, some in the army would
have recruited new army officers almost exclusively from the sons or
relatives of old ones. To achieve that by law, however, and to require it, or
even come close to it, they would have had to offend a number of
powerful people. Some were prepared to do it. De Cessac, for example,
who wanted legal priority assigned to officers’ relatives for entry, simply
noted that many of the rich nobles at Court would be excluded and thus
injured, but times change and new needs arise. Those excluded, after all,
retained “a great many objects” with which to console themselves. All
families for which military careers had not yet been opened would
complain about their exclusion, he wrote, but their exclusion will profit
the “maisons militaires” and the state. The excluded families “will settle
the activity appropriate to their talent, or their ambition, on some career
that is just as important and perhaps too neglected.”99 Another writer, also
a militaire, or advertising himself as such, addressed his Ouvrage d’un
citoyen, gentilhomme et militaire to an audience in the army. Like the
others, he was against luxury and the mixing of ranks. Within the nobility,
with one notable exception, he wanted a kind of democracy – he favored
small distinctive marks to indicate the age of a man’s nobility, this so that
in the real world of institutions other useless forms of personal display,
98 Guibert’s report in Latreille, L’armée et la nation, pp. 450-51.
99 Encyclopédie méthodique. Art militaire, vol. 2, p. 251.
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among which he included unmerited appointments and promotions given
for purposes of social prestige, could then be eliminated. Only merit and
performance should count. What is interesting, however, is the one
exception he set up. He divided new nobles, that is, those of less than 100
years standing, into two very unequal groups. The smaller one was
composed of families ennobled by lettres for special merit or service, and
of persons from families whose nobility came originally from an office but
in which descendants had taken up military service, earning the croix de
Saint-Louis. The second, larger group included all those ennobled during
the preceding 100 years and whose families had either remained in offices,
or had left offices “without entering the état militaire, or at least without
really being attached to it.” The first group would be eligible to send its
sons into the officer corps; the second would not. The writer added that
“the necessity for not mixing up these two classes is obvious. Everyone
complains that in the robe there are too many means for acquiring nobility
through offices and money.”100 Blocked in this way, and marked for 100
years by a special black ribbon, perhaps the new families would
henceforth be less avid for offices and heightened status.
It was, of course, easy for writers to write, but much more
difficult for the army’s leaders to act openly on those principles. Why did
they not demand 100 years of nobility? Or insist that only sons of army
officers could enter? Or both? For, after all, four generations could
represent a quite short period. Entering secrétaires du roi often had living
grandsons, and occasionally even great-grandsons – born roturiers but
fourth-generation nobles at adolescence. And what about the eligible
parlementaires? By the army’s standards, the professional orientation of
their home environments was not very military. It is hard to know how far
the army would have been willing to go in excluding outsiders formally,
but they did not hesitate to make strong recommendations along these
lines. In the ordonnances of 1788 in which they recreated the places of
cadets gentilshommes in the regiments, they added that “His Majesty
recommends that the colonels propose preferentially to fill them with the
sons, brothers, or nephews of the old officers in their regiments, a precious
100 Ouvrage d’un citoyen, gentilhomme et militaire, ou lettres sur la noblesse, qui
présentent le tableau de son origine, de ses droits, dénoncant les abus, en
indiquant les moyens d’y remédier et d’opérer des changements importants pour
ce corps et la patrie, à MM. les Notables (Londres, 1787), pp. 140-41.
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type that he had in mind when creating these positions.”101 Still, they
surely recognized practical limits to what they could do. Guibert said it
himself when he reported that limiting the exemptions from proofs of
nobility for sons of chevaliers de Saint-Louis would be effective in
excluding non-military types “without saying it.”
But the obstacles to more explicit exclusions were formidable.
First, there was the Court. The least common denominator of the persons
there was not ancient noble lineage, but money. It was possible, through
the Ségur règlement, to stop the placing in the regiments of new-noble
Court protégés by a general law that applied to all and affected only some
of the larger body of favorites. But the rule could not easily have been
extended to apply to all these favorites, as de Cessac wanted. The men and
especially the women with influence and power at Court did not
understand honor in the same way that army professionals did. Any noble,
or at least any old noble, surely had it as his birthright, and specific
attitudes toward professional work did not affect that. After all, was
military skill really anything more than knowing how to ride a horse and
command gracefully and die bravely? To explain convincingly at Court
the newer, more mechanical, unheroic, almost bureaucratic vision of honor
would have been impossible.
If the Court was a problem, so were the parlements. The Ségur
règlement was of course a matter of internal discipline for the army, and
did not require registration in the sovereign courts. Thus it received little
public discussion. But no one could have had any doubt about what would
have been the sentiment and reaction of the parlements if the restrictive
act had been put in any other form than the one it received. Ten years
earlier the nobility in the Estates of Languedoc had adopted new
regulations for itself. In a burst of aristocratic pride, they demanded, in
article 7, that the new acquirer of a barony that was entitled to permanent
representation in their body could henceforth no longer sit with them “if
he is not in the profession of Arms; and he will be held to the preliminary
requirement of presenting proofs of Noblesse Militaire on the paternal side
for four hundred years, instead of four generations…” The rigor of proofs
was softened on the mother’s side – she need only have been a simple
noble of one degree. It is hard to see who other than the king could have
been admitted under those conditions, but it was clear that all the
101 “Ordonnance concernant la Constitution de l’Infanterie Française, 17 mars
1788,” in État militaire de France pour l’année 1788, p. 429.
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parlementaires could not. The Parlement of Toulouse reacted promptly
and at length. Their arrêt declaring null the article runs to eighteen angry
pages in print.102 They argued that, unlike those of other countries, all
nobles in France were equal, and “it is this equality that forms their
courage and strength… the nobility is no less pure in its source, nor less
fertile in its performance, whether it originates in the ministry of the Laws,
or in the professions of Arms…” To think anything else was to hold a
prejudice that was “a residue of the old barbarism.” Neither robe nor
sword was a separate order, the Parlement insisted, and they collected
pages of precedents to prove it. If the king chose to honor especially
persons of old and distinguished birth at Court or in other ways, that was
up to him, but public law could not recognize such distinctions. The
Parlement moved on to defend property and the whole order the
magistrates thought to be threatened, attacked the Estates for being
generally unrepresentative, and forbade that body to make a similar
règlement in the future. The Estates, of course, denied the Parlement’s
authority to act, and dispatched its syndic to seek the Royal Council’s
arrêt quashing the one that the Parlement had issued. He obtained it, but
the Estates compromised on the issue by stating that they had meant to say
that only the person entering their body must “be in the profession of
arms,” not all his ancestors.103
Thus, the parlements were touchy, and everyone knew it. There
was no chance that the Royal Council would have risked a struggle over
this issue when it was trying to raise taxes and float loans for which it
would need the cooperation of the sovereign courts. There were places
where the parlementaires as such were formally not welcome, but the
army had not been one of them. By the 1770s men of the robe could not
place their sons in the pages. Hozier, then the royal genealogist, wrote in
1774 to the Grande Écurie to say that he wished he could send the
certificate that de Ricouart needed to join the pages there, “but his family
being of the Robe, I cannot do it.” The next year, the Grand Écuyer, the
prince de Lambesc, had to replace by others two more young men whom
he had accepted to be pages when it was discovered, as his assistant put it,
102 BNF, Fonds Joly de Fleury, 453, f0 58 et suiv., Arrest de la Cour du Parlement,
du 14 Juillet 1770. Qui déclare les Articles VII et VIII des nouveaux Réglemens
faits par les Gens des Trois-Etats de la Province de Languedoc Nuls, comme étant
faits au-delà de leur pouvoir.
103 Archives départementales de la Haute Garonne, C 2414, f0 151 (22 novembre
1771).
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that “they are both from families originally from the robe.”104 After 1781
only two members of parlements qualified, one of them de Séguier, son of
the avocat général in the Parlement of Paris. In the Grande Écurie they
joined 117 other pages, of whom 59 had fathers in military service.105
Sons of parlementaires were not eligible to be élèves du roi in the écoles
militaires. But whatever their private feelings, the parlementaires did not
make an issue over these matters that seemed to pertain to the king’s
prerogative to establish purely honorific distinctions. Their formal and
systematic exclusion from the army officer corps, however, would have
been quite a different matter.
Ségur, who only shortly before 1781 had been expressing
resentment of the intrusion into army affairs by Vergennes, an homme de
robe, shared with Besenval and the other members of the army’s
committee in 1781 a distrust of the parlements.106 Others no doubt agreed
with the views of the future general Dommartin. Writing from garrison
with his artillery regiment at Metz in October 1788, he described in a letter
the return from exile of the parlementaires, “these shrimps who for 30,000
francs claim to be sovereigns.” He expected that they “will be abolished
everywhere.”107 Louis-Sébastien Mercier’s probably unfair caricature of
the young magistrate in the 1780s expresses a current perception: not
serious in work, speaking only of girls, spectacles, horses and battles;
shunning the black clothes traditional to his profession, he “fears nothing
so much as to pass for what he really is… in the fear of being considered a
robin, he takes on the tone and airs of the military man.”108 But whatever
their views, few wanted an open fight. The requirement of four
generations of paternal nobility was a reasonable compromise. It was
consistent with what some parlements themselves were demanding in
cities – Aix, Grenoble, Toulouse – where the presence of other courts or
104 AN 01 972, no. 94, minutes de lettre, 16 décembre 1774, Hozier to unknown; 01
866, f0 51, lettre, 14 octobre 1775, Müller to président Hozier.
105 AN 01 955, “Catalogue des noms et surnoms des Pages qui ont été reçus dans la
Grande Écurie du Roy, depuis l’année 1751.” In the 1780s, then, 50% of the
pages’ fathers had military careers, whereas earlier the number had been much
lower: 8% (11 of 141) in the 1750s, and 23% (31 of 134) in the 1770s.
106 Comte de Ségur, Le maréchal de Ségur, p. 254.
107 A. de Besancenet, Un officier royaliste au service de la république d’après les
lettres inédites du général de Dommartin, 1786 à 1799 (Paris, 1876), p. 23.
108 From Tableau de Paris…, as quoted by Yves Durand in Les fermiers
généraux..., p. 211.
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special municipal forms led to a particularly rapid ennoblement of new
families. If these parlements did not always observe their own règlements,
they could hardly quarrel with the principle. Moreover, the demand for
four generations was one that would split most parlements, and it was not
a matter that, outside Rennes and Nancy, the majority of members would
want to discuss lest it draw unnecessary attention to the newness of their
nobility. Finally, many of the oldest robe families were attached to
traditions that directed most of their sons into the sovereign courts. In
practice, the army would have no serious difficulty in absorbing the fifty-
five sons of sovereign court members who were nearly lost among the
3,000 entering officers after 1781.
One form of the army’s professional reaction or reform, then, the
choice of word here depending on how one wishes to see the process, was
the requirement of four degrees of nobility, a requirement that was not
applied, however, to military families. Its effectiveness in keeping out
newer and civilian nobles, which is what the army leaders intended, has
already been discussed. It would, of course, be a mistake to think that for
military leaders the matter of genealogical proofs was a constant
obsession, a matter that took precedence in their thinking over other
things. They spent more time on questions of soldiers’ discipline and pay,
supply, the hierarchy and structure of command within the officer corps,
the internal organization of regiments and their possible combinations in
divisions, new tactical formations, and so on. Most of their work was
internal and technical. Officers and their recruitment were but a part,
although an important one, of a larger story of military organization and
reform. Further, the exclusion of some social and professional types was,
in turn, but a part of their thinking even about officers.
For recruiting officers, the total program involved excluding
some persons and assimilating others more slowly so as to militarize them
the more effectively before they entered or rose very high. Older nobles
who lacked the military formation in their families were still coming in,
and nothing could be done to prevent it. Court influence and wealth would
still operate to place in high ranks very young men who might or might
not be competent. Mere oldness of nobility was no guarantee of anything.
To deal with them, various other programs were devised and applied. The
army broadened and extended the system of military education in 1776 by
dispersing eleven of its schools through the provinces. In them, the king
continued to support the cost of raising for the army the old noble sons of
poor army officers, but he also opened those schools to sons of other
parents who could afford to pay their own expenses. In Paris, the École
94
militaire, closed in 1776, reopened in 1778 in a new form. Its better-
known role, owing to Bonaparte’s presence there, was to educate further
the ablest of the less well-off élèves du roi from the provincial schools.
But it became also an institution where wealthy and old nobles placed for
several years’ training their sons who were by birth the future colonels and
destined to rise to very high rank. There, in the company of cadets, they
received for the price of 2,000 livres a year some acquaintance with
military science before they joined the troops. For others, as noted above,
the army experimented also with the system of cadets gentilshommes in
the troops, tried and rejected in different forms earlier, in order to teach
new officers about army life from the bottom. It created the new, special
grades of colonel en second and then major en second in order to slow the
rise of the young gentilshommes from the Court and to see that they
learned something before they commanded regiments.109
In short, as it became more professional, the army was trying to
seal itself off, to insulate itself from a civilian society that looked corrupt
and threatening to the health of the military institution. On the one hand, it
attempted to make longer and more serious the apprenticeship that older
nobles had to serve. And, on the other hand, it excluded entirely the
newer, non-military nobles who were thought, by their formation in the
family, not to be assimilable to the new army. Whether the efforts
succeeded and began to produce a better army we have no way of
knowing – probably, many of the older nobles with only a smattering of
military education or a longer apprenticeship were not very different from
their predecessors. But for our purposes that does not much matter. What
does matter for our understanding of the background of revolution, and of
important aspects of the Revolution itself, is placing the army’s actions in
the proper institutional, social, and mental context. The army, wanting to
close itself off, thought that it could reform only by becoming more self-
perpetuating, internally regulated, corporatist. However uncongenial to us
its method, however much it both dignified snobbery by institutionalizing
it and thereby generated an opposing democratic awareness, the army in
its genealogical restrictions was expressing one side of what at the time
seemed broadly modernizing and reformist tendencies. In the process it
was struggling mainly not against roturiers, but against other, non-military
parts of the nobility. Its tendency was toward the formation of caste in an
aristocratic society; its ideas and assumptions were the ones derivable
109 See Latreille, L’armée et la nation, pp. 188-99, 209-10, 248-61.
95
from that society and even the Enlightenment. But what needs to be seen
above all is that the caste was to be military, and would divide the nobility
almost permanently into functionally separate parts. In this sense, the
“aristocratic reaction” in its most conspicuous appearance in the army was
also highly professional.
VII Some conclusions
In a broader way, what does it all mean? It would be a mistake to over-
state conclusions, and my thoughts are tentative. No doubt, more and other
kinds of evidence are needed. Nonetheless, several suggestions for ways
of thinking about problems of development before and in the French
Revolution come to mind. One has nothing to do with the army at all. This
is that the rapid and continuing movement of families into the nobility at
the end of the ancien régime bears on the character of the Revolution and
in what sense it may be said to have been “bourgeois.”110 That it was
110 The character of the Revolution in this sense has, of course, been much
discussed in recent years. Readers of the Annales will know that the matter has
been raised in F. Furet’s article (“Le catéchisme de la Révolution française,”
Annales E.S.C. 26 (1971), 278-89), whose notes detail the relevant earlier literature
to which specific and detailed reference need not be included here. Because some
of my thoughts about this are known – Furet cited and summarized them from the
unpublished paper that sketched a portion of the present study – fairness requires
that I call to the reader’s attention another article (G. Lemarchand, “Sur la société
française en 1789,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 19 (1972), 73-91)
that summarizes other writings in defense of an opposite conclusion. Several
writings in the English language have been important to the discussion: A.
Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (Cambridge, 1964);
Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, “Who Intervened in 1788? A Commentary on ‘The
Coming of the French Revolution’,” American Historical Review 71 (1965), 77-
103; the conclusion to Gruder, The Royal Provincial Intendants; and especially,
George V. Taylor, “Non-capitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French
Revolution,” American Historical Review 72 (1967), 469-96. R.R. Palmer wrote a
summary of these and other developments in the dispute in the English-speaking
world: “Polémique américaine sur le rôle de la bourgeoisie dans la Révolution
française,” Annales Historiques de la Révolution française 189 (1967), 369-380.
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mainly roturier and democratic is not at question, nor is there any doubt
that by clearing the undergrowth of corporatism and privilege the
Revolution made possible an economic development that could be
described as modern. But considering the rate at which the wealthiest
roturiers were entering the nobility, locating leaders or a vanguard of
revolution among great capitalists will not be possible. There were great
capitalists in France, it is true, but most were in the group that became a de
facto noblesse commerçante – new nobles who remained during the
eighteenth century in ever larger numbers in that peculiar French mixture
of activities connected with trade, state finance, and office holding that has
baffled the social historians in their best efforts at classification.111 In any
case, the study of the Revolution is surely complicated by the fact that so
much of the grande bourgeoisie in 1789 was noble, and thus with few
exceptions, did not play the great role in initiating and leading the
Revolution that might have been expected of it.
A second point to suggest is that beneath the surface the French
nobility was quite divided in 1789, just as Necker said it was. Historians
have for long taken note of the nobility’s division into groups of rich and
poor, Court and country, new and old. For all that, as a class the nobility
has seemed fairly unified in its interests, in its attachment to traditional
agrarian arrangements, in its monopoly of the important jobs. But if a
unity did at last develop, it came more slowly than has been thought and in
the Revolution itself, only after it became clear that the principle of
111 The works of George Taylor, “Non-capitalist Wealth..,” and Herbert Lüthy, La
banque protestante en France de la Révocation de l’Edit de Nantes à la Révolution
(Paris, 2 vol.s, 1959-61) are of course essential for this point; Jean Bouvier and
Henry Germain-Martin, Finances et financiers de l’ancien régime, “Que sais-je?”,
no. 1109 (Paris, 1964), ch. 3, gives a convenient summary of Lüthy’s work. For
the existence and growth of this world of commerce and finance, see also Maurice
Garden, Lyon et les Lyonnais, pp. 204, 392-398; Georges Lefebvre, Études
orléanaises, t.1; Contribution à l’étude des structures sociales à la fin du XVIIIe
siècle, Commission d’histoire économique et sociale de la Révolution, Mémoires
et documents, vol. 15 (Paris, 1962), pp. 154, 175-188, 200-201; from Information
historique, three articles by Guy Richard (1957, no. 5, 185-89; 1958, no. 5, 185-
90, 201; 1959, no. 4, 156-60) and one by Pierre Léon (1958, no. 3, 101-105). The
world of the anobli and financier is well described and analyzed in Yves Durand,
Les Fermiers généraux au XVIIIe siècle; and by Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret in his
Gens de finance au XVIIIe siècle, Collection Bordas-Connaissance, série
Université (Paris, 1972); and in his Les financiers de Languedoc au XVIIIe siècle
(S.E.V.P.E.N., Paris, 1970).
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nobility itself was under attack. Just as it took a little time for guild
masters, small-town lawyers, non-commissioned officers in the army, and
vicaires in the church to discover what they shared, what it was in
democratic principles that held them together and required solidarity, so
too were nobles not immediately aware that they all had common interests
that in the end most would want to defend jointly. Before the Revolution
various, only partially overlapping groups within the nobility, not
anticipating what the Revolution was really to bring, were looking at one
another suspiciously. The noblesse commerçante was one such group
whom many distrusted. The badly studied local notables, entrenched often
with roturier colleagues in bailliage administrations and defending their
jurisdiction against the expanding claims of parlements, were another. The
parlementaires, quoting Montesquieu and looking to England or the
almost primeval German woods for constitutional principles, were still a
third; to others these men who claimed to speak for the whole nobility
often seemed merely domineering and self-serving. When it came time to
select the 454 deputies and their alternates to represent the Second Estate
at Versailles in 1789, only 39 (or 8.6%) came from the sovereign courts,
their number submerged in a rising tide that carried in 307 (67.6%) who
were officers in the army or navy.112 On the other hand, looking out from
their bases in the parlements there were many magistrates in whom the
Church evoked visions of fanaticism and the army the spectre of military
despotism. Below the top-most levels association in a common point of
view did not come automatically or easily to nobles before 1789.
The case of Bretagne is instructive for the contrast that it
represents. It is surely no accident that radicalism appeared first and most
strongly there where an older, unified and relatively homogeneous nobility
had for long dominated the important institutions, especially the Estates
and Parlement whose members more than elsewhere mixed easily and
interchangeably with those in military institutions. In Bretagne the old
nobles managed to radicalize by their exclusivism even a secrétaire du roi,
Jacques Cottin. But Bretagne was the exception, together with Béarn and
112 Tabulated from Armand Brette, Les Constituants. Liste des députés et des
suppléants élus à l’assemblée constituante de 1789 (Paris, 1897). For hostile
reactions by some other nobles to the parlementaires at the time of the coup
against the courts in May 1788, see Égret, La Pré-Révolution française, pp. 295-
99.
98
possibly Artois.113 Elsewhere the nobility was not unified, and its internal
divisions surely weakened that body’s capacity to express itself and to act
politically in 1789. This, of course, does not mean that a divided
aristocracy was in any sense moribund, weak economically, troubled by
bad conscience, and ready to be pushed over at a touch. Quite the reverse!
Many in the army, at least, were the tougher and more determined for their
confidence that aristocratic principles of recruitment and exclusion by
birth, as they understood them, represented reform and the future. As R.R.
Palmer argued and showed, in a context and from evidence different than
my own, the Revolution was a struggle between two forces – aristocracy
and democracy – that were rising.114 There is no reason to suppose a law
of conservation of social forces that would lead to matching a rising Third
Estate with a necessarily declining nobility. The nobility in 1789, if
fragmented in many ways, was also in its separate parts tough and
confident. It lost, but only after real, massive, bitter struggle between
forces that represented opposing and conceivably viable (practically, if not
morally) conceptions of the future and modernity.
The third and final point follows from what precedes and has to
do with the broader understanding of social conflict, and the relation to it
of diverse occupational groups. The point is not easy to make without
overstating it. It is surely not true to say that there was no bourgeoisie, or
that the categories of roturier and noble did not matter. Of course they did,
and in many of the ways that have long been assumed. But it is always too
easy to apply categories for analysis taken from one period to others where
they do not fit. In this instance there arises a difficulty. The nineteenth-
century understanding of social and economic class has been interposed
between us and the eighteenth century, and it has led to a tendency among
historians to collapse various smaller categories into the larger ones seen
as operative in large-scale class conflict. In the process, the professions
can get lost or be seen as anomalous. In pursuit of the creation of classes
one may not notice some profound changes in outlook during the
eighteenth century that were making occupations the more important by
113 In Artois in 1755 the corps de la noblesse of the provincial estates asked for
and received permission to raise from four to six the number of generations of
noblesse on the paternal side that new persons who wished to sit with them must
present. In 1770 they persuaded the king to allow them to apply the same
requirement to the maternal side. See registers of correspondance of the Minister
of War in AN E 2772, f os 71, 76; E 2778, 24 Octobre 1770.
114 The Age of the Democratic Revolution, vol. 1, passim.
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slowly altering throughout society the very sense of status that
contemporaries held, and the forms that they used to assign rank. Since the
change was broadly cultural, affecting churchmen and magistrates,
teachers as well as army officers, it was a matter that did not generate
quarrels. Thus, it did not give rise to discussion or produce a large
literature on the subject. The change can be seen, however, through
shifting usage of the word “état.” In the 1694 edition of the French
Academy’s great dictionary the word meant, among other things, the
status or condition of a person in the sense of whether he was noble or
roturier. In the 1762 edition the definition of the word was almost the
same as earlier, except that there was added, “État means also
Profession…”115 Then, looking up the word “profession,” we find that it
had the current, modern definition at both times, meaning magistracy
(“robe”), surgeon, soldier, lawyer and so on. What was added to the
meaning of “état” was very significant, reflecting a fundamental change in
self-awareness. Almost reflexively, without thinking about it consciously,
contemporaries were coming to associate status and rank with profession,
function, or job. In eighteenth century usage, état in the same sense of
rank or status came increasingly to mean what one did.
Now, at the end of the eighteenth century, when social conflict
grew in intensity, it would have been surprising if men’s occupations had
not had a growing and central place in their thoughts and actions. Where
men stood in the social matrix – the image of ladder is sometimes
misleading – was increasingly tied to the consciousness of themselves as
doctors, engineers, lawyers, shopkeepers, or even as writers. The
framework of understanding tied to categories of noble, bourgeois, and
later proletarian was, and is, relevant, but the sense of conflict defined in
those terms was episodic – the very obsession of Marx and others in the
nineteenth century with problems and difficulties in the formation of class
and revolutionary consciousness suggests that a deeply-rooted reality
disturbing to them lay in a development of quite a different kind, one that
would fragment class along lines of profession. Both things, of course,
were real: broad divisions of wealth, legal status, and privilege, the
background of class conflict, also mattered. But if, in the effort to
understand development from at least the mid-eighteenth century, we
115 Le Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, dedié au roi (Paris, 2 vol.s, 1694),
vol. 1, pp. 402-403; “Estat,” Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, quatrième
édition (Paris, 2 vol.s, 1762), vol. 1, pp. 674-75. [I noted later that the “modern”
definition of état was also in the 1740 edition of the Dictionnaire.]
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combine too frequently, too soon, and too continuously the occupational
categories into the larger ones of class, we are likely to distort the
historical process. In this instance, it is no doubt true that the general level
of awareness of aristocratic assumptions was raised in the background of
the revolution, and in turn, this certainly had much to do with generating
its opposite in democratic and egalitarian revolutionary sentiment. But the
actors in the struggle were not simply roturiers, bourgeois, and nobles;
they were churchmen, magistrates, lawyers, merchants, shoemakers – and
army officers. The associations that they represented need to be
understood as social, as well as professional, groups and fitted into the
model of social conflict. The habits and values of aristocratic society, in
the case examined here, contributed heavily to the forms – exclusion on
the basis of birth, and acceptance of tendencies toward the formation of
caste – that the army thought appropriate to the effort to change itself. In
1789, as today, this effort and these forms seem unacceptable to the large
majority who, differing on other things, share the democratic principles
embedded in the Revolution. But if one wishes to understand the reality of
struggle in 1789 and after, the view that Ségur was no more than the agent
of reactionary gentilshommes who just happened to be in the army,
random expressions of generalized aristocratic reaction, will not get us far.
Instead, it was the specifically military impetus to, and form of, reaction
against other parts of the nobility – a reaction engineered by men whose
sense of their own status was increasingly derived from the institution –
that unwittingly contributed to revolution.
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